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[The arbitral tribunal] proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-law court to develop what it viewed as the 
best rule to applied in such a situation . . [and] the conclusion is inescapable that [it] simply imposed its own 
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When I was first approached to talk on this topic---after of course the initial flush of 
pleasure at having been asked----there set in almost immediately a certain amount of 
uncertainty and indeed apprehension.  I have in fact been trying---with incomplete success---to 
come to terms ever since with everything that lurks behind the announced title--and for that 
matter, with the entire subject matter. 
 
I. The Notion of “Gaps” 
For the notion of a “gap” is an evanescent one, one which can---and often does---mean 
everything and nothing. 
 It could perhaps be said that the very notion of a “gap” is simply incoherent--- that the 
very concept of “silence” or “lack of agreement” is problematical and somewhat naïve---
for once we are satisfied that the parties have entered into a “contract,” there can by 
definition be no “gaps.” Indeed, “by its legal definition a ‘contract’ cannot be 
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incomplete.”2  As Justice Breyer bluffly remarked, there is “no such answer” that a 
contract is “truly silent”---for if “it doesn’t say, you try to figure [it] out.”3  
 
 Or perhaps it could be said that, by contrast, there are nothing but “gaps”---that unless 
the parties have taken the pains to construct an infinite agreement, mapping onto every 
conceivable state of the world, likely or unlikely, known or unknown---a contract that 
stretches out to track the real world as if in a story by Borges---then courts must be free 
to reconstruct or interpolate.4 “If contracts had to be complete, there would be no 
contracts at all.”5  For example: 
  
 Where invitations for bids to supply equipment contain detailed specifications of 
the goods---and notes that certain manufacturers are ”approved sources” or that 
the goods “may be purchased” from them---have the parties said anything at all--
-or have they simply been silent---on the subject of whether the goods must 
actually be manufactured by the named firms so that identical components are 
                                                          
2
 That is, the existing contractual framework is necessarily all-encompassing, providing an answer to any question 
at all that may arise with respect to the rights of the parties:  The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, defines 
“contract” as “the total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement as determined by [the Code],” 
“including all the gap fillers.”  Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”:  Filling Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete 
Contracts, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 389, 399 n. 25.  
3
 The actual dialogue, a little less coherent given the constraints of oral argument, went like this: 
Mr. WAXMAN [counsel for the petitioners]:  There is a separate statutory question that arises if the 
answer to the contract question is [that] there is no meeting of the minds. It is truly silent -- 
JUSTICE BREYER: If there is no such answer--- 
MR. WAXMAN: Excuse me? 
JUSTICE BREYER: I thought, in contracts, there is no such answer. When you interpret a contract and it 
doesn't say, you try to figure out -- I used to be taught that; probably I am way out-of-date---you try to 
figure out what a reasonable party would have intended.  
Oral Argument, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 2009 WL 4662509 at *5.  Cf.  id. at *17 (Justice 
Scalia: “I really don’t understand what it means to say that the contract does not cover it . . . [I]f the contract is 
silent, either the court or the arbitrator has to decide, what is the consequence of that silence, in light of the 
background, in light of implied understandings.”). 
 See also Charles Fried, Contract As Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation 69 (1981) 
(“There is no bare flesh showing, as it were, when relations between persons are not covered by contractual 
clothing. These relations take place under the general mantle of the law”). 
4
 “I once had a case in which the contract was 2000 pages long but did not cover the issue that the parties were 
litigating.” Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1581, 1606 
( 2005). 
5 Daniel Markovits, Contract Law and Legal Methods 667 (2012)(“to address every contingency precisely, would 
increase the costs of contracting so that they came to swamp whatever surplus the contractual exchange 
promised to generate”).  See also Posner, supra n.4 at 1583 (“perfect foresight is infinitely costly,” and “even in a 
setting of perfect foresight, . . . parties may rationally decide not t o  provide for a contingency, preferring to 
economize on negotiation costs by delegating completion of the contract to the courts should the contingency 
materialize”). 
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excluded? If they failed to expressly address the issue, what are the 
consequences?6  
 
 Where the parties have entered into a contract granting a licensee the right to 
produce television shows based on a series of children’s books, is there a “gap” 
in the agreement---that is, have the parties failed to tell the decisionmaker 
whether or not the licensee is permitted to produce and distribute videos---even 
if this is a technology that was “not in existence at the times the rights were 
given”? Have they failed to address the question? 7 
 
 Where the parties have entered into a lease of rooms overlooking the planned 
route of a coronation procession, is  there a “gap” in the agreement---that is, 
have the parties failed to tell the decisionmaker what to do---in the event that the 
King suddenly falls ill with an attack of appendicitis?8  Have they failed to 
address the question? 
 
 Where a father has made a support agreement for the benefit of his minor son, 
agreeing in 1937 to pay him $1200 per year “until [the son] enters “into some 
college, university or higher institution of learning,” is there a “gap” in the 
agreement---have the parties failed to tell the decisionmaker what to do---in the 
case where the son finishes high school and is (since the country is at war) 
immediately inducted into the army?9  If there is a “blind spot” here, have the 
parties failed to address it? 
 
 Where the parties entered into a “requirements” agreement by which the buyer 
would buy “solely” from the seller all his “requirements” of propane for use in its 
fleet of trucks, is there a “gap” in the agreement---have the parties failed to tell 
the decisionmaker what to do---if the buyer suddenly decides not to order any 
propane from the seller at all because he has decided not to convert its fleet to 
propane?10 
 
 Where an agreement lacks any dispute resolution clause, is there a “gap” in the 
agreement with respect to arbitration---that is, have the parties failed to tell us 
whether they are committed anyway to submit future disputes to an arbitral 
                                                          
6
 See WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S., 323 F.2d 874, 879 (Ct. Claims 1964). 
7
 See Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379 (1
st
 Cir. 1993)(“ambiguous phraseology [may ] mask an absence of intent 
rather than a hidden intent which the court simply must ‘find’”); see also Robert Hamilton, Alan Scott Rau, & 
Russell Weintraub, Cases and Materials on Contracts 365 (2
nd
 ed. 1992)(“the occurrence of unexpected events or 
changes in circumstances usually places great strain on language that was drafted with an entirely different (and 
often more modest) problem in mind”).  
8
 Krell v. Henry, [1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.). 
9
 Spaulding v. Morse, 76 N.E.2d 137 (1947) 
10
 Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840 F.2d 1333 (7
th
 Cir. 1988). 
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tribunal?  Is this a matter that the parties have failed to address?  And if so, may 
we be justified in concluding that despite their “silence,” the “gap” should be filled 
with an arbitration clause?11 And if the answer is “yes,” would this be as a result 
of 
 
 an exercise of contractual “interpretation” grounded in their likely intent?12 
 
 the crafting of an alternative “default rule,” grounded in the taken-for-
granted nature of arbitration agreements in international transactions---a 
working presumption that would shift the burden to the objecting party to 
show that no such agreement exists?13  Or by contrast, would it be 
                                                          
11
 Obviously we leave to one side here any requirements touching on the formal validity of such an agreement, a 
subject that has nothing to do with the problem of interpretation.  See Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL 
Secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006, ¶¶ 19-20 (the 
original art. 7 of the Law “was amended in 2006 to better conform to international contract practices”; two options 
are now open to enacting states, both of which permit arbitration agreements to be “entered into in any form (e.g., 
including orally)”).  
12
  Art. 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code is suggestive here.  In the common ‘battle of the forms” scenario, 
an offer may say nothing at all about arbitration---but the second form, which is assumed to be an “acceptance,” 
contains an arbitration clause.  The Code’s contract-formation mechanism will lead to the conclusion that an 
arbitration agreement has nevertheless become part of the contract, at least where the arbitration clause is 
deemed not to be a “material alteration” of the offer.  This question of “material alteration” will hinge on whether 
the clause will cause “unreasonable surprise” or “hardship” to the offeror---and that, in turn, will depend on 
whether arbitration would be outside the scope of usual “trade practice”; see, e.g., Alan Scott Rau et al., 
Processes of Dispute Resolution: The Role of Lawyers  677 (4th ed. 2006) (“the idea seems to be that a clause 
which is sufficiently important and unusual that a party would expect to have his attention specifically directed to 
it, should not come into the contract by way of a form that is by hypothesis commonly unread”); Aceros 
Prefabricados, S.A. v. TradeArbed, Inc., 282 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2002) (“unrebutted evidence that arbitration is 
standard practice within the steel industry” “precludes” the buyer from demonstrating “surprise or hardship”;  
therefore the arbitration provisions in the seller's form became part of the contract); Oceanconnect.com, Inc. v. 
Chemoil Corp., 2008 WL 194360 at *4, *5 (S.D.Tex.) (“numerous cases reflect the frequent use of arbitration in 
maritime contracts”; this “evidence of trade usage and the parties' course of dealing defeats a claim of surprise” 
and thus of “material alteration”). 
 Note that when this becomes a plausible reading, the inference of the offeror’s actual consent to 
arbitration, even though never made explicit, seems irresistible.  
13
  Cf. 1 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration 653 (2009)(“because international arbitration is the 
natural and preferred means of resolving international business disputes,” “there are very serious reasons to 
presume, as a general matter and absent contrary indications, that commercial parties are predisposed to enter 
into international arbitration agreements”). On whether as an empirical matter this suggestion should be treated 
as a “majoritarian default,” compare Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An 
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 Depaul L. Rev. 
335, 351-52 (2007) (studying contracts contained as exhibits to Form 8-K filings with the SEC; while arbitration 
clauses do indeed appear more frequently in international contracts than in domestic ones, nevertheless, “the 
international contracts, like the domestic contracts, contain a low absolute rate of arbitration clauses: only about 
20% of international contracts contain them”), with Christopher Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses 
Use (or Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 433 (2010)(the contracts studied by Eisenberg 
and Miller are not “a reasonable sample of what sophisticated parties specify ex ante regarding arbitration”; 
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 the creation of a wholly new substantive right?14 
(And does it really matter?)  
When we are working through problems like this in the context of arbitration, the difficulties 
become far more acute---for  
 there are our ordinary concerns aimed at giving effect to contractual intention, if we can 
locate it, and these intertwine with  
 
 our concerns aimed at giving effect to the choice of private decisionmakers---that is, at 
preserving the powers that the parties, and thus the state, have entrusted to them.  
I think that with respect to each of these, the values of private autonomy should be mutually 
reinforcing, and thus should tend to lead us in precisely the same direction---but as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
“regulations defining what contracts must be filed along with SEC filings effectively limit the Eisenberg and Miller 
sample to  . . . unusual contracts unlikely to include arbitration clauses while excluding more typical contracts that 
are more likely to provide for arbitration”). 
See also Jack Graves, Court Litigation Over Arbitration Agreements: Is It Time for a New Default Rule?, 
23 Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb. 113 (2012) (“since “arbitration is almost certainly the normative method of resolving 
disputes in the majority of international commercial transactions,” “this normative reality should be recognized 
through a default legal rule providing for arbitration in the absence of any agreement to the contrary”; ”parties to a 
particular contract may be deemed to have impliedly consented to certain majoritarian normative terms”).   
Professor Graves goes on to add that in fact, “as a practical matter,” U.S. courts “have already left 
consent far behind in deciding issues of arbitral jurisdiction”---pointing to the fact that “a party whose contractual 
consent is induced by fraud is deemed to have ‘consented’ to the arbitration clause within the main contract,” Id. 
at 129.  Now I have more or less abandoned, as futile, my longstanding practice of protesting common 
misunderstandings of Prima Paint--- but perhaps just this one last time?  All right:  The notion of “separability” 
does not in the slightest degree suggest that consent to an arbitration clause is “implied”; all it does is to simply 
leave the matter open for a discrete inquiry---allocating to the arbitrator the question of the validity of the overall 
agreement, but reserving to the court the question of consent to the process; see Alan Scott Rau, Everything You 
Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 Amer. Rev. Int'l Arb. 1 
(2003)(“under any sensible reading of Prima Paint, a person is only bound to arbitrate a dispute if he has agreed 
to do so,” and “’agreement’ here has no meaning that is in any way different from the use of the term every day in 
the realm of Contract”; the point is that the possible invalidity of the container contract “will frequently,’ but “need 
not,” affect the validity of the consent to arbitrate).  See also Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and the 
Dimensions of “Consent,” 24 Arb. Int’l 199, 200, 204-06 (2008)(despite “separability,” the question of core consent 
“to arbitrate anything at all” is for the courts). 
14
 Cf.  Giles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract: The Case for Default Arbitration in International Commercial Disputes, 32 
Fordham Int’l L.J. 417 (2009), who suggests that states could “amend their legislation in order to make arbitration 
available in the absence of any agreement on dispute resolution”; supposedly it is one virtue of this model that 
granting parties the right unilaterally to invoke arbitration, would cause arbitration to “lose its contractual 
foundation” altogether. But one consequence is that since the entire “contractual foundation of arbitration 
disappears,” the proposed model “could not benefit from the New York Convention.” Id. at 482.  It is only at this 
point, as I have noted previously, that I begin to detect “considerable analytical confusion,” Alan Scott Rau, 
Understanding (and Misunderstanding) “Primary Jurisdiction,” 21 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 161 fn. 294 (2010); 
bargaining in the presence of known default rules can hardly be deemed non-consensual.  
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epigraph to this paper suggests, not everyone sees it quite that way.  Not long ago the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in reviewing an arbitration award, performed an elaborate riff on the 
significance of “silence” (which I take to be a related metaphor), in an attempt to identify the 
outer limits of arbitral authority in “gap filling”---and with a lack of success that was quite 
dizzying.   
Here by contrast is my “take” on the subject.  I fear that it will be seen right away that the 
approach I take is inescapably that of a common-law lawyer, and what is worse, one tainted 
by, and cabined within, all the Legal Realist attitudes of the 1930’s and 1940’s.  I have 
struggled against this tendency---I have tried to be a philosopher---but you may notice how 
vain the struggle has been.15 
 
II. Fatal “Gaps” and the Role of the Arbitrator 
Now there may exist cases where “gaps” may be so extensive, or so critical, that the 
very notion of private autonomy loses any possible legitimacy. These are the true “gaps”:  Here 
there is a failure of agreement that may be fatal in the sense that---as in some low-budget 
horror film--- the cracks spread so widely as to swallow up any pretense of a contract.16   
Contracts students sometimes refer to such cases as exemplifying a lack of a “meeting of the 
minds”---but then have to be reminded that our “minds” are the least seemly thing that we 
should be talking about.  The point is simply that in the event we should find it impossible to 
construct any story at all with respect to what the parties have agreed to---if there are 
inadequate manifestations of mutual assent---then neither has any right to impose duties on 
the other---and this may be true whether the lack of assent is caused by, 
 a “draftsman’s blind spot” hidden by unconscious assumptions (concentrating on one 
problem to the point that no attention is paid to other potential problems);  
 
 an unsuspected latent ambiguity leaving the parties at cross purposes;17 
                                                          
15
 Dr. Johnson was once reunited with a boyhood friend whom he had not seen in many years.  “I have tried too in 
my time,” said his friend, “to be a philosopher, but I don’t know how, cheerfulness was always breaking in.” James 
Boswell, 2 The Life of Samuel Johnson 212 (Everyman ed. 1992). 
16
 Cf. WPC Enterprises, Inc., supra n. 6 (“there was no subjective coming-together, it is true, but an enforceable 
agreement came into being nevertheless”; “it is a normal characteristic” of this class of cases that the “gap 
has not been permitted to swallow the whole contract except perhaps where the gulf is far closer to the 
bounds of the entire consensual perimeter than here”).   
17
 See, e.g., Restatement of Contracts, Second, §20 (“There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange 
if the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations and (a) neither party knows or has reason 
to know the meaning attached by the other; or (b) each party knows or each party has reason to know the 
meaning attached by the other.”) .  Or, perhaps, putting them in the position of the proverbial “ships that pass in 
the night,” as in the classic case of Raffles v. Wichelaus, (1864] EWHC Exch J19 (“contract” called for the delivery 
of cotton “to arrive ex Peerless from Bombay,” but neither party apparently realized that there were two ships of 
that name,. one departing in October and the other departing in December). 
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 a willingness to be content with amorphous, meaningless formulae expressive of 
nothing but a vague benevolent intention,18 
 
 or, more troublingly, by a conscious preference to set aside remote but 
potentially troublesome contingencies in the hope that they will simply go 
away---or that if necessary, a court can be found to make the difficult choices 
that the parties themselves would rather avoid.19 
 
 These are all cases on the margins of contractual behavior, or indeed at its 
outer limits---and there are doubtless far fewer of such cases than there used to be. In any 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 Endless variations: One is presented by a case like WPC Enterprises, Inc., supra n. 6:  Here, the parties’ 
different interpretations had in fact surfaced prior to contracting---but a higher-level misunderstanding occurred; 
“compounding that confusion, they discussed the issue with each other in such a way that each thought, but this 
time without good reason, it had obtained the other’s acquiescence in its chosen reading. The impasse became 
unmistakably plain when it was too late.”   
And sometimes, by contrast, the parties may equally be at cross purposes when such “mutually-
reinforced obscurity” is absent---that is, they may at all times remain painfully aware of their contradictory 
understandings of a contractual term. In such circumstances the Restatement seems to suggest that there is a 
lack of mutual assent and thus an absence of any enforceable contractual obligation.  This was the fact pattern in 
LCC v. Henry Boot & Sons, [1959] 1 W.L.R. 1069) (H.L.):  In a contract for the construction of apartment 
buildings, the question was presented whether an escalator clause calling for an increase in payments in the 
event of increases in the “rates of wages” included increases in the costs of “holiday stamps.”  The parties 
had entered into the contract “both perfectly aware of their opposing views on the subject,” but the House of 
Lords bluffly rejected the assertion that on account of this difference of views “there was no consensus ad 
idem.” 
18
 See, e.g., Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822 (1916)(“if you boys will go on and continue the way you have been 
and get me out of this trouble and get these jobs started that were in the office three years, on the 1
st
 of next 
January I will close my books and give you a fair share of my profits”; held, this is “not only uncertain, but [s] 
necessary affected by so many other facts that are in themselves indefinite and uncertain that the intention of the 
parties is pure conjecture”; “the courts cannot aid parties in such a case when they are unable or unwilling to 
agree upon the terms of their own proposed contract”). 
19
 See, e.g., Joseph Martin Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 417 N.E.2d 541 (N.Y. 1981)(“Tenant may renew 
this lease for an additional period of five years at annual rentals to be agreed upon”; held, tenant’s action for 
specific performance dismissed; the renewal clause contains no “methodology for determining the rent,” nor does 
it “invite recourse to an objective extrinsic event, condition, or standard on which the amount was made to 
depend”; “neither tenant nor landlord is bound to any formula”). 
I say these cases are “more troubling” because while courts are increasingly willing to enforce contracts 
despite the fact that material terms may have been left open, the fact that the parties have expressly identified a 
possible hurdle to agreement may suggest that they were unwilling to submit to a term supplied by some third 
party; cf. Markovits, supra n.5 at 702 (“it is one thing for the parties to a negotiation simply to leave a term out on 
their way to agreement, it is quite another for them to agree to postpone negotiations concerning a term and to 
proceed to other facets of their negotiations, subject to subsequent agreement on the postponed matter”); Ben-
Shahar, supra n. 2 at 395 (with “agreements to agree” “it is not the materiality of the terms per se that prevents 
gap filling, but rather the fact that the parties explicitly identified them as the subject matter for further affirmative 
agreement,” creating the possible inference that “they do not yet intend to be bound”). 
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event a rather naive “contract/no contract” dichotomy is infinitely less interesting than two 
related points which are critical to our discussion: 
 
1.  As a doctrinal matter, in normal discourse, a challenge on any of these grounds, if 
taken seriously, would suggest that there simply “exists” “no agreement to which the 
parties could be bound”--or so commentators regularly tell us.20  But despite the 
continuing cackle that gravely insists on the formalistic and conceptual distinction 
between notions of “existence” and of “validity”21---and despite ineradicable 
                                                          
20
 E.g.,. Marvin A. Chirelstein, Concepts and Case Analysis in the Law of Contracts 35 (3
rd
 ed. 1998).  Cf. G. Rau 
et al., Cours de Droit Civil Français [Aubry & Rau] 180 & fn. 3 (5th ed. 1897)(«We must not confuse transactions 
that are void [nuls] with those that are non-existent [inexistants ou non avenus]. . . If there are missing those 
factual elements that are presupposed by the very nature of the transaction---if it is logically impossible even to 
imagine the existence of the transaction in the absence of those elements- ---then we have a transaction that is 
not only void, but one that simply never existed. . . . So for example one cannot conceive of a contract without the 
agreement of the parties, nor a sale without the goods sold or without a price »). 
21
 I have written that “ingenious riffs on the metaphysical distinction between contract ‘invalidity’ and contract 
‘nonexistence’ have long been a stable of Continental legal learning.” “Its tendency to take metaphor for reality, its 
personification of legal concepts, its characterization of doctrine in terms of what is ‘unthinkable’ or ‘logically 
impossible’---all of this exemplifies the worst excesses of formalism.”  “Separability” in the United States Supreme 
Court, 2006:1 Stockholm Int’l Arb. Rev. 1, 18; see also id. at 19 (“the whole notion of ‘nonexistence’ is not only 
sterile and purely verbal---but what is worse, is completely unnecessary”).  For examples, see Pieter Sanders, 
L’autonomie de la clause compromissoire, in Hommage à Frédéric Eisemann 31, 34-35 (1978) (one must 
distinguish between the “invalidity” [nullité] of the contract and the “complete absence [inexistence] of the 
contract”; “if there is no contract at all, any legal foundation for the powers of the arbitrators is equally lacking”); 
Eric Loquin, Note [to Société Pia Investments v. Société L & B Cassia, Cour de Cassation 1990], 1992 J. Droit 
Int’l (Clunet) 170, 173 (“the arbitration clause [can] have no existence when the contract, which contains it, [is] 
itself non-existent”; “it is difficult to see [sic] how the parties could have bound themselves to arbitrate over a 
contract to which they had never consented”); Sojuznefteexport v. Joc Oil Ltd. (Bermuda), 15 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 
384, 406, 430 (1990) (Ct. of App. Bermuda 1989)(“borrowing Prospero's language, was the sale contract the 
baseless fabric of a vision, insubstantial (i.e., non-existent) or was it in the more prosaic language of the law, 
something which mundane lawyers describe as an invalid contract?”). 
 Happily, French jurisprudence and doctrine do seem in recent years to have retreated from such 
conceptualism. See Société Omenex v. Hugon, [2006] Rev. de l’Arb. 103, 105 (Cour de Cassation Oct. 25, 
2005)(given the “autonomy” of the arbitration clause in international transactions, “neither the invalidity nor the 
inexistence of the container contract affect it”); Jean-Baptiste Racine, Note, id. at 106, 124 (a “turnaround” in the 
case law; it must now be considered a “given” [acquise] in French arbitration law that a claim alleging the non-
existence of the main contract does not impair the jurisdiction of the arbitrator; “the non-existence of the main 
contract cannot automatically be thought to adversely affect the arbitration clause”).    
 But then, curiously, we seem to find it resurfacing again, zombie-like, in the United States; see 
Restatement of the Law Third, The U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration § 4-12(d) & cmt. d 
(Preliminary Draft No. 5, Sept. 1, 2011), which lays down the rule that while “a court does not review the arbitral 
tribunal’s determination of the validity of a contract that includes the arbitration agreement,” nevertheless, “a court 
reviews de novo . . . the existence of the contract that includes the arbitration agreement.” “Such challenges 
necessarily implicate a party’s assent to arbitration, and hence a court has the final say.”  I must say that with all 
respect I strenuously disagree.  It is just as facile to assume a priori that defects in the main agreement must 
vitiate the arbitration clause, as to assume that they cannot.  In other words, “logic”—as usual—will take us 
precisely nowhere.  See generally Rau, “Separability,” supra n. 13 at 38-45 (“void, schmoid”).  As the discussion 
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misunderstandings with respect to the implications of “separability”---such 
challenges must not be taken to impair any contractual duty to arbitrate---and so 
they should be entrusted to the arbitrators themselves for decision:   
 
After all, parties who had repressed (or deferred consideration of) possible 
ambiguities, might still plausibly have gambled that should an ambiguity surface, 
they would be able to persuade the ultimate decisionmaker of the merits of their own 
interpretation---and might plausibly have preferred this decisionmaker to be an 
arbitrator. Contracting parties might have been willing to arbitrate---not only the 
existence of a breach of contract---but also whether the terms of the alleged contract 
were too indefinite to give rise to a breach in the first place.  The only interesting 
question in any of these cases is the likely boundaries of contractual assent, and a 
claim that an enforceable agreement “was never concluded” need not prevent the 
inference that the parties would have wanted to entrust that very question to 
arbitrators chosen by them.  In the words of Judge Easterbrook, “if they have agreed 
on nothing else they have agreed to arbitrate.”22  
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
in the text and in the following footnote demonstrates, it is simply not true that a claimed lack of contract formation 
must always, and by definition, include a claim that the resisting party also did not agree to the arbitration clause.  
22
 Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. All American Ins. Co., 256 F.3d 587, 591-92 (7
th
 Cir. 2001); Judge Easterbrook was 
referring there to Colfax Envelope Corp. v. Local No. 458-3M, Chicago Graphic Communications Int'l Union, 20 
F.3d 750 (7
th
 Cir. 1994)(Posner, J.).  In Colfax an employer and a union disagreed over the meaning of the term 
“4C 60 inches Press-3 Men” in a collective bargaining agreement; the employer believed the language meant—in 
contrast to past practice—that only 3 men would be required to man any of its 78” wide four-color presses; the 
union interpreted the language to refer only to presses 60” and under. The employer sought a judicial declaration 
that no contract existed “because the parties never agreed on an essential term”; the union counterclaimed for an 
order to arbitrate. The court affirmed an order of summary judgment in favor of the union: “Even if” there was no 
“meeting of the minds” on the meaning of this critical term, at the least “there was a meeting of the minds on the 
mode of arbitrating disputes between the parties.”  
Similarly, in Bratt Enterprises, Inc. v. Noble Int'l Ltd., 99 F.Supp.2d 874 (S.D. Ohio 2000), rev’d on other 
grounds, 338 F.3d 609 (6
th
 Cir. 2003), the contract provided that the purchase price of certain assets would be 
adjusted following the closing as a result of certain later expenditures, and “due to the uncertainty associated with 
this post-Closing adjustment, the Parties included an arbitration clause in the Purchase Agreement to resolve any 
disputes associated with this adjustment.” One party later asserted a defense of “mutual mistake” regarding the 
drafting of this portion of the agreement; nevertheless the court pointed out that there was no claim at all “that 
there was any ‘mutual mistake’ in the negotiation of the arbitration clause itself.” 
Precisely the same analysis is applicable in related cases of indefiniteness or “agreement to agree.” See, 
e.g., Toray Industries Inc. v. Aquafil S.p.a., 17(10) INT'L ARB. REP. Oct. 2002 at D-1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 2002)(parties 
signed a document that one party contends “was no more than agreement to agree and that the parties intended 
to negotiate further”; held, “the parties have agreed to arbitrate”—the parties “actively negotiated the choice of law 
and arbitration clause,” which was not “inadvertently slipped in”—and so the arbitrators “will determine all 
questions including the meaning, effect, validity or enforceability of all other contract terms”); Republic of 
Nicaragua v. Standard Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469 (9
th
 Cir. 1991)(in determining whether a “Memorandum of Intent” 
was a “binding contract for the purchase and sale of bananas, or merely an ‘agreement to agree’ at some later 
date,” the trial court “improperly looked to the validity of the contract as a whole” and “ignored strong evidence in 
the record that both parties intended to be bound by the arbitration clause”; court should instead have “considered 
only the validity and scope of the arbitration clause itself”); W. Laurence Craig et al., International Chamber of 
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2. A separate point is that whoever the appropriate decisionmaker may be, such 
challenges are increasingly unlikely to succeed, particularly where the putative 
defect is one of uncertainty and indefiniteness.   
 
a. At bottom, when you come to think about it, there is really nothing particularly 
recherché in the practice of creating entirely new contract terms through 
adjudication: When it is alleged that a failure of agreement has caused a deal to 
be insufficiently defined to be enforceable as a contract, judges, let alone 
arbitrators, will already and frequently do precisely that. The fact that they will 
often do so covertly, under the guise of interpretation--as an increasingly 
preferred alternative to allowing the gap to “swallow up” everything that has in 
fact been settled on--in no way changes the principle.  
 
So despite the traditional wisdom familiar to every first-year student--to the effect 
that courts will not “make a contract for the parties” or enforce arrangements 
where they have merely “agreed to agree”23--we can see a growing judicial 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Commerce Arbitration 165 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing case in which a “contract would have been null under French 
law if the price had not been specifically fixed or determinable by objective reference,” but arbitration clause was 
unaffected by the alleged nullity; the arbitrators then went on to determine that the contract was invalid because 
the price was indeterminate) 
 In light of all this, Judge Easterbrook’s earlier opinion in Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc. v. Fru-Con 
Construction Corp., 101 F.3d 63 (7
th
 Cir. 1996) is puzzling and troubling.  Here Fru-Con agreed to renovate and 
enlarge a pet food plant on a cost-plus basis, but the parties ultimately failed to agree on some fundamental 
issues, notably “how ‘cost’ would be defined”. The district court concluded that the parties “never came to closure 
on all terms” of the agreement and they therefore “had not agreed on anything at all, precluding the possibility of 
arbitration.”  But the court of appeals did not agree, ruling instead that  
 in circumstances where the parties have begun performance with some issues still be resolved, they do 
have an agreement that  
 at least “includes all of the terms that have been mutually approved.”   
So, there was indeed an agreement to arbitrate. Nevertheless the lower court’s refusal to compel arbitration was 
affirmed: The dispute over which the lawsuit had been filed “were the very items over which negotiations [had] 
collapsed”; since “these were issues left open at the bargaining table,” “the arbitration clause, although part of the 
parties’ agreement, does not come into play.” I could certainly use some help understanding this---please: 
 Given the premise of an enforceable agreement to arbitrate,  isn’t the question whether “a contract had 
been formed in the first place” properly one that falls to be decided by the arbitrators themselves? 
 If the arbitrators find that some contract has been entered into, isn’t it for them to determine the precise 
terms? 
 What can it possibly mean as a practical matter to allocate decisionmaking responsibility by saying 
respectively that “some terms” are indeed subject to arbitration---“the portions of the draft master 
agreement on which the parties agreed”--- but that other terms---like those over which the negotiations 
happened to abort---are not arbitrable at all? 
 Is the suggestion, then, that “to the extent there has been a failure to agree, the arbitrators are rendered 
impotent”---and if so, is this not an eerie precursor to Stolt-Nielsen? 
23
 See, e.g., Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc., supra n. 19 at 543  (“Before the power of law can be invoked to 
enforce a promise, it must be sufficiently certain and specific so that what was promised can be ascertained. 
Otherwise, a court, in intervening, would be imposing its own conception of what the parties should or might have 
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willingness to fill consensual gaps in an honest effort to uncover or even 
reconstruct the parties' original narrative.24  
 
b. But the challenge is far less likely to succeed---the challenge is a fortiori going 
nowhere---where we can make this further step:  Perhaps we can conclude that if 
any “gap” appears---however fatal it would otherwise be---the parties 
contemplated that the defective agreement could be salvaged---the missing terms 
filled in---by the arbitral tribunal itself.  
 
Let’s begin at the beginning:  The traditional reluctance of courts to enforce 
inadequately specified agreements---their traditional recital of their inability to 
“make a contract for the parties”--- presumably serves certain funct ions 
and purposes,  no? It  certa in ly has to come f rom somewhere.  An a 
pr ior i  assert ion is not argument. 25  I  think i t  must der ive f rom 
pol icies l ike th is : When courts continue to insist on a certain level of clarity 
and completeness in the terms of a contract, an economist would say that they 
are attempting to insure that the deal is “allocatively efficient”-- roughly, that it 
serves to reallocate resources to higher-valued uses--and that they do so by 
assuring that the deal has been bargained out by the parties themselves, in 
terms of their own assessments of their own interests. They may also be trying to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
undertaken, rather than confining itself to the implementation of a bargain to which they have mutually committed 
themselves”). 
24 Compare Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923)--a 
wooden mainstay of the Contracts curriculum of a generation ago--with David Nassif Associates v. United States, 
557 F.2d 249 (Ct. Cl. 1977).  See also U.C.C. §§ 2-204(3), 2-305.  Joseph Martin, supra n. 19, distinguished 
Sales cases decided both prior to and subsequent to the UCC on the grounds of “the more fluid sales setting in 
which [they] occurred”; by contrast, said the court, “stability is a hallmark of the law controlling” transactions in real 
estate.  
 Other legal cultures may in this respect be---if not indeed more adventuresome---at least more frank in 
openly acknowledging what they are doing. See, e.g., Sir Basil Markesinis et al., The German Law of Contract: A 
Comparative Treatise 59-60  (2
nd
 ed. 2006)(“the net of default rules is wider in German than it is in English law 
and one practical consequence of this is that the parties need not attempt to anticipate in the contractual drafts all 
eventualities”; even essential  terms like price can be left to “be fixed at a later stage,” and “the court is 
empowered to review the exercise of discretion of the contracting party . . . and if necessary replace it with its own 
determination”); see also id. at 140, 143 (the default rule of “good faith” “empower[s] the courts to imply into the 
contract a wide range of collateral obligations”; doing this work of implication “enabled the courts to transcend the 
actual intentions of the parties and imply terms, not which the parties would have included, but which they should 
have included in the contract”)(emphasis in original); Stefan Kröll, Contractual Gap-Filling by Arbitration Tribunals, 
[1999] Int. Arb. L. R. 9, 13 (so “fixing of a price at the judge’s discretion must therefore be considered as dispute-
settlement in the German legal system”).   
25
 But see Pieter Sanders, Arbitration in Long-Term Business Transactions, in  Proceedings, Vth International 
Arbitration Congress (New Delhi, 1975) at C.Ivb1, 2 ( “courts are . . . nowhere, as far as I know, authorized to fill 
gaps and supplement the agreement of the parties by filling in . . . open spots,” and “many (national) arbitration 
laws of the world are based on the principle that the power of the arbitrators cannot reach further than the power 
of the Courts”; to complete the syllogism, then, this is not “arbitration proper”). 
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prevent parties from taking a “free ride” on the public court system by shifting 
onto the courts the burden of determining contract terms.26 
But then, after all, none of these concerns applies with anything like their original 
force when the parties have chosen to entrust the power to fix terms to 
 
 private decisionmakers--chosen by them, as their surrogates, with 
reference to their agents’ training, background, experience, and 
presumed sensitivity to commercial realities;27   
 
 and all this, of course, in a procedure for which they themselves have 
agreed to bear the costs. 
 
In a sense then an arbitrator’s decision, being itself an “instance of contractual 
gap-filling, just is a term of the parties’ contract.”28 
It is thus a familiar proposition that what might otherwise be a fatal “uncertainty” 
of terms can be cured simply by adding an arbitration clause.29 When the parties 
                                                          
26
  See generally Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 Tex. Int’l L.J. 
449, 476-77 (2005).See also Posner, supra n. 4 at 1587 (interpolating a “reasonable term” is often rejected as too 
burdensome; “not only would the court incur the administrative cost of having to conduct an elaborate inquiry, but 
no matter how elaborate the inquiry, a substantial probability of error would remain, and an erroneous 
interpretation undermines the utility of contracting as a method of organizing economic activity”). 
27 One might also suppose that arbitrators--often chosen precisely for their familiarity with the commercial context 
of a dispute--are likely to be somewhat more attuned to the dangers of one party's opportunistic behavior in the 
wake of the other's change of position, and more inclined to police it. Cf. Juliet P. Kostritsky, Taxonomy for 
Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World: What To Do When Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or 
Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts, 2004 Wisc. L. Rev. 323, 364, 368, 377 (in the presence of uncertainty, sunk 
costs, and opportunism, “it becomes difficult to solve problems by contract ex ante,” and parties may instead “turn 
to private ordering and alternative mechanisms of private ‘governance structures' as the most efficient means of 
solving their problems and maximizing the gains from trade”; “[t]he presence of a comprehensive structure of 
nonlegal sanctions lessens the reason for court intervention”). 
28
 Markovits, supra n.5 at 1346. See also id. at 1347 (arbitration “does not so much contractualize adjudication as 
replace adjudication and the adjudicatory process with contract tout court”; it “is not a process for deciding the 
content of independent legal entitlements at all, but rather a part of the substance of the contracts that create it, a 
means of fixing the content of contractual rights”). [Professor Markovits focuses his discussion here on what he 
terms “first-party arbitration,” a formulation that I believe is intended to capture the idea of, “arbitration without 
third-party effects”]. 
29 See, e.g., Lafayette Place Assocs. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 694 N.E.2d 820, 826-27 (Mass. 1998) 
(although the contract left undetermined “exactly what [was] to be included” in the parcel of land being sold as 
well as the price, it also specified that “‘appropriate details of the purchase and sale...shall be resolved be 
arbitration,”’ and thus “created a means for resolving disputes that might arise in the course of effecting the 
ultimate sale”; “[t]o borrow Justice Holmes's metaphor, the machinery was built and had merely to be set in 
motion”); ”); see also Leslie v. Leslie, 24 A. 319 (N.J. Ch. 1892). Disputes between the two owners of a close 
corporation “became so bitter and dangerous to its prosperity” that they wished to separate, with one of them 
retiring from all participation in the company's affairs. “But which should sell--who should go out--was the point of 
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agree to participate in this procedure, they may, even in commercial cases, be 
said to be taking part in a process that “involves not only the settlement of the 
particular dispute but also interstitial rule-making”--a process aimed at creating, 
refining, and elaborating for the future the rules which will govern their 
relationship.30  At the same time, of course, such clauses---despite being labeled 
as “arbitration”---often exist precisely as a means of encouraging the parties’ own 
voluntary efforts at renegotiation and readjustment.  The right to invoke the 
arbitral process is there to make settlement more likely---as would indeed the 
right to force one’s opponent into a game of Russian Roulette---that is, “as a spur 
toward a negotiated agreement,” although inserted in the “fervent hope” that it 
will not ultimately be necessary to resort to it.31   
 
One common setting in which this problem arises is where the apparent need 
arises to “adapt” the terms of ongoing contracts to new and unforeseen 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
difficulty about which they could not agree.” So they “were willing to leave the question as to which one should 
retire by the sale of his stock, and what the other should pay him for his stock, to be settled by arbitration.” Id. at 
321. (The court ultimately vacated the award, though, because it had purported to decide matters not submitted to 
the arbitrators, and because it was “uncertain and inconclusive”). 
The contrast suggested here is made abundantly explicit in a number of judicial decisions; e.g., Walker v. 
Keith, 382 S.W.2d 198, 199-200, 202, 204 (Ky. App. 1964) (lease provided that rental was to be fixed “as shall 
actually be agreed upon” by the parties and to be based on “comparative business conditions”; held, provision 
was too “indefinite and uncertain” to enforce; such provisions “have been the source of interminable litigation” and 
“courts sometimes must assert their right not to be imposed upon”; however, if the parties “had agreed upon a 
specific method of making the determination,” such as the decision of an arbitrator, “they could be said to have 
agreed upon whatever rent figure emerged from utilization of the method).  More recently, see 1651 North Collins 
Corp. v. Laboratory Corp. of America, 529 Fed. Appx. 628 (6
th
 Cir. 2013)(option to renew lease at “the then 
market rent for similar space in the Louisville area, but not less than the immediately preceding five-year period”; 
held, the renewal option is not enforceable; the rental provision “is still too ambiguous to qualify as a definite 
objective standard”; the landlord “could have solved this problem by submitting the question of what constituted a 
‘market rent’ to arbitration, as the original lease agreement contemplates, but it did not do so”). 
30
  Cf. David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 663, 744 
(1973)(labor arbitration). 
 Here is something else, related, though not the principal subject of the present paper:  How often do we 
see arbitrators “create a new term of the contract”---even a term inconsistent with the original agreement---once 
liability has been determined, and such action can be spun (or framed) as an essential remedy needed in order to 
preserve the overall framework---the overall allocation of risks---implicit in the deal?  See, e.g., Timegate Studios, 
Inc. v. Southpeak Interactive, L.L.C., 713 F.3d 797 (5
th
 Cir. 2013)(as a remedy for breach of contract and fraud 
committed by the publisher of a video game, the award provided that ”the Publishing Agreement is hereby 
amended as a matter of law [so that the claimant has] a perpetual license for [the defendant’s] intellectual 
property in the Game”; held, this was “ a remedy that furthered the essence of the” agreement, and “was 
permissible and rationally explainable as a logical means of furthering the aims of the underlying publishing 
agreement”); Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 885 P.2d 994 (Cal. 1994)(arbitrator found that Intel had 
"breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" under a license agreement; AMD's actual damages 
were found to be "immeasurable,” so the arbitrator gave AMD a permanent, royalty-free license to any of Intel's 
intellectual property that was embodied in AMD's competing chip).  
31
 See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 406-07 (1978)(in “complex long-
term supply contracts,” “obligations to negotiate under  the threat of an exercise of adjudicative powers”). 
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conditions. Consider---dating back to 1975---the Georgia Power case, in which a 
coal company entered into a ten-year contract to supply coal to a buyer 
company.32  There was a base price per ton, and a provision for the calculation of 
adjustments upon changes in certain labor costs and in “governmental 
impositions.”  The agreement also provided that: 
 
[A]ny gross proven inequity that may result in unusual economic 
conditions not contemplated by the parties, at the time of the execution of 
this Agreement may be corrected by mutual consent. Each party shall in 
the case of a claim of gross inequity furnish the other with whatever 
documentary evidence may be necessary to assist in effecting a 
settlement.  
 
And “any unresolved controversy between the parties arising under this 
Agreement” was to be settled by arbitration. Four years later, after a rapid 
escalation in prices, the open market price of coal of the same quality was more 
than three times the current adjusted base price under the agreement. The buyer 
predictably argued that in light of the contract language suggesting the need for 
“mutual consent,” submitting the question of price adjustment to arbitration would 
be equivalent to empowering the arbitrator “to make a new contract for the 
parties.” But arbitration was compelled nevertheless. 
 
More recently, price-review mechanisms, “inserted in most long-term natural gas 
sales agreements,” provide a conventional and familiar analogue---responsive to 
the well-known facts that in long-term commodity sales agreements a “fixed price 
for 15-20 years is usually unrealistic,” and that even an agreed pricing formula 
may, if unaltered, “reflect a risk that is unacceptable to both of the parties.”33 
 
Now I suppose it is marginally more convenient---more reassuring for the timid---
to find consent to arbitrate when the process is used 
 
                                                          
32
 Georgia Power Co. v. Cimarron Coal Corp., 526 F.2d 101 (6th Cir.1975). 
33
 See Ben Holland & Phillip Spencer Ashley, Natural Gas Price Reviews:  Past, Present and Future, 30 J. of 
Energy & Natural Resources L. 29-31 (2012).  See also id. at 34:  A clause suggested as a “typical price review 
clause” might provide: 
If a circumstance beyond the control of either party results in a significant change in the energy market of 
the Buyer compared to such energy market on [date], then either party may give notice for a price review. 
If the parties fail to agree a revised price formula within 90 days after giving notice for a price review,  the 
price formula shall be reviewed by arbitration.  In any such arbitration the arbitrator s shall review the 
price formula and shall decide whether it needs to be revised to reflect, as at the review date, the relevant 
significant change(s) in the energy market of the Buyer which affect the value of [the product] in the end 
user market of the Buyer as such value can directly or indirectly be obtained by a prudent and efficient 
buyer.  
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• as part of an ongoing, existing contract--to provide a “backup” for a 
failure of future assent in circumstances expressly contemplated by the 
parties--than when it is used 
 
• to create an essential term of the contract in circumstances where there 
has been “no agreement” in the first place. 
 
Only in the former case one can say (as the court did in Georgia Power), that 
since the parties “remain bound to continued operations under the contract,” “the 
controversy over a claimed right to price adjustment must be settled somehow in 
the absence of mutual consent.”  But note how neatly this conclusory formulation 
(the “right to price adjustment”) begs the question---for the contractual foundation 
of any such “right” is the very question that is up for grabs.  The case illustrates, 
then, how difficult it may be satisfactorily to distinguish 
 
 a dispute over the scope of existing contract “rights”---asking the 
decisionmaker to do the necessary interpretive work of worrying the 
agreement, digging out what is already present in germ--and  
 
 an “interest” dispute---asking the decisionmaker to devise the actual 
contract provisions by which the parties will henceforth be bound.34 
 
And the lesson of course is how often the supposed distinction may be—as, after 
all, are most distinctions in the law—at best, and charitably, a mere question of 
emphasis or degree.  A clause of the sort found in the contract in Georgia Power 
may render the question of arbitral authority marginally easier to resolve, but 
hardly provides a basis for a difference in principle---and matters of degree 
should not be turned into matters of principle without some compelling reason to 
                                                          
34
 For a case quite similar to Georgia Power---although  
 one that seems much closer along the line to the latter of these categories than to the former----  
 and with absolutely no significance to be attributed to the distinction--- 
see Aeronaves de Mexico, S.A. v. Triangle Aviation Services, Inc., 389 F.Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff’d per 
curiam, 515 F.2d 504 (2
nd
 Cir. 1975). Here a contract for the servicing of aircraft provided that if the changes in 
the “volume of flights, aircraft types, arrival/departure times, or cargo load factors” caused “additional manpower 
and equipment [to] be required,” “an increase in the charges will be negotiated to the satisfaction of both parties.”  
Again the inevitable claim was made that an arbitrator under the arbitration clause “could not be expected to write 
a renewal contract for the parties.”  But the court noted that “it is precisely such questions in specialized 
commercial dealings of this sort that are especially adapted to resolution by commercial men as arbitrators.”  And 
so “a failure to agree would give rise to an arbitrable controversy”---or “[a]t least, the arbitrators could so 
conclude.”   
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do so. Given a core consent to the process, and a sufficiently broad mandate, the 
role of the arbitrator is in both cases more or less identical. 35  
 
c. This notion of curing fatal “uncertainty” through arbitral discretion may not be 
viewed quite so complaisantly in legal cultures which are somewhat more reticent 
in accepting all the implications of arbitration as an expression of private 
autonomy---and where in consequence, the potential of the arbitral process is 
cabined more tightly---the powers of arbitrators closely identified with, mapped 
upon, the sphere of action permitted to state courts.36   
 
Indeed the authority of arbitrators in the United States to construe contracts so 
as to fill gaps in insufficiently specified agreements, may be treated as 
noteworthy and unusual in other states, where it is customary to indulge in 
sophisticated and rigorous exercises in taxonomy aimed at classifying just 
what an arbitration “really” “is.”37  A highly conceptual Continental 
jurisprudence frequently leads to the conclusion that someone who has 
been asked merely to supply a term in a contract just “can’t be” an 
arbitrator at all.38  But I would suggest that the notion of a “dispute”---if this is, 
                                                          
35
 Stefan Kröll notes that “in theory” arbitrators may not “create new obligations for the parties” but may only 
“determine existing rights” which---while perhaps not “immediately apparent”---“at least in theory already existed 
before the arbitrators intervened.” Kröll, supra n. 24 at 10.  But the thrust of his argument seems to suggest----
quite correctly---that such a “distinction” will not bear the weight of practical application.  I return to this point at the 
end of this paper in my Conclusion; see text accompanying nn. 207-211 infra. 
36 A good illustration of this point is Société S.E.C.A.R. v. Société Shopping Décor, 1986 Rev. de l'Arb. 263 (Cour 
de Cassation, 1984). Here a commercial lease provided for the rental to be fixed in terms of a construction cost 
index; if the index were no longer to be published, and if the parties could not agree on a substitute, it was 
provided that an alternative index could be chosen by an “arbitrator.” A lower court vacated the award on the 
grounds of public policy, but was reversed by the Cour de Cassation. Professor Mayer doubts, however, whether 
this should have even been characterized as an “arbitration” in the first place: 
Courts--claiming to interpret the will of the parties--have assumed the power in such cases to determine 
the index that the parties would have adopted, if the one that has disappeared had never existed. But 
when [the parties explicitly provide for such a case in their contract, as they have here,] that excludes any 
possibility of discovering some implicit intention in the contract.... From that moment the role of the neutral 
is not to interpret, but to freely create, and this role cannot be taken on by a judge--nor, as a 
consequence, by an arbitrator. 
Pierre Mayer, Note, 1986 Rev. de l'Arb. 267, 270(my translation, and my emphasis). 
37
 See, e.g., Charles Jarrosson, La notion de l’arbitrage 303 (1987); cf. Philippe Fouchard et al., Traité de 
l’arbitrage commercial international 15 (1996)(“a comparative law study will indicate that the distinctions of French 
law [with respect to the question whether we ‘are in the presence of a true arbitration’] are not observed with quite 
the same rigor in certain other legal systems”).. 
38 I gather that in some legal systems, the law revolves around a dichotomy that I have already deprecated as 
largely formalistic and non-functional. In such cultures, 
 it may be permissible for an arbitrator---at least one “appointed as such,” or “whom [the parties] 
describe as such”---who has been charged with a general submission, to supply an omitted term as 
part of his overall mission; see Jean-Louis Delvolvé et al., French Arbitration Law and Practice: A 
Dynamic Civil Law Approach to International Arbitration 24 (2
nd
 ed. 2009); cf. Giorgio Bernini, 
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Techniques for Resolving Problems in Forming and Performing Long-Term Contracts, in 
Proceedings, supra n.25 at C.Iva1, 11,15 (here the neutral is not “filling blanks” left open by the 
parties ab initio,” but instead “settl[ing] disputes arising from divergent party views over the exact 
impact the rebus sic stantibus clause will have” on the original contract; this is a function “which is 
strictly arbitral in nature”). 
 But at the same time, I gather, someone asked merely to come up with a term---even in a binding 
fashion---in order to permit “a contract” to come into existence in the first place---is simply not an 
arbitrator.  
This is a familiar distinction; see, e.g., ICC Partial Award no. 7544 (1995), [1999] J.D.I. 1062 (adjustment of price 
in case of change order; contract provided that failing agreement by the parties, the price should be “provisionally 
fixed by the Engineer, then definitively fixed by an arbitral tribunal”); see id. at 1064, 1066 (note D.H.)(“the role of 
the arbitral tribunal was not exercised in the context of contract formation, in order to determine an essential 
element of the agreement, but in the course of contractual performance”).   
 It explains the a priori assumption in much Continental commentary that when a third party is asked to fix 
the price in a contract of sale, this “is absolutely not” arbitration---“not at all.”  Authorization for such a third-party 
determination is given, for example, in art. 1592 of the French Code Civil: In a contract of sale “the price must be 
fixed and stated by the parties,” although the price “can nevertheless be left to the determination [arbitrage] of a 
third party”; if the third party cannot or is not willing to fix the price, “there is no sale”.  Apparently such a third 
party is nothing but an “agent” whose task is “easily distinguishable” from arbitration; the difference lies in the fact 
that his setting of the price is necessary to the “formation of a contract” by fixing one of its “essential elements”--
that is, “an element without which a contract cannot validly exist”---but which now “enables [the contract] to come 
into existence.” See Jarrosson, supra n. 37 at 232, 287, 294-95, 364. So he makes a “simple finding of fact”---and 
thus “participates in the completion of the contract”---but without being authorized to draw the explicit 
consequences in terms of legal liability.  By contrast, the arbitrator, “like the judge, exercises a jurisdictional 
function”---that is, the role of both arbitrator, just like the judge, is to “give a legal ruling” [dire le droit]”.  Jean 
Jacques Daigre, Note,[to Cour de Cassation, Feb. 16, 2010), [2010] Rev. de l’Arb. 506, 510; see also Delvolvé, 
supra at 24-25 (the function of the third party “is not to render an award for the settlement of a dispute between 
the parties regarding . . . their respective rights and obligations under the contract,” but to fix a figure for the price 
of goods “which will become part of the contract for sale as one of its terms; the contract will thus be complete 
and capable of being performed”); Jean-François Poudret & Sébastien Besson, Droit comparé de l'arbitrage 
international 17 (2002) (the decision envisaged by Article 1592--as well as by similar provisions in Italian and 
German law---merely “determines an essential element of the contract without which the contract remains invalid” 
(my translation)); Sanders, supra n. 25 at C.IVb2; Pieter Sanders, L'arbitrage dans les transactions commerciales 
à long terme, 1975 Rev. de l'Arb. 83, 85 (“can we expand the notion of arbitration in such a way as to include this 
kind of decision? It may be unfortunate, but that's really too much of a stretch [il semble qu'on exagère un peu]” 
(my translation)). 
If we had to diagnose all this, we would note, clinically,  
 the residue of the same tired metaphysical trope of “existence”;    
 the failure, in consequence, to draw all the necessary functional implications from the canonical rule 
of “separability”; and at the same time, 
 the same culturally-determined definition of the notion of arbitration---requiring it to be aligned ever-
so-closely with the judicial model---a model in which claimant and respondent are presumed to 
 have already staked out well-defined but irreconcilable positions, and  
 to have exchanged contradictory pleadings, and  
 to be seeking a judgment of liability founded on reasoning from legal texts; cf. Klaus Peter 
Berger, Renegotiation and Adaptation of International Investment Contracts:  The Role of 
Contract Drafters and Arbitrators, 36 Vand. J. Trans. L. 1347, 1375 (2003)(the traditional 
distinction between presenting a claim “couched in legal terms” and indicating the existence 
of “differences of opinion”). 
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really and truly, essential to the definition of a valid arbitration process---is easily 
capacious enough to encompass the failure of an agreement on price.39   And 
more fundamentally: I would suggest that it will prove infinitely less 
interesting to hunt for the elements that make up “essential parts of the 
notion of arbitration,”40 than it is to acknowledge frankly how much a 
“single unitary model of arbitration” would be misguided ---that “the 
process is sufficiently variable and flexible to accommodate instead a 
wide spectrum of potential forms.”41 
 
 
                                                          
39 But compare General Motors France v. societé Champs de Mars automobile, [2011] Rev. de l’Arb. 436-38 
(Cour de Cassation Dec. 15, 2010)(note Billemont)(“a dispute [litige] only exists in the presence of two 
contradictory legal [juridiques] claims”; by contrast, where the legal consequences “have already been stipulated 
in the contract at the outset [en amont]” we have nothing but a “purely factual disagreement”)(emphasis in 
original); Consorts Attali v. Lecourt, [2001] Rev. de l'Arb. 151, 154 (Cour d’appel Paris 1998) (a partner and 
shareholder in a close corporation agreed to sell his shares to the others at a price to be fixed by two neutrals, in 
order to “put an end to the differences that had arisen” between them; held, the neutral's decision was not subject 
to vacatur as an award because there was, “after entering into the agreement which actually put an end to it, no 
longer any dispute between the parties, but simply a disagreement or a conflict of interests with respect to the 
price”); Frydman v. Cosmair, Inc., 1995 WL 404841 (S.D.N.Y.)(dissatisfaction with an art. 1592 valuation does not 
“relate to an arbitration” so as to allow removal to federal court; after all, the parties had informed the neutral that 
“his decision [would] form the parties' will” with respect to the price, and “[t]hat is hardly the language of dispute”). 
For an extended argument seeking to demonstrate the contrary, see the discussion in Rau, The Culture 
of American Arbitration, supra n. 26 at 494 (it is “beautifully circular” to say that “there can no longer be any 
‘dispute’ [merely because] the very purpose of the submission agreement itself was to eliminate one!”), 495 (if 
“this is intended as a serious account of psychological realities [in the face of “conflicting interests, and 
aspirations”] it seems singularly impoverished”).   
If the neutral’s determination is meant to be binding on the parties---which means, I take it, that it will be 
enforceable at law---then attaching importance to whether or not he actually “purported to draw a legal 
conclusion”---or whether the parties stipulated for such a conclusion in advance---strikes me as trivial and 
formulaic. Cf. id. at 492 fn. 169 (parties may ask for the resolution of issues of fact or may instead ask for 
something that “approximates a request for judicial relief,” but it is only the scope of the contractual submission 
that permits this distinction,” and it is familiar ground that parties may choose to entrust a particularly broad---or 
particularly narrow---inquiry to neutrals whom they nevertheless consider “arbitrators”). But apparently in 
disagreement, cf. Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration 20 (2013), who reminds us that a “”joint mandate” to 
arbitrators to “fill a contractual gap” “does not establish breach or fault; nor does it order payment of other 
remedies. The determination is in principle binding in the manner of a contractual stipulation, but it would also in 
like manner require further legal action to be enforced by public power.” Thus he concludes peremptorily that “the 
law demands that the categories be distinct”---although at the same time, concededly, the parties themselves 
“could scarcely care less.” 
40
 Cf. Kröll, supra n. 24 at 15; see also Bernini, supra n. 38 at C.Iva 11,13 (:where no settlement of opposite claims 
is provided for,” “we are clearly outside of the scope of rules aimed at governing arbitration stricto sensu”; “the 
machinery of international conventions can hardly be deemed applicable to Arbitrage”).  Cf. Klaus Peter Berger, 
Power of Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, 17 Arb. Int’l 1, 2 (2001)(“In his well-known 
study on hardship clauses published in 1976, Fontaine has asked the question that is still discussed today with 
respect to gap filling and contract revision by international arbitrators:  ‘Is this still arbitration?’”). 
41
 Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration, supra n. 26 at 496. 
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III. “Silence” in the Court 
 
“It’s not the notes that you play, it’s the notes that you don’t play.”
42
 
Let’s pass over now those rather unusual instances of contractual “failure” and let’s 
assume that the decisionmaker, whoever he may be---whether court or arbitrator---is unwilling 
simply to leave the parties’ losses where they lie---is unwilling to permit one of them simply to 
walk away from the other without facing the consequences---is satisfied that despite some 
level of failure to fully articulate the terms of the deal, their intention to form a binding 
agreement should be honored and that a reasonably certain basis for doing so can be found.43 
The problem presented to him then becomes, just what are the terms of the transaction to be? 
How is he to proceed given that the text is problematical---that the parties have not, 
unequivocally and completely, answered the question posed in the litigation? 
Rather than discussing this in the abstract, I think it will be helpful to begin with some 
actual judgments---and I start with a line of cases, all quite similar, all posing more or less the 
same question, and all decided recently by the U.S. Supreme Court. As Blake said, “To 
particularize is the alone distinction of merit.”44  It is sometimes striking to see the many things 
that one can learn if one sets out to deconstruct a line of decisions---teasing out from each 
concrete instance everything that has been assumed, everything that has been lost sight of, 
and everything that has been left unsaid.  
 
The Court’s decisions in Bazzle,45 Stolt-Nielsen,46 and Oxford Health,47 are interesting 
case studies:  They not only underscore the difficulties inherent in the very notion of “gaps” or 
“silence,” but reveal something else even more fundamental.  If the following is the only 
“takeaway” from the discussion here, I’d be perfectly content:   
Whenever we are talking about “”gaps” in agreements, we are in all probability talking 
about something else entirely.  Tracking the Court’s reasoning reveals that “silence” is 
frequently just a rhetorical trope, one that is responsive to---dependent on---the 
dialectics of adversarial argument.  Implicit in the assertion that the agreement is 
                                                          
42
 Commonly attributed to Miles Davis. 
43
 See, e.g., UCC § 2-204(3) (“a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to 
make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate  remedy”); § 3-305 (open price 
term; “a reasonable price at the time for delivery” if nothing is said as to price or the parties fail to agree; however, 
if “the parties intend not to be bound unless the price is fixed or agreed . . . there is no contract”). 
44
 William Blake, Annotations to Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses, in 2 Edwin John Ellis & William Butler Yeats 
(eds.), Works of William Blake 323 (1893)(and “to generalize is to be an Idiot”).   
45
 Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
46
 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
47
 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064 (2013). 
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“silent,” for example, is likely to be lurking an unexpressed premise48---perhaps a hidden 
assumption 
a) with respect to who has the burden of proof of demonstrating some critical 
procedural question, or 
 
b) with respect to just who the appropriate decisionmaker is to be.  
 
 
1. “Silence” as the Lack of a Textual Hook:  Bazzle 
It is best to start with Bazzle, which was the first of the Court’s cases to worry the 
question whether it was congruent with the expressed intention of the parties for an arbitration 
to proceed on a classwide basis. In the courts below the South Carolina Supreme Court had 
confirmed a hefty class award in arbitration49: It had begun by first finding that the parties’ 
agreement “was silent regarding class-wide arbitration”; it then asked whether in such 
circumstances of “silence” “class-wide arbitration is permissible.”50 
 
Now “silence” is in itself a curious and not particularly helpful construct. P resumably 
the s tate court meant to suggest nothing more than that 
 
                                                          
48 “Lurking” sometimes in the shadows to the point of invisibility:  Thus it would elide a good share of the important 
work, for example, to assert that where the contract contains no clause expressly guarding against “unforeseen 
circumstances,” arbitrators should be “reluctant to overrule the principle of pacta sunt servanda in favour of 
contract adaptation and gap filling”---and will tend to assume that “the parties have indicated that the principle of 
sanctity of contracts shall prevail.”  Cf. Berger, supra n. 40 at 8.  That would be simply to assume the content of a 
default rule with respect to excuse (or shared responsibility) that may or may not be desirable, but whose 
legitimacy must in any case be demonstrated. 
 For precisely the same reason, it would elide a good deal of the important work to assert that an 
arbitrator is powerless to consolidate related arbitrations where the contract contains no clause expressly 
providing for this, since “if it had been the parties' intention to submit their disputes to a multiparty arbitration 
setting, they would have so provided in their contracts”; cf. Note, Compulsory Consolidation of International 
Arbitral Proceedings: Effects on Pacta Sunt Servanda and the General Arbitral Process, 2 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 
223, 251 (1994) (“If the parties to a multi-party dispute have not explicitly agreed to submit their disputes to a 
consolidated tribunal, then they have chosen to submit their disputes to separate arbitral tribunals . . . . Under the 
doctrine of pacta sunt servanda, the parties are only bound by what is in the contract.”).  But see Alan Scott Rau 
& Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. 89, 113 
(1995)(this “is nothing more than an extravagant form of question begging”). 
49
 In a class proceeding brought by the Bazzles, the arbitrator had awarded almost $11 million in statutory 
penalties, and an additional $3.6 million in attorneys’ fees, for a lender’s failure in violation of state law to 
notify the borrower of his right to select his own attorney or insurance agent.  In a related proceeding the same 
arbitrator had awarded $9.2 million in statutory penalties, and an additional $3 million in attorneys’ fees, to other 
claimants. There were no “actual damages.” Bazzle v. Green Tree Financial Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002). 
50
 Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 351, 359 (emphasis in original). 
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 the contractual text itself contained no particular semantic “hook” on which 
meaning could immediately be hung – or alternatively, perhaps, that  
 
 no definitive meaning could be derived from the contractual text alone.  
Of course, if this were all there was to “silence,” it would be the most trivial of 
preliminary steps – for it would be an impoverished view indeed of the interpretive 
enterprise to suppose that one could sensibly stop there; surely some sense of 
context, and some sort of purposive narrative, are necessary to tease out the parties’ 
“framework of common understanding.”51  
a. Once content with its finding of “silence,” however---once it was satisfied the text 
“said nothing”---the South Carolina court did not pursue any further 
interpretative path. But it did not fail to perceive the need for what we would 
call “construction”: So the lower court orders compelling class-wide arbitration 
were affirmed on the ground 
 
i. that “ambiguous” language must be construed against the drafter; and 
more fundamentally, on the ground 
 
ii. of what appears to be a state-created default rule crafted for 
circumstances of “silence”:  In such  cases, the court held, class-wide 
proceedings are permissible merely on the condition that they “would 
serve efficiency and equity, and would not result in prejudice.”52 
 
b. By contrast, for the respondent, it was inappropriate even to go down the path of 
fashioning these rules of construction: This was because in its view, the agreements 
between the parties were really, ultimately, not “silent” at all – since a fair reading of 
the text would lead to the conclusion that by their terms they in fact prohibited any class-
wide proceedings.53 
                                                          
51
 Cf. UCC § 1-303 cmt. 3 (“the commercial meaning of the agreement that the parties have made”; usage of 
trade, as well as the parties’ “course of performance” and “course of dealing,” “furnish the background and give 
particular meaning to the language used, and are the framework of common understanding controlling any 
general rules of law which hold only when there is no such understanding”). 
52
 Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 360.  The court was hardly unusual in claiming to reach this conclusion “under general 
principles of contract interpretation”; the common conflation of “interpretation” and “construction,” which we will 
note later, was presumably beyond its ken.   
53
 See Brief for Petitioner [Green Tree], 2003 WL 721716 at *42-*43 (“the unlikely conclusion that the parties 
authorized class-action arbitration here is foreclosed by the language of their arbitration agreements”); Final 
Brief of Appellant [Green Tree Financial Corp.], in the Supreme Court of South Carolina, at 17 (“the fact that 
the clause limits the scope of arbitrable issues to ‘disputes, claims or controversies arising from or relating to 
this contract’ evinces an intent that only disputes concerning the contract to which the named plaintiffs were a 
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 But then, when the case reached the Supreme Court, this whole trope of 
“silence” largely disappeared:  And the reason for this speaks volumes. Justice Breyer 
did begin his opinion in Bazzle by posing the question in a rather puzzling way: Are the 
contracts in this case, he asked, “silent, or do they forbid class arbitration?”54   But 
framing the question in that way was nothing more than a direct response to the 
dialectic of the parties’ argument:  This formulation thus neatly encapsulates the 
contending approaches –between, 
 
• on the one hand, the claimant’s invocation of a state-law default rule 
crafted to supplement a supposed textual indeterminacy [“a.ii.” above], 
 
• and on the other, the respondent’s claim rooted in a supposed textual 
prohibition [“b.” above]. 
 
 Writing for a plurality of four Justices, Justice Breyer rose above all that, and 
immediately pointed out that the question he had originally posed need not---and indeed, 
should not---be answered at all:  Whichever of the two contending approaches was 
correct was simply not a matter that fell to be decided by any court, state or federal:  
Instead it “presents a disputed issue of contract interpretation”---a dispute about what 
the contract “means” (i.e., whether classwide procedures were contemplated)---and 
was thus (within the language of the arbitration clause) a dispute “relating to this 
contract.”55 “The parties seem to have agreed that an arbitrator not a judge would 
answer the relevant question,” and although the arbitrators---in going on to administer 
class-wide proceedings---may have acquiesced in the reading of the contract by the 
state courts, nevertheless the parties still had not “obtained the arbitration decision 
that their contracts foresee.”  
 
So this was a question that did not go to whether the parties had ever “agreed to 
arbitrate a matter”(That would have put us in the presence of what it is now customary to call a 
“gateway” question of “arbitrability.”).56  Instead, the question went to “what kind of arbitration 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
party, not the contracts of absent third parties, were to be arbitrated”) (emphasis in the original).  
This is of course precisely the tack taken in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in the Supreme 
Court; see Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455, 458-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)---which argued that the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina h a d  “ imposed a regime that was contrary to the express 
agreement of the parties as to how the arbitrator would be chosen’: since its holding “contravenes the 
terms of the contracts,” the state courts had failed to enforce the agreement “according to [its] terms” 
in violation of § 4 of the FAA. 
54
 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447.  
55 Id. at 447 (“we cannot [“resolve” the question whether the agreement was “in fact silent”] “because it is a matter 
for the arbitrator to decide”).. 
56
 See, e.g., Alan Scott Rau, “Arbitrating ‘Arbitrability,’” 7 World Arb. & Med. Rep. 487 (2013). 
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proceeding the parties agreed to.”  And Justice Breyer thus fashioned a rule by which, under 
the federal common law of arbitration, this question---a question, by the way, that “the 
arbitrators are well situated to answer”---is one presumptively entrusted to them by virtue of the 
standard “broad clause.”  The state-court judgment was therefore vacated and the case 
remanded “so that the arbitrator may decide the question of contract interpretation.”  
 It is striking that Justice Breyer reached out for this formula – as far as I 
can tell – with no particular urging from either party.57  But to say that an agreement to 
classwide arbitration involved “a matter of interpretation” is to minimize the significance 
as well as the likelihood of “silence: At least if the text is not as “clear” in excluding the 
possibility of classwide proceedings as the dissent assumed58---at least, that is, if the 
matter is semantically “arguable”---then there presumably exists something here to 
“interpret.”  And to ask the arbitrators to decide how the contract should be read, 
means---if understood sympathetically, and with an eye to arbitration practice---that 
their work should encompass, at the same time,  
 
• a semantic inquiry into the literal words of the text. 
 
• an appreciation of circumstance and context, the “customs and 
practices which the parties have come to consider as settled patterns of 
conduct59 ---all going to make up what was their “bargain in fact”;60  and, as 
                                                          
57 The claimants---who had prevailed in seeking class-wide arbitration---would certainly have had no 
reason to urge vacatur and a remand to the arbitrators: Indeed the thrust of their argument was that the 
decision to order class-wide proceedings had already been made by the arbitrators. See Oral Argument, 
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 2003 WL 1989562 at *37-38 (Justice Breyer suggests that “the 
correct resolution” is to “send it back to the arbitrator for that determination, not influenced by the South 
Carolina opinion,” but counsel for the claimants demurs, “because the arbitrator already did look at this 
clause and decided that the language of the arbitration agreement allowed him to decide”); Brief for 
Respondents [Bazzles], 2003 WL 1701523 at *44 (“there is no reason . . . to conclude that the 
arbitrator failed to appreciate that the decision was his to make”). 
 For its part, the defendant wouldn’t seem to have had much to gain by a remand to the arbitrators either:  
If anything, it took the position that the decision should be for the court; see Oral Argument at *20 (counsel for 
Green Tree:  “whether the arbitrator has the authority to resolve the rights of unnamed third parties is not a 
question for the arbitrator to decide. That’s a question for the court to decide”); Brief for Respondents [Bazzles], 
2003 WL 1701523 at *44-*45 (remand to the arbitrator was “a remedy that [Green Tree] never sought here, 
could not now seek, and in any event does not want”); Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (defendant Green Tree “merely challenged the merits of the [state court] decision without claiming 
that it was made by the wrong decisionmaker”). 
58
 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451 *(the Chief Justice, dissenting, argues that classwide arbitration would be “contrary to 
the express agreement of the parties as to how the arbitrator would be chosen,” but “we do not believe . . . that 
the contracts’ language is as clear as the Chief Justice believes”). 
59 In re Standard Bag Corp. and Paper Bag, Novelty, Mounting, Finishing and Display Workers Union, 45 Lab. 
Arb. 1149 (1965). See also Lon Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wisc. L. Rev. 3, 11-12, 17 
(the problems in “complicated commercial litigation” “are not unlike those encountered in dealing with labor 
agreements”; both may involve “complex procedures that vary from industry to industry, from plant to plant, from 
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 the work of construction to determine what the text should be taken to 
“mean” – that is, its legal effect. 
 
In resolving disputes over “meaning,” no decision-maker – not an arbitrator, and not 
the South Carolina Supreme Court, nor any common-law court – could be expected 
to divorce any of these from the others:  All are within the sovereign appreciation of a 
“contract reader.”61 
And so, 
• should the arbitrators conclude that class-wide proceedings were 
indeed permissible, the result would presumably be the same as that 
mandated by the  South Carolina courts---that is, a final and definitive 
order to that effect---and remand would otherwise have been largely 
futile.62 
 
• In the (virtually unimaginable) eventuality that the arbitrators should 
conclude that a proper construction of the agreement forbids class-wide 
arbitration, the result would presumably be to the contrary.63 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
department to department”; “though the terms of [its] vocabulary often seem simple and familiar, their true 
meaning can be understood only when they are seen as parts of a larger system of practice”). 
60
 See UCC § 1-201(3) (“agreement” is defined as “the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or 
inferred from other circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade”).  
61
 This is the canonical term in labor arbitration, where it is common to say that the arbitrator serves as “the 
parties' officially designated ‘reader’ of the contract. He (or she) is their joint alter ego for the purpose of striking 
whatever supplementary bargain is necessary to handle the anticipated unanticipated omissions of the initial 
agreement,” Theodore St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise 
Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1137, 1140, 1142 (1977). 
62
 Hence Justice Breyer’s stress on the fact that the arbitrators would be particularly “well situated to answer” 
the question posed, 539 U.S. at 453. Hence above all his invocation of his own earlier opinion in First 
Options – the true teaching of which is that once a matter has been delegated to the arbitrators by agreement 
of the parties, “courts would then be expected to defer prospectively, by refusing to rule on an issue that was 
entrusted to arbitral decisionmaking, and would be expected as well to defer after the fact, by limiting their 
review to narrow statutory grounds.” See Alan Scott Rau, “The Arbitrability Question Itself,” 10 Amer. Rev. Int’l 
Arb. 287, 293 (1999). 
63 Cf. David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 Ind. L. J. 239, 257 fn. 89 (2012).  
Some understatement here: “It seems probable at this juncture that the arbitrator would construe the 
contract to allow class actions, since the alternative would entail vacating his own class arbitration awards.” 
No third alternative could have been imagined: That is, it could not have been supposed that 
there would be some sort of bifurcated proceeding, in which the arbitrators must first decide whether the 
agreement is notionally “silent” – and if the answer is “yes,” then their work of interpretation would be 
done, returning the legal implications of that conclusion, the question of the appropriate default rule, to 
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 While Justice Breyer wrote only for a plurality of the Court---and no rationale could 
command the assent of a majority---there was at the least, and clearly, a majority for the 
limited proposition that on the facts of Bazzle---and in the face of an allegation of “silence”---
the FAA did not foreclose a determination by somebody---whether court or arbitrator--- that 
class-wide proceedings were permissible.64 S o  Bazzle was immediately taken to be an 
endorsement by the Court of a new norm of class-wide arbitrations. 65  So just four or five 
months after Bazzle was handed down, the AAA---in order to “prepare for an anticipated 
increase in demand for the administration of class arbitrations”66---published a set of 
“Supplementary Rules” for class-wide proceedings; these mirror in many respects Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules, and create an elaborate framework for arbitral determinations of the 
sort envisaged by Justice Breyer: There is first to be an arbitral determination, “as a 
threshold matter,” on the “construction” of the arbitration clause---to determine whether it 
permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of a class.  A party may move to confirm or 
vacate this “clause construction award,” and after a stay for the purpose of seeking judicial 
review, the arbitrators are then to proceed to determine the question of class certification – that 
is, whether the case “should proceed as a class arbitration.”  Thus by virtue of the rules, 
incorporated as part of the parties’ agreement, a contractual delegation of decisionmaking 
authority to the tribunal is clear
67
---although at the same time the rules caution that in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
the courts. Such a model would be at the same time unworkable, incoherent and naïve. 
64 Justice Stevens, who cast the deciding fifth vote in the case, agreed that “the decision to conduct a class-action 
arbitration was correct as a matter of law,” Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).  So 
there’s the majority for the proposition that classwide proceedings were permissible if ordered by someone.  
Justice Stevens was however content to rely, without more, on the application by state courts of their own 
default rule. But leaving the decision to state courts would have led to an affirmance of the judgment below---and 
the plurality preferred to reverse, so that the question could be presented de novo to the arbitrators.  So, 
conceding the essential, Justice Stevens concurred in the result and agreed that the matter of contractual 
interpretation “arguably” should have been made “in the first instance by the arbitrator,” Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455 
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).  
65
 Cf. S.I. Strong, The Sounds of Silence: Are U.S. Arbitrators Creating Internationally Enforceable Awards 
When Ordering Class Arbitration in Cases of Contractual Silence or Ambiguity?, 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1017, 1022-
23 (2009) (where an international class arbitration is seated in the U.S., “because the United States has already 
judicially approved of the class arbitration mechanism,” a losing respondent will not be able to argue that the 
class-wide proceeding is “presumptively disfavored as a matter of international law or policy”); Shroyer v. New 
Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 991, 992 (9th. Cir. 2007) (“we read [Bazzle] as an implicit 
endorsement by a majority of the Court of class arbitration procedures as consistent with the Federal 
Arbitration Act”; since “class arbitrations further the FAA’s purpose of encouraging alternative dispute resolution,” 
our holding that a waiver of class proceedings is unconscionable cannot in consequence be preempted as in 
conflict with federal policy). 
66
 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., Brief of AAA as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, 
2009 WL 2896309 at *9. 
The AAA’s searchable class arbitration “docket” of cases administered by the institution is available at its 
website at www.adr. org.  As of May 6, 2014, it included 376 cases, including cases that were  inac t ive  
because settled, withdrawn, or dismissed, and awards that had been vacated.  
67 These supplementary class rules are to apply to any contract calling for arbitration under any body of AAA 
rules (although the AAA will not “administer class arbitrations where the underlying arbitration agreement 
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“construing” the arbitration clause the arbitrator is not to “consider” the existence of the 
rules “to be a factor either in favor of or against permitting the arbitration to proceed on a 
class basis.”68 
 
2.  “Silence” as the Failure of Agreement: Stolt-Nielsen69 
 
The trope of “silence” played a quite different, and far more problematical, role in 
another “class arbitration” case a few years later.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
explicitly precludes class procedures,” Commentary to the American Arbitration Association's Class Arbitrations 
Policy, Feb. 18, 2005). 
68
 R. 3. In short, mere agreement to the rules does not in itself amount to an “agreement to classwide 
arbitration” – is not even probative of any such agreement.  There is a simple grant of authority to the 
arbitrators, but this does not in itself amount to expressing a preference for arbitral judgment to be 
exercised in any particular way. 
 Cf. Strong, supra note 65, at 1073-74. Professor Strong criticizes the AAA rules for 
“apply[ing] the concept of implied consent to allow retroactive application” to parties whose contract may 
“dat[e] back to the 1970’s or 1980’s when the rules were “not even in existence” – resulting in unfair 
“surprise.”  Does this suggest, by negative implication, that if the rules had indeed been “in existence” at 
the time the contract was entered into, we would then be warranted in drawing the opposite conclusion--- 
there had in fact been “consent” to classwide proceedings?  Precisely the same problem is lurking in her 
suggestion that there would be no problem in finding “implied consent to classwide proceedings” where 
parties have chosen as the seat of the arbitration a jurisdiction “that  recognizes arbitrators’ authority to 
order classwide proceedings,” id. at 1062-67 & n.209.  Presumably to choose a lex arbitri is 
presumptively to choose the law in force at the seat at the time the proceeding is instituted, not the law 
that might have been in effect at the time when the contract was drafted. 
 All this highlights a far more fundamental problem:  I confess that I still remain unsure whether 
the “implied consent’ that Professor Strong is discussing, is in fact, 
 “consent” to empower the arbitral tribunal as the ultimate decisionmaker [which will raise the 
question whether authority to order a classwide proceeding was ever conferred on the tribunal in 
the first place], or 
 “consent” to the actual classwide proceeding itself [raising the question, for the tribunal, whether 
such a proceeding would be within the parties’ expectations, and for a reviewing court, whether 
the undoubted jurisdiction of the tribunal has been exercised in an illegitimate manner]. 
Bazzle itself of course is a case that  ra ised the  former  issue -- -where class arbitration rules did 
not exist at the time of contracting, but the existence of arbitral power was deduced from a general 
broad grant of decisionmaking authority. Stolt-Nielsen and Oxford Health are cases that raise the latter 
issue.  The sentence I quoted above [“[if the arbitration agreement points strongly to seating the 
proceeding in a jurisdiction (such as the U.S.) that recognizes arbitrators’ authority to order classwide 
proceedings, then the parties may be said to have implicitly consented to classwide proceedings”).] 
shows how easily these two questions can be conflated--- despite the earnest attempt by the AAA to 
keep them separate---shows how easily one can deduce the latter form of “consent” from the former---
and so powerfully suggests that despite the caveat of R.3, the gravitational pull of these rules can be 
very intense indeed.  
69
 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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In Stolt-Nielsen, a number of charterers had brought antitrust suits against a 
shipping company, each purportedly on behalf of a class, and later consolidated. 
The respondent had successfully moved to compel arbitration, and the claimants then 
demanded a class-wide arbitration proceeding.  The contract had not originally 
incorporated the rules of the AAA, but the parties---“in light of Bazzle”
 70
- - - entered into 
a “supplemental agreement” by which the question of class arbitration was to be 
submitted to a panel of three arbitrators, who were to “follow and be bound by” the 
AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations; an arbitral tribunal was empanelled 
under those rules to render a “clause construction award.”  You will note immediately 
that this agreement of the parties rendered the jurisdictional holding of Bazzle largely 
irrelevant: We have here an express grant of power to the arbitrators that replaces 
the presumed allocation, found by the plurality in Bazzle to be implicit in the arbitral 
enterprise. 
The arbitrators then went on to conclude that the arbitration clause did indeed 
authorize classwide arbitration.71  The respondents sought to have this “clause 
construction award” vacated, and in a most conventional analysis, the Second Circuit 
rebuffed the attempt: Repeating the mantra that “interpretation” is “an area we are 
particularly loath to disturb,” it concluded that an arbitrator’s “misapplication” of a 
contract’s terms can hardly “rise to the stature of ‘manifest disregard’” of the law---
whatever that means---and that determinations of custom and usage, informing any 
reading of a contract, are themselves in any event “findings of fact” wholly immune 
to review on any such grounds.72 
Now one would have thought that the next step could have been predicted with 
some confidence. The Court in Bazzle- - - a fter remanding for an arbitral exercise in 
construction---had seen no need to go further: That is, it saw no need to address what 
standards the arbitrators would be expected to use, or what sort of decision (if any) the 
FAA might require, or what level of scrutiny a court would be expected to deploy.  For 
af ter  a l l ,  the answers to all of these questions might reasonably have seemed 
                                                          
70
 Stolt-Nielsen  SA  v. AnimalFeeds Int’l  Corp., Brief for Petitioners, 2009 WL2809359 at *7. 
71
 The arbitrators claimed to believe that the resolution of this issue was “controlled by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in [Bazzle]”- - -but th is  betrays cons iderable misunders tanding and can’t  be taken at face 
value:  However receptive to the notion of class-wide proceedings, and however deferential to arbitral 
competence, the Court in Bazzle provided no guidance at all with respect to how an arbitral tribunal should 
proceed.  
72 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 548 F.3d at 98. 
Nor could the court find any state or federal maritime “rule of construction” that “clearly governs” the 
issue here – that is, which governs whether a failure to address the question of class-wide arbitrations should 
be taken to be probative of an intent not to allow them, or of an intent not to prohibit them. Id. at 99.  By 
contrast, as we have seen, a “rule of construction” with respect to this issue was precisely what the South 
Carolina courts had found and applied in Bazzle (although only Justices Stevens and Thomas thought that 
deference to this rule was necessary). 
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implicit in the holding: The plurality there had pretty clearly taken the view that the 
availability of class-wide proceedings did not even rise to the level of what we have 
become accustomed in this country to call a “gateway question of arbitrability.”73  And 
what can we possibly mean when we say that an issue is not one of “arbitrability”? 
Only this: that we are willing, at the very outset, to presume that the parties have 
consented to entrust it to the arbitrators, without any need for an express allocation.  
This must be true a fortiori when we can find such a delegation of authority in the form 
of the parties’ express submission to the AAA rules.   And if we are satisfied that the 
parties have in fact done this, then we would expect an arbitral award on the subject to 
command precisely the same degree of deference as would any decision “on the 
merits” resolving a dispute submitted by contract to the tribunal. 
Nevertheless the Supreme Court reversed, mandating that the award should be 
vacated. While Bazzle itself could not be directly overruled,74 the inevitable second 
thoughts, changes in the composition of the Court, 75 and the dreaded spectre for a 
corporate-oriented Court of an increased resort to classwide proceedings, all meant that 
earlier confident predictions were to prove fruitless.  For the Court in Stolt-Nielsen, there 
                                                          
73
 As it “concerns neither the validity of the arbitration clause nor its applicability to the underlying dispute 
between the parties.” Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452.   
 See Alan Scott Rau, “Consent” to Arbitral Jurisdiction: Disputes with Non-Signatories, in Multiple Party 
Actions in International Arbitration:  Consent, Procedure and Enforcement 69, 71 (Belinda Macmahon ed., 2009): 
This “question of arbitrability” – whether there is a “duty for the parties to arbitrate” the dispute – 
whether the parties have consented to a final arbitral judgment on the issues – whether, in short, the 
arbitrators have “jurisdiction” to decide – is undeniably an issue for judicial determination. 
Yes, I appreciate that the terminology is highly fraught and that our usage is completely at odds with the way that 
the notion of “arbitrability” is used in other legal systems; see Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in 
Gerald Aksen (ed.), Global Reflections on International Law, Commerce and Dispute Resolution: Liber Amicorum 
in Honour of Robert Briner 601, 609 (2005)(our “persistent abuse” of this “vaporous locution” “has led to 
international disharmony, because elsewhere that word has an established meaning” referring to public policy 
limitations upon what it is legally permissible to arbitrate). I have in fact often suggested that the term “can easily 
be dispensed with,” Rau, “Separability,” supra n. 13 at 120.   
74
 The Court in Stolt-Nielsen acknowledged that in light of the express agreement of the parties subjecting 
themselves to the AAA rules, “we need not revisit” the question whether the permissibility of class-wide 
proceedings was otherwise reserved for the arbitral tribunal, Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772. 
75
 The Court was divided  5-3.  (Justice  Sotomayor did not participate).Justice Kennedy, who had dissented in 
Bazzle on the ground that ordering class-wide arbitration was impermissible as a matter of federal law, naturally 
found himself in the majority here, as did Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Thomas had also 
dissented in Bazzle- - - b u t  o n  t h e  b a s i s  o f  h i s  c u s t o m a r y  a n d  i d i o s y n c r a t i c  p o s i t i o n  
t h a t  s t a t e  c o u r t  a r b i t r a t i o n  r u l i n g s  should not be interfered with by federal law; here, though, 
the absence of any overt Supremacy Clause concerns left him free to join the majority as well. The fifth vote 
of Justice Scalia---who had concurred in Justice Breyer’s opinion in Bazzle--- is considerably more difficult to 
rationalize. Justice Stevens, who had been willing to join the plurality in Bazzle---at least to the extent of 
remanding the case and preserving the issue of contract construction for the arbitrators---appropriately 
dissented in Stolt-Nielsen (as did of course Justice Breyer himself and Justice Ginsburg, both of whom were in 
the same position). 
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was no basis at all for the tribunal’s endorsement of a classwide proceeding.  The 
holding can be broken down into two parts: 
1. Instead of making some “determination regarding the parties’ intent”76---
and instead of “identifying and applying a rule of decision” derived from 
state or federal law77---the arbitral tribunal had merely “imposed its view 
of sound  policy”78---and by doing so, had “exceeded its powers” 
under§10(a)(4) of the FAA.79 
 
2. Nor was there any reason, after vacatur, to remand and “direct a 
rehearing by the arbitrators” under §10 (b) – that would be pointless 
because “there can be only one possible outcome on the facts before us”: 
Since there was no  “contractual basis” to support a finding of  consent  
to  class-wide proceedings, the parties “cannot be compelled” to 
participate in one.80 
  
                                                          
76
 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.4. 
77
 Id. at 1770. 
78
 Id. at 1767-68 
79
 Id. at 1770; see also id. at 1767-68. 
This was the only invocation of any statutory ground for vacatur.  I should mention that in the 
early proceedings below the district court had in fact vacated the award using a different formulation---
relying on the assertion that the tribunal had “manifestly disregarded a well defined rule of governing 
maritime law.”  It is hard to know what to make of this; could it mean that the arbitrator is tasked with 
having disregarded evidence with respect to the content of the prevailing custom and usage? See Stolt 
Nielsen, 435 F.Supp.2d at 387 n.3. (“silence” “simply opens the door to extrinsic evidence, which here 
strongly supports Stolt’s position”); But see Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration, supra n. 
26 at 526 (even in the Second Circuit the notion of “manifest disregard of the evidence” is “now treated 
as a mere sport in the law, having joined the choir invisible of discarded conceits.”). The Supreme Court 
did touch on this matter briefly, in a rather curious footnote, Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.4:. 
Justice Alito remarked that “we do not decide” whether the “manifest disregard” ground still “survives” 
as an “independent ground for [judicial] review” – but added that “assuming, arguendo, that such a 
standard applies, we find it satisfied for the reasons that follow.” All this is lazy and readily lends itself to 
ridicule; see Adam Samuel, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Undistinguished 2010 Trilogy: An English 
View, DISP. RES. J., Feb.-April 2011, at 33, 35 (“dodging issues”), 36 (“painful fence- sitting”). But I 
don’t find the Court’s footnote overly bizarre: For all the Court is really saying, at bottom, is that any 
notion of “manifest disregard” doesn’t, and can’t, matter much in the sensible resolution of any case---
which must be arrived at on other grounds and for other reasons. And this is something we knew all 
along. 
80 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770, 1776. 
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a. “A Determination Regarding the Parties’ Intent” 
 
“I used to teach Contracts, did you know that?”
81 
 
The first of these holdings has by far the most resonance for our present 
concerns:  It is also by far the most inexplicable, and ultimately the least defensible.  So 
naturally I will dwell on that here. 
 
Now if a claimant is demanding that a court – or an arbitral tribunal – order 
“his” arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis, what is the route to such a 
conclusion: What is the link between the demand and the order? 
 
What is clearly the appropriate starting point is some sort of finding to the 
effect that this would be consistent with the “ agreement of the parties.”82 The 
“threshold” inquiry mandated by the AAA’s “Supplementary Rules for Class 
Arbitration” is whether the arbitration clause “permits the arbitration to proceed on 
behalf of” a class.  At oral argument, Justice Scalia complained that this “doesn’t 
help me a lot. What does it mean, ‘if it permits it’? . . .  [D]oes that mean whether the 
parties have agreed to it?”83  Well, not quite:  I would suggest that the proper answer 
to his question would have been this: The Rules simply envisage a “level 2” inquiry84 
into, “whether the ability to order class-wide proceedings is within the scope of the 
powers granted by the parties to the arbitrators?” 
Before the arbitral tribunal, the parties in Stolt-Nielsen had apparently agreed that 
the arbitration clause said nothing particularly explicit on the issue of class-wide 
proceedings – but that it was instead “silent.”85  Before the case was over this trope 
                                                          
81
 Oral Argument, supra n.3, 2009 WL 4662509 at *39 (Justice Scalia). 
82
 Section 4 of the FAA, as we know, mandates a court “order directing the parties to proceed to 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”  And after an award has been rendered, § 
10(a)(4) provides for vacatur where the arbitrators were “guilty” of “misbehavior by which the rights of 
any party have been prejudiced”: It should hardly be surprising that this antique formulation does not 
expressly track Art. V(1)(d) of the New York Convention – which permits a refusal of recognition and 
enforcement where “the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties” – 
but it would be surprising indeed if the scope of § 10 were held to be much narrower and not to 
encompass these Convention grounds as well; cf. 2 Gary B. Born, International Commercial 
Arbitration 2595 (2009)(“in jurisdictions where no statutory provision directly addresses the subject, 
courts have nonetheless held that arbitral awards are subject to annulment if the arbitrators fail to 
observe the procedures agreed by the parties”); cf. Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in 
American Courts, 7 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 213, 236 (1996) (“as a practical matter [it is] highly unlikely 
– to put it mildly – that actual results in concrete cases will tend to diverge significantly depending 
on whether an award is scrutinized under Article V of the Convention or  under § 10 of the FAA”). 
83
 See Oral Argument, supra n.3, 2009 WL 4662509 at *52. 
84
 See Rau, “Separability,” supra n. 13 at 92-94, 110-11 ((elaborating a “conceptual framework” involving “three 
separate questions [that] will recur in connection with any arbitration”). 
85
 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 70, 2009 WL 2809359 at *8. 
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of “silence” had come to mean something quite different from what it meant in Bazzle-
--but that such an offhand remark would ultimately assume such an outsized and 
outlandish importance, must have been a considerable surprise to everyone. 
 
At the outset, summoning up this notion of “silence” seemed to be little more than a 
rhetorical shorthand: For the claimant, “because the arbitration clauses were silent, 
arbitration on behalf of a class could proceed.”86    
(Here’s the premise underlying that:  Recall that Justice Breyer framed the 
problem faced by the Court in Bazzle as a choice between two “contending 
approaches”--between, on the one hand, a state law default rule deployed in 
the event of textual indeterminacy, and on the other hand, “the respondent’s 
claim rooted in a supposed textual prohibition.” So the claimant’s obvious 
intent was to invoke Justice Breyer’s dichotomy---and in doing so to point out 
the preferred alternative. In other words, to eliminate the latter prong---there 
could be no prohibition “because the arbitration clauses were silent”---would, it 
was hoped, necessarily open the door to choosing the former – that is, it would 
permit an arbitral choice of a default rule that would operate in his favor; under 
this formulation classwide arbitration was privileged to the extent that a reluctant 
party was required to affirmatively demonstrate a manifested intention to exclude 
it.) 
For the respondent, by contrast, “because the arbitration clauses were silent, the 
parties intended not to permit class arbitration”87:  
(And here is the premise underlying that:  The obvious purpose here was to 
invoke the many cases that, over the years, tended to assume – again, in the 
absence of some explicit authorization – that federal courts lack any power to 
order the consolidation of related arbitrations.  Reliance on this federal 
background law would, supposedly, explain and justify the lack of any more 
precise provision with respect to class proceedings).88 
So the conceit of “silence” here could not have been meant to carry much beyond 
                                                          
86
 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 89 (emphasis added). 
87
 Id.  
88 See generally Rau & Sherman, supra n. 48, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. at 113 (“the dominant emerging 
tendency” has been a “presumption against consolidation in the absence of some affirmative evidence 
that the parties have consented to it, either in their original agreement or later at the time of submission”). 
 For this argument by the respondents, see Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
Clause Construction Hearing, Joint Appendix, 2009 WL 2777896 at *104a-*105a (“you have to know what 
the law said at the time you enter this agreement because you’re not going [to] write down everything the 
law gives you anyway. . . . [T]hroughout this time period, they knew you couldn’t consolidate.”); Brief for 
Petitioners, supra note 70, 2009 WL 2809359 at *8 (“In the face of that silence, [respondents] cited 
federal case law prohibiting class or other consolidated arbitration without all parties' consent”). 
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the usefulness of such a frame in the dialectic of adversarial argument:89 Nor did 
any supposed agreement along those lines prevent the parties from engaging in 
sustained and vigorous argument, both semantic and otherwise, with respect to what 
their “true intention” had been:  A reading of the briefs and the transcript of the oral 
argument hardly suggests that they thought this question of interpretation had been 
stipulated away.90  And neither the district court nor the court of appeals made the 
slightest reference to it below: Indeed the award in Stolt-Nielsen did purport to 
proceed by divining contractual intent from the language of the agreement,91 and the 
                                                          
89
 This insistence by the parties on mutually exclusive default rules triggered by “silence” also presumably 
explains their convergence on the proposition that the contract was “unambiguous” – with the apparent 
consequence that any need to consider “parol evidence” was obviated. See Joint Appendix, supra n. 88 at *77a 
(counsel for claimant: “all the parties also agree that the arbitration clause is unambiguous”); Stolt-Nielsen, 130 
S. Ct. at 1770. 
The continuing insistence by lawyers on the supposed lack of “ambiguity”- - - even in circumstances 
where it serves no particular function---that is, even in circumstances where there is no danger whatever 
of wayward fact finding on the part of a jury---continues to bemuse me. Cf. Restatement (Second) 
Contracts, § 212 cmt. d. (“historically,” “partly perhaps because of the fact that jurors were often 
illiterate, questions of interpretation of written documents have been treated as questions of law in the 
sense that they are decided by the trial judge rather than by the jury”). For the same reasons – while 
the concept of “an agreement that is silent” is challenging enough – the category of “an agreement that 
is unambiguously silent” is merely calculated to cause migraine. But cf. William Whitehill, Class 
Actions and Arbitration: Murky Waters, 4 World. Arb. & Med. Rev. 1, 2 (2010). 
But it is s i m p l y  n o t  our lot to escape doubt. I still remember an episode from my first-year Contracts 
class, when during a discussion of the Restatement First § 31 (“In case of doubt it is presumed that an offer 
invites the formation of a bilateral contract”), our professor asked, “but what of the case where there is doubt 
as to whether there is doubt?” Even at the time, I think, I sensed that this could not have been intended to be 
taken seriously as a useful aid to taxonomy – although in the hands of the much- and appropriately-revered 
Jack Dawson it was certainly clever enough Socratically. 
90 For the claimant in the arbitration (AnimalFeeds):  Brief for Respondent, 2009 WL 3404244 at *33-*34 (“the 
contract’s conferral on the arbitrators of power to decide ‘any’ dispute is most reasonably read as not limited to the 
subset of disputes between a single parcel tanker owner and a single customer”; “so, too, the clause’s use of the 
term ‘dispute’ is permissibly read to include disputes involving multiple parties, as here”); Oral Argument, supra n.3, 
2009 WL 4662509 at *43-*44 (counsel for claimants: “that goes back to whether ‘any disputes’ can plausibly be 
read to encompass the class mechanism, because if it can, well then, by agreeing to that contract, you have, 
in effect, agreed to something that delegates to the arbitrator the ability to use that”); see also Clause 
Construction Hearing, Joint Appendix, supra n.88, 2009 WL 2777896 at *79a (“the arbitration clause here 
contains broad language and this language should be interpreted to permit class arbitrations”; “the term ‘any’ and 
‘all differences and disputes of whatever nature’ . . . would include class arbitrations”). 
 For the respondent:  See id., 2009 WL 2777896 at *92a-*93a (“you guys read the contract and you 
figure out the procedures that apply, whether we contemplated having a class action or not”); id. at *95a 
(Arbitrator Jentes: “What’s the issue?”; counsel for respondents: “What do the parties intend in this contract. 
Basic contract interpretation. And it’s for you to decide”); Brief for Petitioners, 2009 WL 2809359 at*21 (before 
the arbitrators, respondents argued “that in context, the [arbitration] clause should be construed to prohibit 
class arbitration as a matter of properly inferred intent”); Oral Argument, supra n.3, 2009 WL 4662509 at *15-*16 
(“our position about the construction of the contract was that in fact, although there is no express provision one 
way or the other, this is a maritime contract, and the---and maritime law is ascertained by custom and practice, 
and we introduced evidence in the form of affidavits that were unrefuted . . . since the days of Marco Polo. . . .”). 
91
 The arbitral award acknowledged that the arbitrators “must look to the language of the parties’ 
Alan Scott Rau 
“Gap Filling” by Arbitrators 
May 9, 2014 




entire thrust of the Second Circuit’s decision was deference to the arbitrators’ own 
exercise in “interpretation” and to their “findings of fact”---finding their reading of the 
agreement to be “at least colorable.”92  
 
Nevertheless the Supreme Court took this putative stipulation and---with no 
particular urging from anyone---ran away with it. On the matter of “silence,” the 
claimant had in fact gone on to concede that “when a contract is silent on an issue 
there’s been no agreement that has been reached on that issue.”93  For the Court, this 
did not suggest merely that there had been no “express reference” to class-wide 
proceedings---it implied as well that the parties had had no understanding with respect 
to the matter whatever---that is, that at least with respect to that particular term, there had 
been no “meeting of the minds” at all.   
And what are the implications of that, exactly? 
Now as we have seen, there exists a weak account of what “silence,” or “gaps”---
we might prefer to talk instead of “omitted terms”---can mean: On this account the 
problem is merely this---that the text of the agreement does not explicitly and 
immediately direct us to any conclusion with respect to intent, or with respect to how a 
question of “meaning” should be resolved.  In such cases, whoever is charged with 
giving effect to the contract must begin by trying to tease out what the parties had 
wished to do, through recourse to the usual extrinsic methods for determining the 
content of the “bargain in fact”---either by 
 
 “worrying the text of the agreement in order to discover some sort of 
underlying narrative,”94 or by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
agreement to ascertain the parties intention whether they intended to permit or to preclude class action,” 
see 548 F.3d at 97. And so on review, the claimants not only argued the point of interpretation, but in 
fact went further – suggesting that they had actually submitted this question of contract interpretation to 
the arbitrators, and that the arbitral award, ordering class-wide proceedings, had been rendered 
precisely on that basis and in response to its arguments; see Oral Argument, supra n.3, 2009 WL 
4662509 at *30-*32 (“what they relied on was the broad language of the agreement, the language ‘any 
disputes’”; “they are saying: We are not going to do this based on a default rule; we are going to do 
this based on the language and intent. Right?”); id. at *55 (counsel for claimants had previously made 
“the argument that we believe the arbitrators adopted, which is that the arbitration clause here contains 
broad language, and this language should be interpreted to permit class arbitrations”). 
92
 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 99. 
93
 Clause Construction Hearing, Joint Appendix, supra note 88, 2009 WL 2777896 at*77a. But – once again – 
this can only be understood in the context and flow of the argument – as an attempt to underline that a 
favorable default rule remained available: “Therefore,” the claimant went on, “there has been no agreement 
to bar class arbitrations.” Id. 
94
 See Rau & Sherman, supra n. 48, 30 Tex. Int’l L.J. at 112 & n. 124 (for example, a court might be able “to find 
some sort of ‘implied’ consent to consolidation” of related proceedings where it is presented with a vertical chain 
of related contracts and subcontracts). 
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 looking to context and circumstances (“surrounding” by definition) to help 
determine the “commercial meaning” of the language and the “framework 
of common understanding.”95 
 
Indeed the arbitral tribunal in Stolt-Nielsen had made gestures in this direction96--
-but for Justice Alito, it had been entirely illegitimate for it even to begin to go down 
this path. This suggests a much stronger version of “silence”---one asserting that the 
parties’ “stipulation” of “no agreement” had necessarily barred, at the outset, any of 
the traditional routes to contractual interpretation:  The arbitral tribunal, he wrote, had 
“had no occasion to ‘ascertain the parties’ intention’ . . . because the parties were in 
complete agreement regarding their intent”---that is, presumably, that they were in 
complete agreement that they had no intent at all.  In such circumstances, “any inquiry 
into that settled question would have been outside the [tribunal’s] assigned task,” and 
even the wording of the agreement itself “was quite beside the point.”  All that could be 
left, then, was not “interpretation” but the tribunal’s own idiosyncratic “policy choice.”97 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
In doing this the “contract reader” will not disdain resort to marginal bits of homely “folk wisdom” that 
purport to tell him, as an empirical matter, how most people--draftsmen and legislators--are likely to deploy 
grammar and syntax. This includes, for example, many of the canons of construction; cf. Circuit City Stores, Inc. 
v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2000)(where Congress excluded from the reach of the FAA “contracts of employment 
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” the 
italicized language must not be interpreted literally and in isolation from the rest---but must be understood in light 
of--and thus modified, qualified and restricted by, “controlled and defined by reference to”--the specific categories 
that precede it).  Not all the canons, of course, can be described in that way; see, e.g., the dreaded canon contra 
proferentem, discussed at text accompanying nn. 154-58 infra. 
95
 See text accompanying nn. 51, 59-61 supra.  
This role of context in helping to determine the “framework of common understanding” assumed 
particular importance in the Stolt-Nielsen litigation. See Stolt- Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
435 F. Supp. 2d 382, 385-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“in the maritime area . . . the interpretation of 
contracts – and especially charter party agreements – is very much dictated by custom and usage,” 
and “experts in international maritime arbitrations [testified] to the effect that sophisticated, multinational 
commercial parties . . . would never intend that the arbitration clauses would permit a class arbitration”), 
rev’d, 548 F.3d 85, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2008) (“custom and usage is more of a guide than a rule”).  In the 
Supreme Court, Justice Alito moved seamlessly from  
 noting the undisputed “expert opinion” with respect to the expectations of “sophisticated, 
multinational commercial parties”--- summarizing, in a long footnote, extensive “expert evidence 
from experienced maritime arbitrators,” “demonstrating that it is customary in the shipping 
business for parties to resolve their disputes through bilateral arbitration”; seed Stolt-Nielsen, 130 
S. Ct. at 1769 n.6 (“in the view of the London Corps [sic] of International Arbitration, class 
arbitration is ‘inconceivable’”), 
  to a conclusion that the tribunal has “simply imposed its own conception of sound policy,” Stolt-
Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1769. 
This is either a non sequitur, or, more likely, a commentary to the effect that the tribunal had wantonly 
ignored the weight of the evidence. 
96
 See n. 91 supra. 
97
 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1770. 
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Now a formal stipulation to the effect that the parties had not arrived at any 
common understanding with respect to a particular contractual issue---that on this 
issue, there were “no concordant wills”98---is surely uncommon.  (Perhaps, though, the 
fact of expressly leaving a term open---in the form of an “agreement to agree” on it at 
some later time---might in the end amount to much the same thing?99).  I have 
suggested in fact that in the procedural context of the Stolt-Nielsen litigation, the 
supposed “stipulation” was “largely fictive anyway,” the Court’s treatment of it “reek[ing] 
of disingenuousness”:  For “it seemed to operate here largely as a trap for the unwary 
claimant, who could hardly have imagined that he was conceding the very question of 
interpretation on which his case rested.”100  Nevertheless it is surely not unusual for the 
parties to enter into an agreement that purports to be a contract---that they believe to 
be a contract---without “agreement [having] been reached” on any number of terms, 
whether of price, or delivery, or conditions of financing---and this for any of a number of 
reasons that we have already canvassed.  
  
At the same time it could not seriously have been argued in Stolt-Nielsen that a finding of 
“no agreement” with respect to classwide proceedings alone, could possibly suggest that the 
entire contractual process had aborted---that any “manifestation of mutual assent” to the 
exchange was lacking---that the “gap” had thereby swallowed up everything that had actually 
been agreed to, forcing us to conclude that the parties had never intended to be contractually 
bound at all.  Nor was this argued.  For such a notion to come into play---for us to conclude 
that there was “no contract”---“the area of non-agreement would have to be considerably 
broader, and closer to the ‘bounds of the entire consensual perimeter,’ than was the case in 
Stolt-Nielsen.”101 
In those circumstances, then, Justice Alito’s reaching out to attribute significance 
to some supposed “stipulation” is especially telling---because it illustrates, I think, 
precisely where the Court went astray. The critical flaw lies in the limits that Stolt-
Nielsen independently imposes on the process of contract construction when carried on 
by an arbitral tribunal---and in the cramped and cabined view of arbitral adjudication that 
the opinion reveals. For if we are really satisfied that the parties have “failed to 
                                                          
98
 Fried, supra n.3 at 60. 
99
 See nn. 19-21 supra. 
100
 Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 Amer. Rev. of Int’l Arb. 435, 
460 (2011).  
 See also Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 646 F.3d 113, 129 fn. 2(Winter. C.J., dissenting)(“If Stolt-Nielsen 
resolves only the effect of a sui generis and idiosyncratic stipulation of the parties, the case hardly meets [the 
criteria for granting a writ of certiorari (that “an important question of federal law” “has not been, but should be, 
settled by this Court”)). 
101
 Rau, supra n. 100 at 462.  Where the clause is marginal to the exchange, this must be true even where the 
“gap” was not the result of crossed signals---or a mere “blind spot”---but where the parties entered into the 
agreement despite the fact that they were “at all times . . . painfully aware of their contradictory understandings of 
a contractual term,” see n. 17 supra.  
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manifest any type of inferable assent” with respect to a particular question,102 then 
the work of giving “meaning” to the contract hardly ends – really, it is just barely 
getting underway. 
 
An obvious, but modest, start is to look at the structure and purpose of the 
agreement, inquiring into the solution that would be most congruent with the 
“overall objectives of the parties.”103 Once we can identify the “sense of the 
transaction”---what the parties were about, and what they were trying to do---the 
question whether there has been a true “meeting of the minds” may begin to seem 
somewhat arid and abstract: Indefiniteness can often be cured by little more than an 
exercise of practical wisdom, striving to give content to the agreement by ensuring 
the “business efficacy” that the parties “must have intended” the transaction should 
have.104 
To privilege a meaning towards which “most sensible people” would gravitate, may 
not, perhaps, always lead us directly to what the parties actually “had in mind when 
contracting”---but it is intended to coincide with “what a reasonable person would 
have understood under the circumstances.”105  More precisely, perhaps, it is intended 
to coincide with (1) what a reasonable plaintiff believed and (2) had the right to believe-
--as long as (3) a reasonable defendant ought to have realized that such was the 
plaintiff’s understanding.  But that, of course, is precisely what the Orthodox 
“objective theory of Contracts” treats as the primarily relevant intention---or more 
properly, treats as the appropriate definition of contractual intention---that is what 
                                                          
102
 Ben-Shahar, supra n. 2 at 393. 
103
 Rau & Sherman, supra note 48, at 114. 
104
 The classic demonstration, if one is to take it at face value, is that of Justice Cardozo in Wood 
v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (“A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole 
writing may be ‘instinct with an obligation,’ imperfectly expressed”). Cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 
1603-04 (if “one of the rival interpretations proposed does not make commercial sense, the 
interpretation will be rejected because it probably does not jibe with what the parties understood when 
they signed the contract”); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 Va. L. 
Rev. 947, 953n.25 (1982)(“‘Casual empiricism’ is not a pejorative in my vocabulary; indeed, when used 
by wise people its other name is wisdom”). 
 See also Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 781, 782, 785 (1999) (“the Code recognizes that the rights and duties of contracting 
parties can be derived not solely from specified authoritative static forms, most notably the text of the 
bargain, but also from the dynamic, legally unformulated, fact patterns of common life”; nevertheless 
Ben-Shahar suggests that “the type of flexibility that the Code potentially promotes” will, because of 
factors like imperfect information and the randomness and imprecision of adjudication, often “make 
contractual parties worse off”). 
105
  Cf. Steven J. Burton, Elements of Contract Interpretation 44 (2009). 
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“intention” is.  We are never, after all, concerned about the viewpoint of the “reasonable 
fly on the wall.”106 
More broadly:  In every long-term arrangement there are, in the immortal words of 
Donald Rumsfeld, known unknowns (suggesting the need for flexibility and adaptation 
in contract administration), and unknown unknowns (where the state of the world turns 
out somewhat differently from what we had taken for granted):  But in either case---
underlying both---the parties are likely to have shared certain tacit assumptions with 
respect to the nature of their common enterprise, and with respect to the scope of their 
cooperative venture. To inquire into these, leads us to an assessment of the ambit of 
the risks each party has undertaken.107  
A tacit understanding with respect to the allocation of risk may for example be 
sought in any of the other “dickered” terms of the deal, for example, the agreed-upon 
price.108  And merely to use the overall framework of the agreement as a template may 
make available any number of alternative devices: A total failure to agree on the 
conditions of financing may, for example, be bypassed if we imagine that the party 
seeking to enforce the deal is willing to concede to the other the best possible terms to 
which he would be entitled.109  In all these exercises of “interpretation” we are not, that 
                                                          
106
 Cf. Davis v. Davis, 175 A. 574 (Conn. 1934).  Plaintiff and defendant went on an automobile ride with several 
young people. “It was a joyous occasion, and to add to the excitement the defendant dared the plaintiff to marry 
her”; “neither party intended at the time to enter into the marriage status”; held, although the ceremony had been 
performed by a justice of the peace---presumably an eminently reasonable man---“no real contract [was] created” 
and “no marriage ever came into existence.” 
Cf.  Laurent Lévy, L’interprétation arbitrale, [2013] Rev. de l’arb. 861, 890 (distinguishing between an 
arbitrator’s tendency to treat the matter from the point of view of the drafting parties themselves (attempting, in 
other words, to discover what it is that “they had meant to say”), and a judge’s tendency to interpret a text in the 
way that “a reasonable person (himself)” would have understood it---but recognizing that the two methods 
converge in practice and “generally lead to the same result”). 
107
 A textbook example, as you might expect, is Judge Posner’s opinion in Empire Gas Corp., supra n. 10.  The 
“gap” here consisted of the question---unaddressed by the parties---of “how much is the buyer obligated to buy in 
a requirements contract”?  The court held that the buyer’s decision, for undisclosed reasons to order nothing at 
all, amounted to a lack of good faith---pointing to the fact that “the sudden termination of the contract midway 
through performance is bound to disrupt [the seller’s ] operations somewhat”: 
The Illinois courts interpret a requirements contract as a sharing of risk between seller and buyer. The 
seller assumes the risk of a change in the buyer’s business that makes continuation of the contract 
unduly costly [e.g., where there is a complete “lack of orders”], but the buyer assumes the risk of a less 
urgent change in his circumstances, perhaps illustrated by the facts of this case where so far as one can 
tell the buyer’s change of mind reflected no more than a reassessment of the balance of advantages and 
disadvantages under the contract.   
108
 See, e.g., Restatement, Second, Contracts sec. 351 cmt. f (consequential damages; “ an extreme 
disproportion between the loss and the price charged by the party whose liability for that loss is in question” 
“suggests that it was not intended to cover the risk of such liability”). 
109 See, e.g., Restatement, Second, Contracts § 33 Ill. 2 (where part of the purchase price was to be in cash and 
part “on mortgage,” but the terms of the loan were not stated, “the contract is too indefinite to support a decree of 
specific performance against [the buyer]---but [the buyer] may obtain such a decree if he offers to pay the full 
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is, “guessing at the hidden but determined content of some list of meanings in the 
speaker’s head”---rather “our concerns particularize, render concrete, inchoate 
meanings.”110  And---an overarching, but obvious point---the content of any merits-
based contractual presumption with respect to the proper allocation of risks (no matter 
who performs the exercise) is a very different thing indeed from any presumption that 
would foreclose the decisionmaking authority of arbitrators.111 
Yet a further step---barely perceptible as anything different from what has gone 
before---would ask us to move from “interpretation” as commonly understood to the 
process of filling a gap in a responsible way. The law of Contracts is of course rife with 
“gap fillers”---it is rather hard to see how we could function without them---and much 
of the UCC in fact consists of presumptions to which we necessarily default in 
reading an agreement, where the parties have given us no particular indications to 
the contrary.112  The most common tactic is to adopt a “mimicking” principle which 
seeks to align what the court does with a hypothetical consent (which is why we 
speak of “implied terms”).  The search is for those terms “the parties would have 
agreed upon”113 in a completely spelled-out agreement---or perhaps114, for the “bargain 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
price in cash”); Ontario Downs, Inc. v. Lauppe, 192 Cal.App.2d 697 (2004)(parties entered into an agreement for 
the sale of 15.87 acres of land but did not specify which 15.87 acres within the seller’s 450-acre lot were to be 
sold; held, if  the buyer waived any right of selection he might have “and was willing to accept any 15.87-acre 
parcel, the court could require the [sellers] to select an appropriate parcel and upon [sellers’] refusal to so select, 
then allow [buyer] to designate a reasonable parcel”).  See generally Ben-Shahar, supra n. 2 at 390, 411 
(proposing that “a party who seeks enforcement of a deliberately incomplete agreement [should] be granted an 
option to enforce the transaction under the agreed-upon terms supplemented with terms that are the most 
favorable (within reason) to the defendant”; “if the parties recognize their deadlock and nevertheless draft a partial 
agreement, they are indicating that some assent has been obtained,” and the remaining gap could be “decoupled” 
from the agreed-upon terms, allowing each party “to enforce upon her opponent a deal that, with respect to the 
contested issues, includes the opponent’s favored terms”). 
110
 Fried supra n.3 at 60 (“so when a person refers to all the even numbers between 10 and 1000, he intends to 
refer also to the number 946, although that number may not figure explicitly on some list in his head”). 
111
 But cf. Berger, supra  n. 40 at 8 (“the presumption of  the professional competence of the parties to 
international business contracts” leads to a “yardstick” that “it is up to the parties to take precautions in their 
contract against unforeseen circumstances”; thus ”in the absence of a special clause in the contract, the parties 
have indicated that the principle of sanctity of contracts shall prevail” so that “the risks of changed circumstances 
or discovery of gaps” is to be “borne by the parties”; “since the parties do not want an arbitration of that kind, 
adaption and supplementation may not be imposed on them by the arbitrators”). 
112
 See Rau, “Separability,” supra note 13, at 29 n.71 (“sales law consists of little else but an abundant off-the-
rack stock of background presumptions”). 
113
 Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 397 (“the mimicking theory is based on a premise that there exists an 
underlying ‘will’ or hypothetical consent,” or more precisely, that there are “specific definitive terms that 
the parties would have rationally agreed upon had they paid sufficient attention to the matter”); see 
also Clayton P. Gillette, Cooperation and Convention in Contractual Defaults, 3 S. Cal .  In terd isc .  
L.J .  167, 170-71 (1993) (“a default rule concerning risk of loss may reflect the objective that the 
parties would have achieved had they bargained fully about the matter, while allowing [them] to save 
the costs of achieving that bargain”). 
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that most similarly situated parties would have chosen,115 or that it would be rational 
for such parties to have chosen ex ante.”116 
 I say this is a “barely perceptible” step because quite often, it is not acknowledged---
or perhaps even realized---that a conscious choice of a default rule is being made.117  
Conventional commentary may insist on a doctrinal separation between mere questions of 
“interpretation”--- necessarily focused on the search for the appropriate “intent”---and 
exercises in “gap filling”118---but after all, this is unlikely to be a stable or workable 
distinction,119 and conceptualism should not prevent us from appreciating that “gap filling” is 
equally “interpretive”---precisely to the extent that it represents  an effort “to determine  how 
the parties would have resolved the issue that has arisen had they foreseen it when they 
negotiated their contract.”120 Conversely, given that there is often no true “intention” one way 
or the other, courts in a sense “make” contracts for the parties “almost every time they 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
114
 “if the judicial task of identifying the hypothetical consent is more difficult, in light of the heterogeneity of 
contracting parties and the uncertainty concerning the circumstances,” Ben-Shahar, supra n. 2 at 398. 
115
 See also Lévy, supra n. 106 at 889 (“the views that people with characteristics similar to those of the parties in 
the suit, and placed in analogous circumstances, would have shared”). 
116
 Rau & Sherman, supra note 48, at 115.   
117
 See the discussion at note 48 supra.  
118 See, e.g.,  Margaret N. Kniffin, 5 Corbin on Contracts § 24.3 (rev. ed. 1998) (a court’s action in filling a gap 
“with respect to a matter which the parties did not have in contemplation and  concerning which they therefore 
had no intention” “may be called construction” but “should not be called interpretation”). 
119
 The theme, in other words, is that “gap filling” and a semantic inquiry into “meaning” are both at bottom 
“interpretive”; see Posner, supra n. 4 at 1586, 1589 (both “interpretive in the sense that they are efforts to 
determine how the parties would have resolved the issue that has arisen had they foreseen it when they 
negotiated their contract”; “disambiguation” cases “could be turned into ‘gap’ cases by redefining ‘gap’ to mean 
not just the omission of a term but a gap in meaning because the term the parties included is unclear with 
reference to the particular contingency that has materialized”).   
 Cf. Restatement, Second, Contracts § 204 cmt. a. (“the supplying of an omitted term is not technically 
interpretation, but the two are closely related”); id. cmt. c. (where there is “a common tacit assumption” or where 
“a term can be supplied by logical deduction from agreed terms and the circumstances,” then “interpretation may 
be enough”; nonetheless “the supplying of an omitted term is not within the definition of interpretation”).  Since 
“bargaining in the presence of known default rules can hardly be deemed nonconsensual” [see n. 14 supra],  I 
really don’t know whether entering into a contract of sale with an open price term, in full awareness of UCC § 2-
305, calls for an exercise of “interpretation of intent” or of “gap filling.”  See also Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of 
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 Va. L. Rev. 821, 827, 909 (1992) (when “default rules are 
chosen to reflect the commonsense or conventional understanding of most parties,” “enforcement may still be 
justified on the grounds of consent”; “abstract methods of analysis are simply presumptive surrogates for 
evidence of actual meaning”). 
120
 See Posner, supra note 4, at 1586; see also Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation 
and Supplementation, 97 Colum. L.  Rev.  1710, 1719 (1997) (“when courts determine the meaning of a 
contract, they frequently resort to several sources at the same time,” making the supposed distinction 
between interpretation of the contract and supplementation (or “gap filling”), “problematic”); cf. Eric A. Posner, 
There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 Fla. St.  U. L. Rev. 563, 579 (2006) (“one might 
plausibly argue that interpretive presumptions are analytically the same as default rules even if they are placed 
in a separate doctrinal category”).  
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resolve an issue of contract interpretation” under the guise of deciphering the text:
121
  Both 
ambiguous and omitted terms can be recharacterized simply as terms that have failed to 
“fully specify obligations.”122 
 
From here there is often one further, small, but significant step. A default rule 
that purports to mimic a hypothetical transaction may not after all make a great deal 
of sense once one concedes that really, there has been no agreement whatever with 
respect to the missing term.123  As a consequence courts may think it best to bypass 
the exercise entirely---foregoing any pretense of conjecture about the bargaining 
process, or any attempt to reconstruct what the parties “would have chosen”---in 
favor of bringing to the surface what was probably latent all along: They may, in other 
words, proceed directly to select the solution which appears most economically 
efficient, or perhaps proceed to apply “a term which comports with community 
standards of fairness and policy.”124   When courts act in this way, they are still 
                                                          
121
 Hamilton, Rau, & Weintraub, supra n. 7 at 366-67.  
 Professor Nicklisch arrives, I think, at this conclusion---comes to realize it, it seems, almost in spite of 
himself---in Fritz Nicklisch, Agreement to Arbitrate to Fill Contractual Gaps, 5 J. Int’l Arb. 35, 41 (1988).  He writes 
there that a “course is often taken” to “regulate,” “in the wording of the contract,” “almost all areas and conceivable 
situations, using blanket clauses to cover those which are not foreseeable”---and in such a case an arbitral 
tribunal would not be “faced with the task of gap-filling, but rather with that of interpreting and applying the 
contractual regulations in an equitable manner.”  But of course, he ends with the---fairly obvious---recognition that 
“materially speaking the concretization of blanket clauses is very near to gap-filling in the fuller sense.”  
122
 Posner, supra note 120, at 579. 
At oral argument in Stolt-Nielsen, Justice Breyer posed this hypothetical: 
Imagine a worker who says: I have a right, permission, it’s permissible for me to eat lunch next 
to the machine. The employer says no. . . . So the arbitrator or the judge reads the words [of 
the contract]. Nothing. . . Then the judge or the arbitrator reads the rest of the contract. 
Hasn’t a clue. Then the arbitrator or the judge goes and looks and sees: “What’s practice 
around here?. . . Then they might look to what happens in the rest of the industry. 
Stolt-Nielsen, Oral Argument, supra 3, 2009 WL 4662509 at *40. 
 It is obvious that in adjudicating such a case, whether one: 
 looks at course of performance and custom and usage, or 
 asks what seems most consistent otherwise with the overall structure of the agreement, or 
 seeks to determine what is most likely to be consistent with the usual background 
presumption of employer control of physical arrangements in the workplace — 
all will call for conducting a similar analysis and will tend to lead to a similar result. 
 It is striking that Justice Breyer doesn’t stop there but continues: “Then they might look to what 
happens in foreign countries with comparable industries. Then they might look to public policy. They might 
look almost to anything under the sun they think is relevant.”   All of this goes to “what, objectively read, those 
words in the contract mean.” 
123
 Cf. Ben-Shahar, supra note 2, at 391-92, 414 (the premise that “a mutual will of the parties exists” is 
“problematic in incomplete contracts,” and amounts to a “pure fiction”). 
124
 Restatement, Second, Contracts § 204 cmt. d (“where there is in fact no agreement, the court should supply a 
term which comports with community standards of fairness and policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model of 
the bargaining process”); see a lso  id.  a t  §  351 cmt .  f  (consequent ia l  dam ages ;  “the fact that the 
parties did not attempt to delineate with precision all of the risks justifies a court in attempting to allocate them 
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remaining faithful to their usual role in formulating rules of general application---they 
are hardly at large, purporting to act as amiables compositeurs---nor could that be 
said of arbitrators who might follow their example.  For we can be pretty confident that 
a bluff and straightforward attempt to “supply” a term which is simply “reasonable 
in the circumstances”125 is not likely to stray too far from what at the very least were 
the tacit assumptions of the contracting parties underlying the deal.126  Still, 
normative concerns will in any event ineluctably play a role here, and a court which 
has no particular interest in camouflaging the route to its conclusion may well 
appeal to them explicitly.127 Any number of default rules in our law of arbitration can 
already be understood in precisely this way.128 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
fairly”);  cf. Zamir, supra note 120, at 1754 (“the judicial process of recognizing and developing ‘implied terms’ 
ordinarily produces rules that conform to prevailing conceptions of what is just, reasonable, and efficient in 
contractual relations”);  Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Wood v. Lucy: The Overlap between Interpretation and Gap-
Filling to Achieve Minimum Decencies, 28 Pace L. Rev. 219, 226-27 (2008) (“the exhaustion of all interpretive 
steps is not needed to create a ‘gap’ designed to leave room for mandated observance of perceived minimum 
decencies in the course of performance”).. 
125
 Restatement, Second, Contracts § 204.    
126
 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of 
Contract, 18 J .  Lega l  Stud.  105, 106 (1989) (“what rational parties would have agreed to is . . . 
strong evidence of what these parties did, in fact, agree to where there is silence or ambiguity”; there 
is accordingly “a complete congruence between the ‘efficient’ identification of the proper contract terms 
and honoring what the parties did, or would have agreed to do, under contract”). 
127
 Cf. David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 
Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1875-77 (1991) (in the case of two unmarried persons living together, a court 
found “the existence of an agreement for property to be owned jointly”; this “strategy of imaginative 
reconstruction” – or in an alternative formulation, this “implicit paternalism” – might be justified on the 
ground that it “may help to change social attitudes about duties of men and women living in intimate 
relationships”; “the judicial standard of fair conduct may be one that persons will defer to”). 
128
 For example, the time-honored doctrine of “separability,” and our “presumption of arbitrability” [the 
former is fairly to understand as just an aspect of the latter, an included case], are both probably best 
viewed as majoritarian defaults that imputes to contracting parties a preference for “one- stop 
adjudication”; see Rau, “Separability,” supra note 13, at 115-16 (“inevitably more economical, and thus 
likely to have been desired by both parties ex ante”; in addition, “questions of scope and questions 
going ‘to the merits’ are often so intertwined that we can expect similar arbitral competence to be 
relevant, and similar factual considerations to come into play”). At the same time, though, they might be 
thought to reflect a federal policy preference in favor of directing disputed issues to alternative fora. 
See, e.g., Roadway Package System, Inc. v. Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 296-97 (3d Cir. 2001) (“any default 
rule is doomed to be inaccurate in some cases,” but in light of the FAA’s “raison d’être,” it is worse to 
“wrongly conclud[e] that parties intended to opt out” of the FAA’s standards of review, than to “wrongly 
conclud[e] that they did not”). 
Either way, the methodology – which is impeccable – has particular resonance for the cases we 
are discussing here. I say the methodology is “impeccable” because in any concrete case, as a 
response to a particular question, it supplies a presumptively applicable term on the basis either of 
• an assessment of presumed intent, or 
• an instrumental exercise of state policy. 
The Prima Paint inquiry in particular has become so routine, so mechanical, so much a question of 
second nature to us, that we rarely notice the process we are going through:. To courts, attorneys, and academics 
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 So to review the bidding: Default rules in adjudication can be crafted by the 
decision-maker as an attempt to “mimic” the contracting parties' hypothetical bargain, or 
to track their tacit assumptions---or such rules can be crafted, more simply and directly, 
in overt response to concerns of efficiency and fair play.  But none of this---despite the 
suggestion of the Court---is remotely akin to suggesting that “mere silence” can itself 
“constitute consent ” to class-wide proceedings:129 That of course is not what the 
arbitrators did, nor is it what any reasonable arbitrator would do. 
Now having reached this point, we pause and look around and find ourselves 
pretty clearly now in the realm of what would normally be termed, not “interpretation,”130 
but “construction.”131  Nevertheless skepticism about the coherence, or stability, or 
utility, of any supposed dichotomy between the two seems abundantly justified, and 
growing---whether it involves reading a will,132 or even a constitution.133  With respect 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
alike, Prima Paint does not really seem to be just a “presumption”—still less does it seem to be an individualized 
factual inquiry—it rather has the feel of a “doctrine,” a “rule of law.  But Prima Paint is in fact nothing but an 
“unremarkable and eminently sensible” default rule “with respect to the likely boundaries of contractual consent,” 
a “working presumption” that contracting the parties did indeed wish the matter of contractual validity to be 
entrusted to arbitrators. This rule of thumb in the absence of explicit articulation, this allocation of the burden of 
proof, is no more a “fiction” than is our usual assumption that a seller has promised to deliver merchantable 
goods.
” 
 As a device allowing a court to “fill gaps” in the absence of an “agreement,” a default rule is 
necessarily – at the same time – a presumption that allocates between the parties the burden of 
persuasion as to whether a particular term was included in the deal. And in assigning burdens in 
litigation, it is certainly a familiar enough phenomenon to see the choice made largely in the interest of 
handicapping a contention that happens to be socially disfavored. See, e.g., Edward W. Cleary, 
Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 11 (1959) (while “policy 
more obviously predominates at the stage of determining what elements are material, its influence may 
nevertheless extend into the stage of allocating those elements by way of favoring one or the other 
party to a particular kind of litigation”); Marshall S. Sprunge, Note, Taking Sides: The Burden of 
Proof Switch in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1301, 1309-10 (1996)(this rationale “reveals 
the link between the procedural device of the burden of proof and substantive legal concerns”; for 
example, “since some judges disliked that a negligent defendant could escape liability merely on the 
fortuity that a plaintiff had also been negligent,  they assigned to the defendant the burden of proving 
contributory negligence”). 
129
 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776. 
130
 See Horan v. Danton, 2005 WL 189733 (D. Del. 2005), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 2006 WL 859042 (3d 
Cir.2006)(“ When a court engages in ‘interpretation of language,’ it determines what ideas the language induces 
in other persons”). 
131
 See id. (“When a court engages in ‘construction of the contract,’ it determines the contract's legal operation -
that is, its effect upon the action of courts and administrative officials”). 
132
 See Richard F. Storrow, Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing Distinction between Will Interpretation 
and Construction, 56 Case Western Res. L. Rev. 65, 82-83 (2005)(the ALI “has decided that will interpretation 
and will construction are not discrete parts of a sequential process but are, in fact, simply components of a single 
process known as construction”). 
133
 See,  e.g., Laura A. Cisneros, The Constitutional  Interpretation/Construction Distinction: A Useful Fiction, 27 
Constitutional Commentary 71, 75, 80 (2010)(any line between the two is “artificial, as it defies all practical 
attempts to draw it consistently from case to case,” and, “as an aid to the practice of judging,” “unhelpful”). 
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to the reading of a contract – our particular concern – the two are routinely conflated.134  
And in any event it has never been thought that a court was foreclosed from going 
down this path; in all the cases I have mentioned there is a “gap” in the simple and 
straightforward sense that a conceded “contract” has failed to specify a result in all 
possible future states of the world.   
So, at just what moment---just where in this gradual series of moves---are arbitrators 
now to be told to stop and to go no further? Note that the strategy of the Court in Stolt-
Nielsen is to 
• purport, somewhat disingenuously, to notice a supposed “stipulation” 
respecting a failure of “agreement”---and then 
 
 to choose to draw the line right there---allowing a tribunal to go no further, on  
the ground that doing anything more---ordering classwide proceedings in the 
absence of some “contractual basis”---would be to “impose its own 
conception of sound policy.”135 
 
This amounts to imposing on our law of arbitration an extraordinarily confined view of 
adjudication: 
  
• For one thing, as we have just seen, no designated “contract reader” 
                                                          
134
 See Corbin on Contracts, supra note 118, § 24.3 at 11 (the “overwhelmingly common practice” of courts is to 
use these terms “interchangeabl[y]”). 
 At most, perhaps, one might stake out some relevance for the distinction in the claim that “construction” 
(alone) is to be deemed a matter of “law” – if only in the precise sense that exercises in “construction” (alone), 
when engaged in by lower courts, are to be subject to a heightened standard of review on appeal; see Horan, 
supra n. 130 (“Questions of contract interpretation are reviewed according to the clearly erroneous standard, 
while questions of contract construction are reviewed de novo”; nevertheless in this case, involving an 
“unambiguous written contract,” it does not matter whether the Bankruptcy Court ‘construed’ or ‘interpreted’ the 
agreement, as under Delaware law “construction and/or interpretation” of such a contract “is a question of law”). 
 However doubtful we must be as to whether any of this is particularly manageable---for in disputes 
that turn on the meaning of a contract, questions of “fact” and “law” will be after all inextricably intertwined
 
– it is 
very hard to see any purchase at all for such a notion in the context of attempts to vacate an award.  The critical 
point is that an arbitration agreement makes arbitral tribunals plenary judges of fact and law without any sort of 
review remotely reminiscent of that exercised over a hierarchically inferior court; see S.A. Wenger & Co., Inc. 
v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, 146 N.E. 203 (N.Y.1924)(“Traders may prefer the decision of the arbitral tribunal 
to that of the courts” on “difficult questions of law as well as of fact”).  The very fact that Americans (alone in the 
world) have to live with the civil jury---which after all sets the gold standard for unprincipled decision-making---
may perhaps explain why we can be so tolerant of, and comfortable with, departures from legal norms in an arbitral 
process to which the parties have voluntarily submitted. For well over a century the cases have been full of 
reminders to the effect that “if an arbitrator makes a mistake either as to law or fact, it is the misfortune of the party 
and there is no help for it,” Patton v. Garrett, 21 S.E. 679, 682-83 (N.C. 1895). 
135
 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 fn. 10. 
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operates this way. 
 
• For another, it is entirely ahistorical to insist on a constricted authority---not 
on the part of a lower court, but of an arbitral tribunal set in motion as the 





That takes us, then, to what is for my money the most mystifying sentence to be 
found in any opinion ever written by the Supreme Court on the subject of arbitration:  
The award must be vacated, Justice Alito writes, because “the panel proceeded as if it 
had the authority of a common-law court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to 
be applied in such a situation.”137 But if an arbitral tribunal is really instructed to stop 
well short of all the usual work of construction that a common-law court would be 
expected to perform, then the resulting tension between our notions of arbitral and 
judicial adjudication becomes manifest.  
The Court’s remark that the arbitral tribunal had “exceeded its powers” by simply 
“impos[ing] its view of sound policy,” quickly gave rise to a vast amount of free-ranging 
speculation---much of which, it seems to me, misses the mark. 138  The Court could 
                                                          
136
 In fact the Uniform Arbitration Act has long warned that “the fact that the relief [granted by arbitrators] was 
such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of law or equity is not ground for vacating or refusing 
to confirm the award.” Un i f .  Arb.  Act  § 12(a) (1955); see also Revised Unif. Arb. Act § 21(c) (2000). There are 
a number of possible implications of this language. Among other things, the text has been invoked to buttress 
our understanding that arbitral awards need not in substance track the course of official jurisprudence. At the 
same time it also serves to remind us that whatever policies underlie the traditional refusal of courts to take 
upon themselves the task of salvaging an excessively indefinite “agreement to agree,” they have no particular 
relevance when the parties were content to have an arbitral tribunal do so. W e don ’ t ,  in  o ther  words ,  and 
qu i te  proper l y  so ,  go  in  m uch  here  f o r  an y not ion  o f  “ synchron ized com petenc es . ”  See also 
text accompanying nn. 25-31, 37-41 supra. 
137
 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1769. 
138
 E.g., S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return 
to First Principles, 17 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 201, 240 (2012)(the Court’s language seems “odd,” given that in cases 
like Mitsubishi the Court “has indicated that the failure to consider relevant public policies can lead to the 
overturning of an award”); Margaret Moses, Did the U.S. Supreme Court, in its Stolt-Niesen [sic] Decision, Make 
it Easier for Courts to Vacate Arbitration Awards?, available at 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2010/12/14/did-the-u-s- supreme-court-in-its-stolt-niesen-decision-make-it-
easier-for-courts-to-vacate-arbitration- awards (the Court’s decision is “unusual and without precedent,” since 
FAA  § 10(a)(4) “has  never  previously been  interpreted  as  meaning  that if  arbitrators consider public policy, 
they have exceeded their powers”); Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and Procedure, 94 
Marquet te  L .  Rev.  1103, 1155 (2011). 1148 n.159 (if the “rationale” of Stolt-Nielsen is “that arbitrators lack 
the authority of common law courts to make decisions on the basis of public policy,” does this suggest that 
parties by agreeing to arbitration might “be forgoing substantive rights” despite declarations to the contrary in 
cases like Mitsubishi?); Gerald Aksen, The Short Life of International Class Arbitration in the USA, in Liber 
Amicorum en l’honneur de Serge Lazareff 47, 52 (Laurent Lévy et al. eds., 2011) (Stolt-Nielsen “casts doubt 
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hardly have intended to suggest anything at all that would in the slightest call into 
question the power of arbitrators to adjudicate claims implicating the “public interest”:  
For arbitrators may and indeed must decide questions of mandatory law in fidelity to 
the choice of the parties---once made---to entrust such matters to them.  Nor, when 
the majority reminds us that arbitrators do not sit to “dispense [their] own brand of 
industrial justice,” could it be thought that they were suddenly reaching out to 
appropriate some alien doctrine of review peculiar to our collective bargaining 
jurisprudence.139    
 
No, I would think that what the Court was trying to say was undoubtedly much 
simpler---and it was even, marginally, to the point:140  It seems that the intention was 
merely to invoke a conventional trope that has long been familiar to our law of 
arbitration---to the effect that what will provoke vacatur, is the arbitrator’s frolic, his 
“flights of fancy”141---for this and only this “lies outside the perimeter of agreement.” 
The “critical distinction” then has always been “between the arbitrators’ imperfect 
ability to carry out the task entrusted to them, and their simple failure even to try.”142  
That the award must in this sense “draw its essence” from the parties’ agreement may 
seem a curious formulation, but it is also curiously satisfying, and manages to get the 
idea across quite adequately: And this is really all that “excess of power” (or 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
regarding who decides ‘public policy’ issues,” which is “particularly troubling---arbitrators decide questions of 
sound policy all the time”; while the New York Convention “allows a public policy defense in award review, 
here the decision arguably holds that the question does not even fall under the scope of a broad arbitration 
clause”). 
139
 Cf. Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: Stolt-Nielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the 
Future of American Arbitration, 22 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 323, 342 n.107 (2011) (the Stolt-Nielsen majority 
“borrowed, for the first time in a commercial arbitration decision by the Court, and somewhat anachronistically, 
[this] maxim from the collective bargaining realm,” and so this “principle of labor arbitration must now be 
regarded as a part of the law surrounding FAA Section 10(a)(4)”); Moses, supra note 138 (“the Court drew upon 
a standard from labor arbitration rather  than from commercial arbitration”; this “labor arbitration standard” “does 
not appear to be very different from a finding that the arbitrator improperly applied the law”). 
140
 Not the least of the “literary offenses of James Fenimore Cooper,” in Mark Twain’s delightful account, is that 
the conversations of Cooper’s characters “consisted mainly of irrelevancies”---but “with here and there a 
relevancy, a relevancy with an embarrassed look, as not being able to explain how it got there.”  The essay is in 
Kenneth S. Lynn (ed.), The Comic Tradition in America 328, 338 (1958). 
141
 Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1990). 
142
 Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration, supra n. 26 at 531. 
To the same effect – although using the conventional language of “interpretation” – is Hill v. Norfolk 
and Western Ry. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (7th Cir.1987)(Posner, J.) (the question “is not whether 
the arbitrator or arbitrators erred in interpreting the contract; it is not whether they clearly erred in 
interpreting the contract; it is not whether they grossly erred in interpreting the contract; it is whether 
they interpreted the contract”; a party can only complain if the arbitrators “disregard the contract and 
implement their own notions of what is reasonable and fair”); Wise v. Wachovia Securities, LLC 450 F.3d 
265, 269 (7th Cir. 2006)(Posner, J.)(“the issue for the court is not whether the contract interpretation is 
incorrect or even wacky but whether the arbitrators had failed to interpret the contract at all, for only 
then were they exceeding the authority granted to them”). 
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“manifest disregard,” for that matter) comes down to.143 
 
Nevertheless: mere adjudication in the face of a lack of agreement is hardly 
tantamount to proscribed “faithlessness”---not as long as it remains within the 
authority of the parties’ chosen arbitrators to devise appropriate default rules to help 
them construe the contract. It is only the arbitrator’s failure to proceed as instructed144--
-or the defiance of some contractual mandate limiting his mission145---perhaps indeed 
to the point of saying, “to hell with” the applicable law146---that begins to endanger 
the paramount value of private autonomy. If there are indeed any outer “boundaries” to 
the process of construction, they are here.  
 
In the very same sentence as its extraordinary rebuke of the arbitral tribunal for 
having “proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-law court to develop what it 
                                                          
143
 The canonical “draws its essence” formula originated of course in the first, “Steelworkers” “trilogy,” United 
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)(“an arbitrator is 
confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense 
his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is 
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement”). But among the 
many non-labor cases that have since found it to be helpful, going back to the time immediately following 
Steelworkers, see San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 
(9th Cir. 1961)(charter party; “manifest disregard” “is the sort of thing the Court had in mind” in its language in 
Steelworkers); Bosack v. Soward. 586 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009)(claim of breach of fiduciary duty against 
former investment manager and general partner; arbitrators “exceed their powers” when they express a 
“manifest disregard of law,” or when they issue an award that is “completely irrational” – and an award is 
“completely irrational” where it “fails to draw its essence from the agreement”); Hoffman v. Cargill Inc., 236 
F.3d 458, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2001) (proper price for delivered corn; “an award will only be set aside where it is 
completely irrational or evidences a manifest disregard for the law,” and it “may only be said to be irrational 
where it fails to draw its essence from the agreement”). 
144
 Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration, supra n. 26 at 531 (“suppose that an arbitrator has been entrusted 
with the task of valuing a party’s shares in a close corporation, and that he has been told to value the 
business ‘as a going concern in the light of past, present and prospective future earnings and the net 
worth of said business’”; however, “it can be shown that he did not even bother to obtain any operating 
figures or net earnings for the previous five years, and that he did not capitalize prospective earnings”). 
145
 E.g., Roadway Package System, Inc., s u p r a  n .  1 2 8  (arbitrator was asked to determine “whether the 
termination of [an independent contractor] was within the terms of this Agreement,” but he instead framed the 
question as “whether the termination was wrongful or proper,” and his award “makes crystal clear that [his] 
decision was based on the fact that he thought [the respondent’s] procedures for notifying [claimant] of its 
dissatisfaction with his performance were unfair”; the arbitrator thus “ruled on an issue that was not properly 
before him”). 
146
 See, e.g., Edstrom Industries, Inc. v. Companion Life Ins. Co., 516 F.3d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 2008)(Posner, J.); 
see also id. at 552 (“if they tell him to apply Wisconsin law, he cannot apply New York law”). The arbitrator in 
Edstrom did not actually go quite so far---but although the contract directed that he “strictly apply Wisconsin 
law,” it appeared to the court that “he seems not to have interpreted it at all but merely to have ignored it”---“it is 
unrealistic to think that the arbitrator was even trying to interpret Wisconsin law.” (emphasis in original)  So 
the award was vacated. See also N.Y. Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers of Amer., 256 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 
2001)(“perhaps,” the arbitrator had written, “it is time for a new court decision”). 
Alan Scott Rau 
“Gap Filling” by Arbitrators 
May 9, 2014 




viewed as the best rule,” the Stolt-Nielsen Court faulted the tribunal for failing to 
“[inquire] whether the FAA, maritime law, or New York law contains a ‘default rule’ 
under which an arbitration clause is construed as allowing class arbitration in the 
absence of express consent.”147  Such a “default rule,” as we have seen, can 
indeed be found in the law of a number of jurisdictions, such as South Carolina----
although of course in those jurisdictions the “rule” will only surface in circumstances 
where it is assumed that the decision is to be made in the first place, not by an arbitral 
tribunal, but instead by a court.148   
 
 Now the implication that the arbitrators were somehow obligated to 
expressly “identify” and articulate the basis of their award149---and that 
we are not permitted to deduce one circumstantially from the award 
itself---is surprising to begin with.150  
 
 A further implication is more startling still---that if some textual hook, 
some “contractual basis” or “interpretive path,” can’t be found---then the 
arbitrators, in the absence of any well-established judicial “default rule,” 
will be powerless to spin out one of their own.  It is almost as if 
arbitrators were to be placed in a position analogous to federal courts in 
diversity cases, bound when embarking on an Erie exercise to defer to 
state law---but then, even so, federal courts in such circumstances are 
not really expected to shut down the process and turn off the lights should 
they be unable to identify a state-court rule of decision.  
 
 And finally---and even more strikingly---any observer must be bewildered 
by what this passage does not take into account: An unexceptional 
“default rule” is after all readily to hand, if one only takes the trouble 
to look for it. For a “meta-default rule” informs every feature of our law of 
                                                          
147
 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768-90; see also id. at 1770. 
148
 See text accompanying n. 52 supra; cf. Rau & Sherman, supra n. 48, at 114 (statutes permitting court-
ordered consolidation in the interest of efficient case administration and in the absence of a contrary 
agreement). 
149
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 (because the agreement was “silent,” “the arbitrators’ proper task was to 
identify the rule of law that governs in that situation”); id. at 1770 (“instead of identifying and applying a rule of 
decision derived from the FAA or either maritime or New York law, the arbitration panel imposed its own policy 
choice and thus exceeded its powers”). 
150 Cf. Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1992) (the burden is on the party seeking to overturn the 
award to refute “every rational basis upon which the arbitrator could have relied”); see also Rau, The Culture of 
American Arbitration, supra n. 26 at 513-14 (an arbitrator’s ability to render a “naked award” may have “an 
important positive effect,” maximizing “his freedom from overbroad rules or time-honored categories, which 
might otherwise appear to dictate a result he would prefer to avoid”; conversely, “any attempt to impose 
reasoned awards on arbitrators will be motivated at least in part by the desire to expand judicial supervision of 
the process”). 
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arbitration---I mean, of course, a background rule to the effect that by 
submitting to the process, the parties in cases of “silence” have 
presumptively entrusted to their arbitrators a wide-ranging power to 
determine just what form their proceeding will take.151 
 
Note carefully that I have been talking here about the broad party-delegated 
authority of arbitrators to give meaning to contracts and to devise appropriate 
default rules (whether by means of “interpretation” or “construction”). This is the 
only question posed---the question is therefore not, as the Court phrased it, 
“whether the parties [actually] agreed to authorize class arbitration,”152 That, by 
contrast, was precisely the question posed to the arbitral tribunal itself.  To frame 
the matter as the Court did is thus to conflate questions going to the merits with 
questions going to the identity of the appropriate decisionmaker.153   
Here is one final test of the Stolt-Nielsen methodology: Suppose that an arbitrator were to 
issue a “clause construction award” holding that class-wide arbitration is permitted, and were to 
base his conclusion on a rule of applicable law to the effect that contracts are to be 
“construed against the drafter.”154  This contra proferentem canon is often marginalized as a 
                                                          
151
 See Rau, “Consent” to Arbitral Jurisdiction, supra n. 73 at 139 (once there is “an agreement in which 
arbitrators have been selected and entrusted with the power to do something,” the inquiry then turns to “what the 
parties could reasonably have expected to be within the authority of ‘their’ arbitrators,” and “at the core of any 
mandate would naturally be matters touching on the appearance of the process and the conduct of the 
hearings”); Oral Argument, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, supra n. 57, 2003 WL 1989562 at *25-*26 
(Justice Scalia: “they don’t consent to every jot and tittle of means by which the arbitration will be conducted; 
they consent in a gross kind of way to arbitration or nonarbitration, and – and that’s – that’s what their consent 
makes the difference between, but they don’t consent to every consequent detail that enters into the actual 
conduct of the arbitration”). 
152
 Stolt-Nielsen, 1390 S. Ct. at 1776. 
153 Of course, these two concepts---of “arbitral jurisdiction,” and “unreviewable arbitral discretion”---are closely 
related---are tightly interdependent.  An arbitral exercise of power delegated by the parties to the tribunal will after 
all routinely command the usual degree of deference that is extended to any decision “on the merits”---or at the 
very least will be subject to a judicial control substantially less intrusive than de novo review. Conversely, that a 
given outcome will be clearly illegitimate in arbitration, must cast considerable doubt on the willingness of the 
parties to entrust the matter to the arbitrator in the first place; see text accompanying nn. 170-174 infra.  Still, the 
two represent separate analytic problems that should not be muddled.  
 Naturally, though, the distinction is not universally observed.  See also the discussion at n. 68 supra.  For 
a mature attempt to grapple with it, see Oral Argument, Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Florida, 2013 WL 1193215 
(March 25, 2013) at *21 (Justice Sotomayor: “I used to think that exceeding your powers was deciding an issue 
the parties hadn’t agreed to arbitrate, but here you’ve conceded that you gave the issue to the arbitrator . . . So 
what instead you’re saying is that ‘exceeded your powers’ means that an error the arbitrator makes has to be of 
what quality?”). 
154
 Genus Credit Management Corp. v. Jones, 2006 WL 905936, at *1-*3 (D. Md. Apr. 6, 2006)(arbitrator 
determined that the agreement “was ambiguous as to class arbitration and should be interpreted against the 
drafter”; held, “it cannot be argued in any respect – as is plaintiff’s burden – that [the arbitrator’s] interpretation 
fails to draw its essence from the contract”). 
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technique of construction “of last resort”155:  Still it may do occasional useful service as a 
“penalty default” – setting the baseline not at all at what the parties “probably wanted”  (or 
“would have wanted”), but precisely at what they would have wished to avoid---in the 
interest of discouraging strategic behavior, creating incentives for the more knowledgeable 
party to draft more explicitly in order to contract around the default.156  And “interpreting” a 
contract against the drafter can above all serve an openly redistributive function, correcting for 
“an imbalance in the fairness of the exchange.”157  “It is chiefly a rule of policy, generally 
favoring the underdog.”158 The one thing that this “rule” is not, clearly, is an interpretive guide 
aimed at ferreting out what the true “intention” or “meaning” of the parties truly was. (If there was 
any “intention” at all, surely we can attribute to the drafting party the will to draft in a way as 
favorable as possible to himself?) While it remains commonplace for courts to conjure up 
notions of contra proferentem, are we now, after Stolt-Nielsen, to conclude that this can no 
longer be part of the tool box of the arbitral “contract reader”? 
 
                                                          
155
 E.g., Empire Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Morris, 65 A. 450, 453 (N.J. Err. & App.1906)(“it is the last to be 
resorted to---a rule never to be relied upon except where other rules of construction fail”). 
One could realistically go somewhat further and suggest that it serves most often as little more than a 
makeweight, wheeled out to bolster a result already reached and chosen for more functional purposes.  This 
seems exemplified by Mastrobuono v.Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995)(the strong 
“federal policy favoring arbitration” requires that arbitration agreements be “generously construed,” and this 
requires “an unequivocal exclusion” of punitive damages; “moreover, respondents cannot overcome the 
common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court should construe ambiguous language against the 
interest of the party that drafted it”). 
156
 The locus classicus is Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Y a l e  L . J .  87 (1989). On understanding Hadley v. Baxendale through this 
optic, see id. at 101-04 (the Hadley default can “be understood as a purposeful inducement to the miller as the 
more informed party to reveal that information to the carrier,” which “creates value because if the carrier 
foresees the loss, he will be able to prevent it more efficiently”). On understanding contra proferentem through 
this optic, see Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 927 F.2d 974, 976 (7th Cir. 1991)(Easterbrook, J.), and 
Ben-Shahar, supra n. 2 at 391, 398. 
157
 Burton, supra note 105 at 188. 
158
 Corbin on Contracts, supra n. 118 at 306. See also Restatement, Second, Contracts § 206 cmt. a. 
(the drafting party is “more likely than the other party to have reason to know of uncertainties of 
meaning” and may indeed “leave meaning deliberately obscure”; “sometimes the result is hard to 
distinguish from a denial of effect to an unconscionable clause”); Zamir, supra note 120, at 1724-25 
(“this established rule may be justified on grounds of personal responsibility, fairness, efficiency and 
redistribution”; “some of these ends, like the reallocation of power and wealth between the parties, 
represent distinctively social values”). 
Professor Horton has suggested an alternative rationale---that “the doctrine is better understood as 
encouraging uniformity of meaning in mass produced contracts,” allowing firms to “reap the benefits of 
standardization” and consumers to “pay a price that reflects these savings”; without it, standardized terms 
would “mean different things to different consumers---a result that would tear the fabric of contract law.” David 
Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. Colo. L. Rev. 431, 438, 
474 (2009). Whatever the merits of this approach it will be noted that it does not, any more than traditional 
notions, rest on any attempt to ascertain true “intention.” 
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b. “Only One Possible Outcome on the Facts Before Us” 
 
So one view of Stolt-Nielsen, then, is that it represents a censure of the arbitral 
tribunal for presuming to go about deciding the case in the way it did: If all that the 
award amounted to, was the arbitrators’ attempt to “impose [their] own view of sound 
policy,” then it seemed to follow that the requisite “contractual basis” for the award 
must be missing.  This, as we have seen, has extremely troubling implications that 
extend far beyond the factual matrix of the case – implications for the way in which 
arbitrators are now to be expected to do their work of contract “construction,” and 
implications for the way in which courts may now respond to demands for annulment. It 
does not seem too much to say that this analysis calls into question our traditional 
view of arbitration as an alternative forum for adjudication. 
 There is another way of looking at the holding, however, this somewhat 
more “substantive”: It is that on the facts before the tribunal---and indeed on any view 
of the case- - - any award that would permit class-wide proceedings would be 
forever illegitimate.  The starting point here is that “a party may not be compelled under 
the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding 
the party agreed to do so.”159  So the parties’ supposed “stipulation” must mean 
precisely that the requisite affirmative showing of “consent” had not been made---
therefore depriving the arbitral order of the requisite “contractual basis.”  This is to enlist  
the FAA to ensure “freedom from arbitration.”160  And so on this view there was simply 
“no need” to send the case back to the arbitrators for a re-examination. 
 
We need not dwell on the back story here, which is troubling enough but not our real 
concern today. Few legal issues are as deeply fraught for the modern U.S. Supreme Court as 
the question of classwide proceedings. This part of the holding is obviously responsive to the 
Supreme Court’s predictable and result-driven agenda---captured as it has been by neo-liberal 
ideology and corporate interest---for it is clear enough that bilateral arbitration is valued by 
corporate users above all for “its promise to minimize the claim facilitating and liability effects 
of all aggregate litigation.161  So in our context of the “silent” arbitration clause, the premise 
                                                          
159
 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1775 (emphasis in the original). 
160
 See text accompanying n. 82 and n. 82 supra.  
161
 See Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract, supra n. 100 at 543, 527.  In a case handed down one year 
to the day after Stolt-Nielsen---and relying heavily on the earlier decision---the Court held that state law may not 
invalidate as “unconscionable” contractual provisions in which the drafting party attempts to insist on bilateral 
arbitration and to exclude classwide proceedings.  The state rule, Justice Scalia wrote, would impermissibly 
“interfere with arbitration.” And he added candidly that: 
[C]lass arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants. . . . [W]hen damages allegedly owed to tens of 
thousands of potential claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error will often 
become unacceptable. Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be 
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from which everything follows is this---that classwide proceedings would “change the nature of 
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed that the parties consented to it”---that 
is, the tribunal cannot be allowed to order it---merely because the underlying dispute is subject 
to arbitration.  
a. To say that an arbitral tribunal may not “proceed as if it had the authority of a 
common-law court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be applied” is, 
as we have seen, a proposition that in the normal run of cases is simply 
unthinkable---but such a remark can perhaps be marginalized by how it plays out 
in context here:  The Court is in fact saying that once the parties cannot be 
shown to have affirmatively agreed to classwide proceedings, a new and 
overriding federal “default rule” comes into play---a default rule to which state law 
must yield and which state courts and arbitrators alike, in applying it, must honor: 
The technique is to spin out from the FAA a federal policy privileging party 
autonomy – not only to preserve the freedom to arbitrate – but equally in the 
interest of protecting the parties’ freedom from having to arbitrate in any 
particular manner. So what will be considered to be “in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement” must apparently be evaluated, not by the state law of 
contracts, but by a federal common law grounded in § 4; to “enforce 
arbitration as agreed” apparently means that neither state courts nor arbitrators 
may not impose any form of proceeding alien to the parties’ expectations.   
Under this “default rule” the absence of an acceptable “agreement” necessarily 
means that recourse to the AAA class procedures is foreclosed.162 
 
b. And to say that classwide proceedings would necessarily “change the nature of 
arbitration” can also readily be misunderstood. The Court is saying nothing in 
particular about whether a given process “qualifies” as arbitration, or about how 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
pressured into settling questionable claims. Other courts have noted the risk of “in terrorem” settlements 
that class actions entail, and class arbitration would be no different. 
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).  
162
 Earlier remarks in which the Court reproached the arbitral tribunal for its failure to have considered the “New 
York default rule” [cf. text accompanying nn. 147-48] have to be considered disingenuous (or are perhaps just a 
case of running up the score?)--- because 
 whatever purchase state-law rules may have in informing the interpretation of contracts generally, 
 they have none here. 
In his decision, Justice Alito intimated strongly that federal courts even in diversity cases had no reason to defer 
to any contrary state-law default rule with respect to classwide proceedings, see Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773 
(“while the interpretation of an arbitration agreement is generally a matter of state law, the FAA imposes certain 
rules of fundamental importance, including the basic precept that arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion”).   
And then there is AT&T Mobility, LLC, supra n. 161:  If, as the Court put it there, the FAA “prohibits states” 
from insisting on class-wide proceedings as a condition of enforcement -- if state law to that effect is “preempted” 
because this would somehow denature arbitration---then “I should think it most unlikely that state courts remain 
free instead to ‘nudge’ the parties in the direction of class proceedings, by prescribing a similar ‘default rule’ in 
cases of “silence”; see Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract, supra n. 100 at 484 fn. 173. 
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to “define” the true “‘nature’ of arbitration,” or about what arbitration “really” 
“is”163---an inquiry that has a conceptual, essentialist---dare I say, 
“Continental”---air to it.  As we have seen---and  thankfully--- the quest for the 
“true essence” of the concept of “arbitration” has not, in this country, been 
conducted with anything like the ingenuity and obsessiveness devoted to the 
task in some other legal cultures.  Rather, the Court need only be taken as 
saying this: That the arbitrators’ imposition of a class-wide proceeding, 
 
 was (a matter of degree) so far outside the scope of the probable 
expectations of the contracting parties, and in consequence 
 
 would (a matter of degree) so drastically alter the cost/benefit calculus of 
their original decision to arbitrate, 
 
that (as a consequence) their agents should not have taken it upon themselves to do 
so---not, at least, without some further indicia of the parties’ consent.164 
 Now this is in fact an attractive and measured argument. It has considerable appeal 
when we are looking at commercial parties, particularly in the maritime context in which Stolt-
Nielsen itself arose.  It also has some appeal---of a different sort, perhaps, but still real---in 
the context of contracts of adhesion with consumers and employees---where concededly the 
drafter may have had reason to be aware of the possibility of class-wide proceedings---but 
also, at the same time, where he had the motivation (and the probable desire) to structure the 
transaction in such a way as to avoid them.  Whatever the systemic benefits of aggregate 
litigation,165 the very fact that drafting parties will rarely arrange their affairs so as to subject 
themselves to class-wide liability---and can be expected, if permitted to do so, to immediately 
opt out of any general background rule that does carries this danger---suggests that the 
Court’s may be a “majoritarian default.”  Even the notorious “stickiness” of default rules does 
not seem to have prevented strenuous attempts to “contract around” Bazzle. 
The delicate point rather lies elsewhere. This new “default rule” may in the abstract 
                                                          
163
 Cf. Strong, supra note 138, at 246-62 (attempting “to identify a universally acceptable definition of arbitration 
that can be used . . . to determine whether class arbitration does, in fact, ‘change the nature of arbitration’”). 
164
 Among the “fundamental changes brought about by  the shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action 
arbitration,” the court pointed to the fact that 
 the arbitrator “no longer resolves a single dispute between the parties to a single agreement, but instead 
resolves many disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties”; 
 under the AAA rules the :”presumption of privacy and confidentiality” no longer applies, and  
 the award “no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the 
rights of absent parties as well.” 
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776. 
165
 Cf. Strong, supra n. 65, at 1048-49 (identifying the advantages of “efficiency,” extending also to “unnamed 
claimants” and to “society as a whole,” as well as of “promoting social justice”). 
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seem sane enough.  Nevertheless---however sensible it may be--- it does not come to 
us as mere counsel to guide the exercise of arbitral discretion---but instead, as a 
limitation imposed by the state from outside the system entirely, and intended to 
demarcate the outer boundaries of arbitral “power.”  It is thus remarkably blind to the 
considerations of context and policy that usually inform the a r b i t r a t o r ’ s  process 
of contract construction: Apparently we are asked to accept that our practice of 
leaving judgments with respect to the parties’ expectations in the hands of their 
chosen arbitrators---a conventional assumption---must now be overridden by 
 
• the unusual nature of class-wide proceedings, coupled perhaps with 
• the particularly acute danger of distortion through arbitral self-interest. 
 While default rules pervade so much of our law of arbitration,166 this is their first 
appearance in the form of rules that are said to govern the determinations of the arbitrators 
themselves, on pain of vacatur.  Indeed, one would have to invest a good deal of time and 
effort before being able to identify cases---which in the end amount only to a trivial number--- in 
which the Supreme Court has been willing to mandate or approve the annulment of an arbitral 
award. (And before now these have been strictly outliers, grounded either on the lack of any 
agreement at all,167 or on some impropriety in the composition of the arbitral tribunal).168  But 
then we come to Stolt-Nielsen: It can hardly be accidental that the specter of class relief in 
arbitration is just about the only feature of the arbitration process that has been anathema to 
the business community---or that this rare decision restrictive of arbitral power happens, 
wonder of wonders, to be one in which a corporate-oriented Court manages more or less to 
relieve it of any such anxiety.  
 
 The dangers this seemed to pose in breathing new vigor into the mysterious prohibition 
of “excess of powers”---of forcing open widely “the door of vacatur”---were obvious, and 
                                                          
166
 See text accompanying nn. 128-29 supra.  For other examples, see Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of 
Contract, supra n. 100 at fn. 168.  
167 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)(company president argued that he had never 
consented in his individual capacity to allow arbitrators to determine the merits of the dispute; the Court held that 
he had not “submitted” this “arbitrability” challenge to the arbitrators merely by arguing the point before them). 
168
 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968). 
 In Bazzle, as we have seen, the Court did vacate a state court's confirmation of the award, but only 
because -- with respect to the critical question of whether class-wide proceedings were authorized -- “the parties 
have not yet obtained the arbitral decision that their contracts foresee”; the case was remanded “so that the 
arbitrator may decide the question of contract interpretation.” Efforts to characterize a measure as “pro-arbitration” 
or “anti-arbitration” are as often as not simplistic and naive, see Alan Scott Rau, The UNCITRAL Model law in 
State and Federal Courts:  The Case of “Waiver,” 6 Amer. Rev. Int’l Arb. 223, 270-71 (“waiver”; do courts “favor” 
the arbitration process “by staying litigation and moving the parties into arbitration whenever they have a chance 
to do so? Or do they ‘favor’ arbitration by creating incentives for the parties to initiate the process at the earliest 
possible moment, rather than allowing litigation to proceed?”). But it is not seriously open to argument that Bazzle 
falls securely in the former category. 
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immediately perceived. 169  The risk does seem to have receded considerably in recent 
months, a point I will turn to in a minute when we discuss the third case in this triptych, Oxford 
Health. 
 
 Before we go further, though, it might be appropriate to pause for just a moment to ask 
what was left, after all this, of the Bazzle case---which had been decided after all just a few 
years previously.  As we remember, Bazzle was all about reserving the question of 
interpretation for the tribunal---and so the validity of the actual holding there could not directly 
be called into question, given that in Stolt-Nielsen the parties’ adoption of the AAA Rules had 
amounted instead to an express delegation to the arbitrators of the authority to do so.    
 Still, the Court in Stolt-Nielsen went out of its way to suggest that the premise 
underlying Bazzle---the notion that arbitrators had presumptive competence to construe a 
contract in order to ask whether classwide proceedings were authorized---has not survived (at 
least in the absence of an express delegation of the sort contained in the Rules).  What else 
can one conclude from the Court’s flat assertion that “an implicit agreement to authorize class-
action arbitration . . . is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate”?170  That it is not enough for parties to be properly before the 
arbitrators---that the arbitrators may not presume to order classwide proceedings in the 
absence of some demonstrable “consent” to the arrangement---that their mission must 
terminate once the lack of some “contractual basis” for the order is noted---all must cast 
considerable doubt on whether the matter could be properly submitted to them in the first 
place.171  And all of that comes very close to saying that this issue of construction is now one 
where it is the court that is charged with monitoring entrance through the “gateway” ---a 
                                                          
169
 See Stipanowich, supra note 139, at 342; Aksen, supra n. 138 at 53 (Stolt-Nielsen “contains enough dictums to 
jeopardize the finality of commercial arbitration awards in general”). 
170
 That is, “it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an 
arbitrator.” Stolt-Nielsen, 230 S. Ct. at 1775. 
171
 When Justice Ginsburg in dissent noted in passing that the issue of class-wide proceedings merely concerned 
“the procedural mode available for presentation of [the claimant's] antitrust claims,” Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 
1781-82, she seemed to be channeling the Howsam/Bazzle jurisprudence under which such “procedural” 
questions were presumptively confided to arbitrators “well situated” to answer them. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452 
(“the question here” “does not fall into [the] narrow exception,” the “limited circumstances,” in which “the parties 
intended courts, not arbitrators, to decide a particular arbitration-related matter”; such “gateway matters” include 
the question “whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly binding 
arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy,” but neither is at stake here).  But the Stolt-Nielsen 
majority simply brushed this aside: “If the question were that simple,” wrote Justice Alito, “there would be no need 
to consider the parties' intent with respect to class arbitration.” Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776.  I find that a most 
puzzling comment: In the first instance the relevant “intention” at stake would appear to concern the parties' 
willingness to submit to an arbitral determination; if indeed it is only the proper “procedural mode” of adjudication 
that is implicated, then party intention remains critical in yet a second sense---in the sense that it would then 
become a matter for the arbitrators themselves to go on to tell us, with the statutory degree of finality, what the 
parties' manifestation of intention in their contract “means.” 
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conclusion made explicit in later jurisprudence172 and one which---while rejected by the 
plurality in Bazzle itself173---was already adumbrated in Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion 
there.174 
 Still, it seems excessive to say flatly that as a result, Bazzle “has been left with 
essentially no remaining effect.175  If indeed the avoidance of class relief is the engine driving 
the Stolt-Nielsen machine, the holding might be cabined as something of a “one off”---that is, it 
may be seen as largely responsive to the unusual and dramatic feature of class proceedings. 
The Court's aversion to classwide proceedings may thus be the impetus for Stolt-Nielsen and, 
at the same time, its limiting principle.176  And even more importantly, remember that Bazzle 
                                                          
172
 See AT&T Mobility, LLC, supra n. 161 at 1751-52: Here, on its way to holding that states may not condition the 
enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a consumer case on the availability of class-wide relief, the Court 
closely tracked the argument of Stolt-Nielsen and went on to conclude:  “We find it unlikely that in passing the 
FAA Congress meant to leave the disposition of [the] procedural requirements [of class arbitration] to an 
arbitrator”; since “arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation,” “we find it hard to believe that 
defendants would bet the company with no effective means of review.”  
  In the lower courts, see, e.g., Chassen v. Fidelity Nat’l Financial, Inc., 2014 WL 202763 (D.N.J. 2014) 
(closely tracking Stolt-Nielsen; “the arbitration clauses are silent or ambiguous as to whether an arbitrator should 
determine the question of class-wide arbitrability; and that is not enough to wrest that decision from the courts,” so 
that “there must be an actual showing of consent in order to refer a matter to class-wide arbitration”; “the Supreme 
Court having held that class action matters are poorly suited for arbitration, this Court finds it should determine the 
gateway issue of class arbitration at an evidentiary hearing focused on whether the parties did, in fact, consent to 
class arbitration”). 
173
 See nn. 56-57 supra.  Of course, as the opinion in Stolt-Nielsen was quick to point out, Bazzle had only been 
decided by a plurality of the Court and thus “did not yield a majority decision” on this question, Stolt-Nielsen, 130 
S. Ct. at 1172; see text accompanying n. 64 supra. 
174
 See Bazzle, 439 U.S. at 456-57 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) “the parties’ agreement as to how the arbitrator 
should be selected is much more akin to the agreement as to what shall be arbitrated, a question for the courts 
under First Options,” than it is to questions that are “for the arbitrator under Howsam”; “just as fundamental to the 
agreement of the parties as to what is submitted to the arbitrator is to whom it is submitted”)(italics in original). 
175
 Christopher R. Drahozal, Error Correction and the Supreme Court’s Arbitration Docket, 29 Ohio St. J. on Disp. 
Resol. 1, 18 (2014).  
176
  For example, Stolt-Nielsen might plausibly be read as falling short of a prohibition of arbitral orders of 
consolidation:  If indeed such orders do not implicate to the same degree the concerns expressed by the Court 
[see n. 164 supra], then Bazzle is left intact---that is to say, everything said in Bazzle with regard to the 
interpretative power of arbitrators in cases of “silence” still has purchase---even, I would suggest, where the 
parties have been naïve enough to make a “stipulation” concerning their “lack of agreement.”  
 See, e.g., Safra Nat'l Bank of N.Y. v. Penfold Investment Trading, Ltd., 2011 WL 1672467 
(S.D.N.Y.)(“joinder and consolidation remain distinct procedural issues of the sort parties would intend for the 
arbitrator to decide”). Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Bill’s Pills, Inc. 2012 WL 1660958 (E.D. Mo.)(“whether the 
arbitration clause authorizes joinder is a procedural question for the arbitrator”; “while class arbitration may be 
included among the gateway issues for courts to decide under Stolt–Nielsen, “joinder and consolidation remain 
distinct procedural issues of the sort parties would intend for the arbitrator to decide”;  “the concerns pertaining to 
class arbitration do not apply to consolidation proceedings where only three claimants are asserting their 
individual claims in the underlying arbitration”); The Rice Co. v. Precious Flowers Ltd., 2012 WL 2006149 
(S.D.N.Y.)( two arbitration proceedings arising out of a single shipment of wheat from Texas to Peru; 
“consolidation does not fall within the narrow exception reserved for gateway matters that the parties would likely 
have expected a court to resolve”; “the question of consolidation “concerns the nature of the arbitration 
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retains a sting in its tail:  The decision there was after all the impetus for the elaborate class-
arbitration mechanism contained in the AAA Rules---which contain an express delegation of 
authority to arbitrators---and, at least where the stronger party has not drafted around it, these 
continue and flourish. 
 
3. The Arbitrator at Large: Oxford Health 
 
JUSTICE SCALIA: But  . . . he has to have come to a plausible construction. It's not enough that 
he said, I'm construing the contract; I have looked at the terms of the contract and what the 
parties said, and my construction of the contract is X. That's not enough. It has to be plausible. 
MR. KATZ [counsel for the claimants]: Yes. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Now, why is this plausible? 




Inevitably, in a common-law system, the matter could not rest there. Right after 
Stolt-Nielsen was decided I speculated, in print, as what might be expected to happen in 
the future---in a lower court 
 which has been presented with a case that seems identical to Stolt-Nielsen in every 
way, 
 
 where the parties have also both consented to an arbitral determination on whether 
classwide proceedings were permitted by the contract, 
 
 where they both are making the same and inevitable arguments with respect to the 
text of the arbitration agreement---an agreement conventionally drafted, 
e n c o m p a s s i n g  i n  “ b r o a d ”  l a n g u a g e  “any dispute, claim or controversy,” 
and empowering the tribunal to award “any types of legal or equitable relief” that would 
be available in court---but necessarily indeterminate on the subject of class-wide 
proceedings, 
 
 but where there has been no comparable stipulation by the claimant with 
respect to a “lack of agreement”---no concession, that is, that could be seized 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
proceeding agreed to, not whether the parties agreed to arbitrate” and therefore “presumptively falls to the 
arbitrator”). 
 At the very least---the bare minimum---the differences may be such as to affect the calculus of “likelihood 
of success on the merits” for the purpose of evaluating requests for preliminary injunctions against arbitral 
proceedings. E.g., Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 462, 477-78 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)(“only twenty-
four investment accounts held by thirty-eight parties are at stake in the arbitration; the usual rules of privacy and 
confidentiality apply; and  no parties are absent”).  
177
 Oral Argument, Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Florida, 2013 WL 1193215 (March 25, 2013) at *34. 
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upon and exploited.178 
 
One would have thought that in order to remain true to the spirit of Stolt-
Nielsen, the inevitable conclusion was that in these circumstances, the text alone---
even in the absence of any “stipulation”---would be insufficient to justify an arbitral 
order of classwide proceedings.  This was in fact a view shared by a number of 
thoughtful observers.179  But the world in fact turned out somewhat differently. 
 Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans was a putative class action in which primary care 
physicians accused a managed care network of improperly denying, underpaying, or delaying 
reimbursement of their claims for the provision of medical services to the plan’s members.  The 
agreement’s arbitration clause provided that 
No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted 
before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration 
in New Jersey, pursuant to the Rules of [the AAA]. 
Immediately following the Bazzle case, “at a conference with the parties it was agreed that 
under [Bazzle], [the arbitrator] must determine whether the parties’ Agreement allows for class 
action,”and “the parties . .. agreed that [the arbitrator] should proceed to make the 
determination”180---so again, as in Stolt-Nielsen, we can find a clear and express delegation of 
authority to the arbitrators.  
                                                          
178
 Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract, supra n. 100 at 458. 
179
 See, e.g., Drahozal & Rutledge, supra n. 138 at 1155 (to reason that “any dispute” would sweep in disputes 
being arbitrated on a class basis “does not satisfy Stolt-Nielsen,” for according to that case “a general arbitration 
clause . . . does not authorize class arbitration because class arbitration differs too much from individual 
arbitration”; the authors do not, however, address the possible relevance to this question of any party ‘stipulation’ 
regarding a ‘lack of agreement”); Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract, supra n. 100 at 460 (“the mere 
failure to locate any ‘stipulation’ with respect to ‘silence’ (coupled with the canonical ‘broad’ clause) is unlikely 
to provide any stable equilibrium for understanding and applying the Court’s holding”; “the text alone, even in 
the absence of any ‘stipulation,’ will not be adequate to justify an order of classwide proceedings”); Jock v. 
Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 72 5  F .  Supp .  2d  4 44 ,  4 49  (S .D .N . Y.  201 0) (Rak of f ,  J . ) ( a fter all, “the 
clauses at issue in Stolt-Nielsen contained similarly broad wording”; “at most the record supports a finding that 
the agreements do not preclude class arbitration, but under Stolt-Nielsen, this is not enough”), rev’d, 646 F.3d 113 
(2
nd
 Cir. 2011); Reed v. Fla. Metropolitan University, Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 642  (5
th
 Cir. 2012)(the “any dispute” 
clause “is a standard provision that may be found, in one form or another, in many arbitration agreements,” and 
“merely reflects an agreement between the parties to arbitrate their disputes”). 
 Professor Park was somewhat more prescient; see 5(5) Global Arbitration Rev. 33, 34 (2010)(since the 
Stolt-Nielsen holding “was based” on a supposed “stipulation”---but since “in the future [no] party in the position 
of AnimalFeeds [is] going to agree to” such a thing--- then d esp i te  t he  cas e  we  m a y in  f ac t  e ven  see  
c lass w id e  a rb i t r a t i on  “ i nc re ase  in  t he  U S. ” ) .  
180
 Memorandum and Order, Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., AAA 18-193-20593-02 (Sept. 23, 2003). 
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 The arbitrator found that the clause I quoted above was not even “ambiguous”—but that 
“on its face” it “expresses the parties’ intent that class action arbitration can be maintained.”  
The award authorizing classwide proceedings was confirmed by the lower courts. 
 Now if I were a “liberal” member of the Supreme Court, eager to preserve the possibility 
of classwide proceedings in contracts of adhesion against the encroachments of a neo-liberal 
majority, I would certainly have voted to grant a writ of certiorari and accept review of this 
case.181  For the Court had in fact painted itself into a difficult corner in Stolt-Nielsen: Surely it 
could not have been envisaged that federal courts were now to go wholesale into the business 
of second-guessing awards---spinning out a jurisprudence aimed at developing detailed legal 
standards intended to govern arbitral construction of contracts---monitoring how arbitral 
tribunals are expected to deal with the problem of “silence”?   
 Still, Oxford Health itself was not perhaps the vehicle in which the Court could best 
announce its intention to back away from such an enterprise.  For the award in fact was facially 
preposterous.  Consider the wonderfully brazen sleight-of-hand in this arbitral “syllogism”: 
a. “No civil action” “must mean “no civil action of any kind whatsoever.” 
b. To say that “all such disputes shall be submitted” to arbitration means that the clause 
sends to arbitration “all such disputes which . . . could have been brought in the form of 
any conceivable civil action.” 
c. “Since there can be no dispute in any court without a civil action of some sort, the 
disputes that the clause sends to arbitration are the same universal class of disputes 
the clause prohibits as civil actions before any court.” 
d. “A class action is plainly one of the possible forms of civil action that could be brought in 
a court.” 
e.  “Therefore [sic], because all that is prohibited by the first part of the clause is vested in 
arbitration by its second part, I find that the arbitration clause must have been 
intended to authorize class actions in arbitration.”  
Q.E.D. 
 
In addition, said the arbitrator, any conclusion to the contrary would mean that a class 
action, prohibited in litigation by the first phrase of the clause, could not be brought in 
arbitration under the second---leading to the result that class actions would not be 
“possible in any forum”--- a “bizarre result” that could not have been intended in the 
absence of some “clear expression.”182  
 
 It is, I hope, obvious that “reasoning” of this sort---had it been indulged in by a 
district judge---would never have been tolerated by a hierarchically superior court.  
Naturally I recognize that the standard on review of an arbitral award is not and should 
                                                          
181
 The votes of only four members of the nine-member Court are necessary for the writ to be granted. 
182
 Memorandum and Order, supra n. 180 at *18-*19. 
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not be in any way comparable, and I am hardly suggesting the contrary---but surely 
noting this fact should give us some insight into just what it is that we mean by “the 
process of engaging in interpretation”?  It is rather hard to escape the conclusion that 
all the preceding rigmarole was little more than pretextual---the thinnest “textual” veneer 
applied to an outcome-driven award.183  
 
 Although the arbitrator claimed to believe that this arbitration clause was “much broader 
even than the usual arbitration clause,” it reads to me pretty much like the most 
conventional of boilerplate:  “No civil action” means nothing more than this---that no 
party is allowed to institute a lawsuit on a matter “arising under the Agreement,” but 
must instead go to arbitration---a provision that is actually relatively narrow, as these 
things go, and a conclusion that was in any event not contested.  Is the arbitrator’s 
“reasoning” really any different from inferring an agreement to classwide proceedings 
“solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate”?184  
 
 And to find that it would be “bizarre” to read the contract so as to completely foreclose 
the possibility of classwide proceedings, is either 
 
 grotesquely naïve---after all that’s rather the point, isn’t it? 
 
 a reversal of the federal default rule imposed by Stolt-Nielsen, or 
 
 a policy decision on an issue of “unconscionability.” 
 
Or, perhaps, all three. 
 Nevertheless the Court unanimously affirmed: The opinion by Justice Kagan consisted 
of little but a single litany:  The award may have been in “grave error,” may have been 
“mistaken,”185 but it holds nevertheless, “however good, bad, or ugly,” as long as the arbitrator 
had not “strayed from his delegated task of interpreting a contract”---as long, that is, as he 
stopped short of what Stolt-Nielsen had expressly proscribed.  And here the award revealed 
that he had indeed “focused on the arbitration clause’s text,” and his “decisions” were, “through 
and through, interpretations of the parties’ agreement.”  
                                                          
183
 Allowing for the hyperbole of adversarial argument, counsel for the respondents in Oxford Health was 
nevertheless on to something when he characterized the award as “a ruse,” “a “cover up,” dissembling,” “post hoc 
rationalization,” “pretense,” and “pretext.” .See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, Brief [by Respondent] in 
Opposition to Writ of Certiorari, 2012 WL 5838439at *18-*19. 
184
 See text accompanying nn. 170-71 supra; see also Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract, supra n. 
100 at 460 fn. 89 (“not indeed from ‘the mere fact of an agreement to arbitrate,’ for that would be expressly 
proscribed by Stolt-Nielsen ---but apparently from the next best thing (and functionally identical to it)---the terms of 
a boilerplate ‘broad’ clause”). 
185
 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 2013 WL 2459522 (U.S.) at *4-*5. 
 The New Yorker used to run a recurring column headed, “Department of Understatement.” 
Alan Scott Rau 
“Gap Filling” by Arbitrators 
May 9, 2014 




 A rather curious concurring opinion by Justice Alito warned nevertheless that even 
should a class be certified, the absent members of the putative class might not be bound by 
the arbitrator’s ultimate resolution of the dispute because unlike the named members, they had 
“never conceded” that the contract authorizes him to make the class determination in the first 
place.186  The point of this concurrence is superficially difficult to understand187 and, if taken 
uncritically and at face value, can readily lend itself to misunderstanding188---but there is in fact 
much less here than meets the eye.189  
                                                          
186
 Id. at *7 (“the absent members of the plaintiff class have not submitted themselves to this arbitrator’s authority 
in any way”; in consequence “it is far from clear that they will be bound”---indeed “it is difficult to see how an 
arbitrator’s decision to conduct class proceedings could bind absent class members who have not authorized the 
arbitrator to decide” on a classwide procedure). 
187
 All class members, absent or present, signed “materially identical” arbitration agreements that provided for 
arbitration under AAA rules.  Under these rules, as we have seen, agreeing to arbitration “pursuant to any of the 
rules of the AAA” means that “the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration” “apply” wherever a dispute is 
submitted on behalf of a purported class, and in such a case, the arbitrator is empowered to ‘determine as a 
threshold matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the arbitration clause,” whether the 
clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of the class. That's what happened. So how can it be plausibly, 
sensibly, said that "absent" members “didn't consent to this exercise of authority"? 
188
 See, e.g., Linda Mullenix, The Court's 2012 Class Act: A Little Bit of This, a Little Bit of That, 40:8 Preview of 
United States Supreme Court Cases 328, 332 (Aug. 10, 2013)(Justice Alito “oddly sounded a precautionary note 
protective of absent class members”). 
189
 Nobody seems to have talked about this, although Justice Alito asked a question to the same effect (and 
without getting much of an answer) in oral argument. Oral Argument, supra n. 177, 2013 WL 1193215 *35-*40.   
He speaks as if some principle of general application is involved, but the apparent explanation is far less 
interesting and of limited significance: 
 The arbitrator’s clause construction award---in which he decided that the agreement did indeed authorize 
classwide proceedings---was dated September 23, 2003, and so the arbitration had presumably been initiated 
some time prior to that.  But the AAA’s rules for class arbitrations were promulgated only on October 8, 2003, as a 
“supplement” to the other rules.  And the Commercial Arbitration Rules (presumably otherwise applicable) provide 
that “these rules and any amendment of them shall apply in the form in effect at the time the administrative 
requirements are met for a Demand for Arbitration or Submission Agreement received by the AAA.” R. 
1(a)(version in effect as of July 1, 2003, but the current rules are identical).  So the Supplementary Class Rules, 
with their express delegation of decisionmaking power to the arbitral tribunal, were for this reason presumably not 
applicable to the Oxford Health arbitration. 
 Thus Justice Alito's point is an extremely narrow one: 
a. While the AAA’s “Supplementary Class Rules” may not have governed the Oxford Health arbitration, 
they will of course apply in any AAA arbitration that will have been initiated later, even only a few 
weeks later--- on the (generous) assumption, that is, that the drafting party has not insisted by contract 
on a bilateral arbitration.  Cf. President & Fellows of Harvard College v. JSC Surgutneftegaz, Partial 
Final Award on Clause Construction (AAA 11-168-T-01654-04, Aug. 1, 2007) at *7 fn. 5 (“the 
Supplementary Rules became effective about eight months before this arbitration was commenced”; 
“since the AAA rules apply here . . . the Supplementary Rules also apply”). 
b. If one assumes that the “express delegation” in the AAA rules do not apply to bind the 
absent class members in Oxford Health, then the only thing that could possibly bind them 
is the Bazzle-plurality-presumption that under a “broad” clause this question (a question 
of “what sort of proceeding has been agreed to”) falls to the arbitral tribunal for decision.  
If Justice Alito reasoned this far, then for him to assert that they will nevertheless not be 
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 Now given the obvious defects in the Oxford Health award---in which the Court readily 
acquiesced---it might well be wondered what has become of the federal “default rule” so critical 
to Stolt-Nielsen. (This default rule, as we remember, was imposed there by the Court on an 
arbitral tribunal that was not even allowed to inquire into the text of an agreement conceded to 
be “silent.”).  It would certainly have been consistent with the thrust of Stolt-Nielsen to say---
even in the absence of any “stipulation”---that at the very least, a thumb is to be placed on the 
scales. Surely, once the Court rests an argument on the assertion that classwide proceedings 
would necessarily “change the fundamental nature of arbitration”---once it claims that such 
proceedings were so far outside the scope of the probable expectation of the contracting 
parties, that arbitrators should not have taken it upon themselves to order such proceedings in 
the absence of some indicia of consent---it would seem to be inviting some requirement of 
explicit statement.190  But we gather from Oxford Health that while arbitrators are still 
presumably bound to place the burden of proof on the proponent of any agreement, the Stolt-
Nielsen “default rule” doesn’t have much more sting than that:  It does not function like the 
presumption of arbitrability---it does not even function as a rule of “clear statement” like the 
fraught and hollow First Options requirement of the “clear and unmistakable” 191---it is far more 
easily overcome.   
 
 This is not to say that there is nothing of Stolt-Nielsen that remains:  The holding could 
perhaps still linger as at least a warning shot across the bow---requiring arbitrators henceforth 
to think twice, and deeply, and work strenuously, at justifying any construction that would favor 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
bound, is necessarily to assert that Bazzle has not survived. Indeed, in his concurrence 
he invokes the critical language in Stolt-Nielsen to this effect, remarking that “if we were 
reviewing the arbitrator’s interpretation of the contract de novo, we would have little 
trouble concluding that he improperly inferred “[a]n implicit agreement to authorize class-
action arbitration . . . from the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”  See my 
discussion of this language at text accompanying n. 170 supra.  That this aspect of 
Bazzle has not survived is thus consistent with my reading of Stolt-Nielsen. To the extent 
that the Court purports to leave open the question whether “the availability of class 
arbitration is a so-called ‘question of arbitrability,’” 2013 WL at *4 fn.2, the only 
explanation is unseemly coyness.  
190
 On “changing the nature of arbitration,” see text accompanying nn. 163-64 supra. 
 On the inference of a heightened standard of proof, see Oral Argument, supra n. 177, 2013 WL 1193215 
at *5, *15-*16 (counsel for respondent: “we are asking that that generally applicable standard of review be applied 
to a question with a very strong empirical presumption that the FAA has attached to it”; “what you held in Stolt-
Nielsen was not simply that parties who  have stipulated can’t be forced into class arbitration. What you held was 
that you cannot have class arbitration in the absence of affirmative agreement that is not evidenced by an all-
disputes clause; and . . . that background---that strong presumption must as a matter of Federal law inform the 
arbitrator’s decision”).  See also Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract, supra n. 100 at 477 (“at the very 
least,  the proponent will now need to make a strong affirmative showing---a showing (in text or context) that this 
was in fact  the intention of the contracting parties---in order to overcome the contrary presumption. The formula 
that such a showing must be ‘clear and unmistakable’---not being used so much anymore elsewhere---will 
presumably be available, and would certainly be consistent with the spirit of Justice Alito’s opinion”). 
191
 See Rau, Arbitrating “Arbitrability”’ supra n. 56 (“On the ‘Clear and Unmistakable’: ‘This is All One Big 
Overblown Latke’”). 
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classwide proceedings.  For a while that is precisely the effect it had on the more earnest 
arbitrators who were gamely trying to follow along with the twists and turns of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence192---and it may still serve that function for those arbitrators who are less inclined 
towards nullification. 
 But a glance at the arbitral caselaw in the wake of Oxford Health certainly suggests that 
arbitrators are finding very little difficulty in scooping up something more than “silence” to throw 
in the eyes of potential reviewing courts. Between the date that Oxford Health was decided 
and the date this is being written (May 6, 2014), AAA arbitrators issued 22 “clause construction 
awards.” In 16, the arbitrator found that classwide proceedings had indeed been agreed upon 
by the parties193---and in most of these, the putative “interpretative path” was one that would 
                                                          
192
 See, e.g., Rivera v. Sequoia Education, Inc., Award on Motion to Reconsider Clause Construction Award, AAA 
11-434-1075-08 (Sept. 22, 2011)(in 2009 the arbitrator determined that the agreement “permitted class arbitration 
based upon applicable California law”; however, Stolt-Nielsen, decided subsequently, “has caused me to 
conclude that where an arbitration agreement . . . does not explicitly contain language permitting class arbitration, 
class arbitration is not permitted”; both Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion make clear that “class arbitration is so 
fundamental a structural shift that it is not to be ordered in the absence of an express and explicit agreement”); 
Maslo v. Oak Pointe Country Club, Inc., AAA 11-181-02243-06, Amended Clause Construction Award (June 15, 
2010)(in 2007 the arbitrator rendered a Clause Construction Award finding that the agreements “permit the action 
to proceed as a class”; however, Stolt-Nielsen “compels a reconsideration” of this award; Justice Breyer’s dissent, 
concluding that the majority opinion was “establishing an affirmative-authorization requirement in contracts for 
class arbitrations,” allows us “to determine the full impact” of the case; “being unable to presume [an] intent [to 
“affirmatively agree to class arbitration”] from the broad language of the arbitration clause,” “the reasoning set 
forth in the original Clause Construction Award is no longer tenable as a matter of law and must be reversed”). 
 I do not know if these cases are still pending or if yet another motion could now be entertained to 
reconsider, yet again, in light of Oxford Health. 
193
 This is however a somewhat less positive track record than the outcomes in the arbitral caselaw in the years 
prior to Stolt Nielsen: According to the AAA, in the first six years that the AAA's Class Rules were in effect, 135 
clause construction awards were rendered, and of these only 5% held that “the arbitration clause did not permit 
the arbitration to proceed on behalf of a class”). Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., Brief of AAA as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, 2009 WL 2896309 at *9.   
 Still, a success rate for classwide construction of 73% is not unimpressive. Might it be said that a 
tribunal’s decision to ‘construe” an agreement so as to permit classwide proceedings is likely to be skewed by the 
nature of arbitral incentives?  The reader may possibly think so, although I couldn’t possibly comment. 
 Typical of the exceptions in the post-Oxford Health period is Alam v. Charter College, LLC, AAA 73 160 
00378 12 (Sept. 26, 2013).  In this barely reasoned award the arbitrator noted simply that “the relevant language 
of the arbitration clause in this case is substantially the same as the contractual language” in Stolt-Nielsen, and 
that “there is no dispute that the parties in this case, like those in Stolt-Nielsen, have come to ‘no agreement.’”  It 
is not precisely clear on what the “no agreement” conclusion was based---the claimants did after all argue that 
“there was no way for [them] to have known that their agreement to the language ‘all disputes’ would not include 
class claims,” and I take this to be an interpretive argument based on their apparent intention.  Still, the 
proponents of classwide proceedings had equally argued the interpretive point in Stolt-Nielsen itself, see text 
accompanying nn. 89-92 supra, and so the award seem faithful enough to Supreme Court authority. 
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make a first year law student blush: I do not know if  he awards are truly disingenuous, but 
they are by and large (in Judge Posner’s term) “wacky.”194 
 
 For the moment, the principal “interpretative techniques” du jour appear to be: 
 
 reliance on the generic “broad” arbitration clause” (i.e., precisely the same clause that 
was in issue in Stolt-Nielsen itself);195  
 
 reliance on the very fact of “silence”---apparently deploying a presumption to the effect 
that the mere failure to address the matter in the contract implies the parties’ willingness 
to arbitrate on a classwide basis (i.e., a discredited interpretation of Bazzle itself and a 
move explicitly foreclosed by Stolt-Nielsen)196; 
                                                          
194
 See Wise v. Wachovia Securities, supra n. 142 (Posner, J.); cf. Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 373 F.3d 851, 
854 (7
th
 Cir. 2004)(Posner, J.)(“As long as what the arbitrators did can fairly be described as interpretation, our 
hands are tied”). 
195
 See, e.g., Partial Final Clause Construction Award, Harding v. Midsouth Bank, N.A., AAA 69-516-Y-00219-12 
(Aug. 29, 2013)(language requiring the arbitration of “any controversy or claim . . . that arises out of or relates to 
this agreement” permits arbitration of the class-action claims; “the word ‘claim’ clearly includes class claims”; “the 
word ‘controversy’ is even broader than the word ‘claim’” and the word “any “is the “broadest possible modifier 
that could have been chosen, and leaves no doubt that the clause was intended to cover representative claims”); 
Clause Construction Award, Betts v. Fastfunding The Company, Inc., AAA 33-516-00012-13 (Aug. 21, 2013)(“the 
‘broad’ arbitration clause language leads the arbitrator to the conclusion that the Agreement was intended by the 
parties to operate as a plenary diversion of all disputes between them ‘arising from or relating to’ the Transactions 
to arbitration”; “under the plain language of the Agreement” “the parties agreed to submit all disputes to 
arbitration, including claims for class relief”); Clause Construction Award, Maldonado v. Callahan’s Express 
Delivery, Inc., AAA 33-523-00375-13 (April 18, 2014)(“This clause is not silent. It requires arbitration of any and all 
disputes ‘arising under this agreement’”; “there is no ‘limiting language’ in this contract or clause and the Parties 
are bound by their own words”). 
 See also n. 179 supra; Oral Argument, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp., 2009 WL 4662509 at 
*36: (Justice Scalia: “so the only language you can point to is . . . that ‘any dispute’ language?”; “you are 
hanging . . . your whole assertion that these arbitrators . . . found that the contract positively authorized class 
action, upon that language”?). 
196
 On Bazzle, see text accompanying nn. 54-67 supra; on Stolt-Nielsen, cf. 130 S. Ct. at 1776 (“the differences 
between bilateral and class-action arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with their limited 
powers under the FAA, that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to 
resolve their disputes in class proceedings”). 
 But nevertheless, see, e.g., Clause Construction Award, Gonzales v. Brand Energy & Infrastructure 
Services, Inc., AAA 70-160-000270-13 (Oct. 15, 2013)(same arbitrator as in Betts, supra n. 195; “there is no 
suggestion [in the agreement] of any truncation in arbitration of procedural devices or substantive rights available 
in court”; the agreement’s “silence in regard to what [the respondent] now asserts the parties intended to 
foreclose is deafening in context,” and the fact that the agreement “does not hint that [classwide] procedures are 
foreclosed strongly suggests that under the terms of the agreement, the parties intended that they be available in 
arbitration”); Clause Construction Award, Grande v. Lawrence Recruiting Specialists Inc., AAA 57-160-00080-13  
(December 20, 2013) (“LRS could have made this interpretive task easy by inserting or amending this contract 
and clause to preclude class arbitration by using clear language,” but “did not avail itself of this opportunity”; Stolt-
Nielsen “was a signal that if a Party to a contract wanted to avoid class arbitration they [sic] could write a clause 
precluding class arbitration”; the case “gave employers an open invitation to write contracts that would clearly 
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 reliance on the clearly noninterpretive canon contra proferentem197 , and, most 
commonly, 
 
 reliance on a variety of supposedly “textual” elements which, however ingenious, 
appear from out of deep left field and are unqualifiedly irrelevant.198 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
foreclose class arbitrations”).  Apparently, then, the “interpretive basis” for classwide proceedings here is to be 
found in the drafting party’s very failure to exclude them.   
 A variation on the “presumption from silence”---equally making something out of nothing, equally 
reversing the default rule of Stolt-Nielsen---can be found in the occasional recourse to the canon expressio unius. 
See, e.g., Clause Construction Award, Guzman v. AIMCO River Club, LLC, AAA 18-526-Y-000120-13 (Dec. 4, 
2013)(the agreement “provides a ‘carve out’ for certain actions the parties intended not to be arbitrable” [such as 
actions for eviction or to collect past due rent]; “having turned its attention to enumerating the various claims, 
actions, and proceedings to be excluded, the Landlord certainly could have added class arbitration claims or 
proceedings to the list of excluded claims.  It did not,” and this then is “more than ‘mere silence’”); cf. Partial Final 
Clause Construction Award, Benson v. CSA-Credit Solutions of America, Inc., AAA 11-160-M-02281-08 (July 
6, 2010)( since the parties had ruled out arbitration for trade secret disputes, they “knew how to exclude certain 
disputes from the scope of the arbitration agreement, but apparently chose not to exclude collective and  class 
arbitrations”---despite the fact that it was “not uncommon” for other parties to do so in other agreements). 
197
 See, e.g., Partial Final Clause Construction Award of Arbitrator, Price v. NCR Corp., AAA 51-160-908-12 (Oct. 
24, 2013)(“the Agreement was entirely drafted by Respondent and presented to Claimant as a condition of his 
being hired without opportunity for negotiation.  As such, it is a contract of adhesion and must be construed 
against the draftsman”).  On contra proferentem, see text accompanying nn. 154-158 supra. 
198
 See, e.g.,  
 Grande, supra n. 196.  Here the clause required arbitration of “any claim or controversy between the parties 
to this Agreement which arises out of or relates to the Agreement, the business of the Company, [Employee’s] 
employment with Company, or any other relationship between [Employee] and the Company”; for the 
arbitrator, “surely” this language empowers the employee to bring claims that “[raise] questions about a 
pattern or practice by which the business of the company is conducted,” a category “broad enough to involve 
more than one employee where that claim questions a pattern or practice of the business”. As I tell students, 
“surely”---like underlining and raising one’s voice---is usually a bad sign in an argument.  Quaere whether a) 
the scope of the substantive claims that are stipulated to be “arbitrable” is really the same question as b) the 
identity of the parties to the proceeding. 
 
 Partial Final Clause Construction Award, Kissel v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., AAA 13-516-00198-13 (Dec. 6, 
2013).  Here the clause called for arbitration “if we cannot resolve a Claim informally, including any claim 
between us, and any claim by any of us against any agent, employee, successor, or assign of the other, 
including, to the full extent permitted by applicable law, third-parties who are not a party to this Agreement”; 
for the arbitrator, the italicized language was “broad enough to contemplate incorporating class claims into the 
arbitration clause.” Quaere though whether the italicized language, plainly subject to the word “against,” does 
anything more than extend the benefit of the arbitration clause to potential defendants.  Precisely the same 
move---and the same error--- is regularly found in other recent awards, e.g.,  Partial Final Award on Clause 
Construction, Cordova v. United Education Institute, AAA 73-516-Y-000065-13 (Aug. 21, 2013)(respondent 
“inserted language extending the student’s obligation to arbitrate any ‘controversy’ or ‘claim’ the student might 
have against any of a laundry list of other persons and entities affiliated with [respondent,] all of whom are 
non-signatories” to the agreement; given the extension of the agreement “for the benefit of a broad range of 
persons and entitles related to [the respondent], the reasonable expectation of [claimants] . . . is that there 
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 Other moves, equally unprincipled, have something of a history but do not seem for the 
moment to have reappeared in the recent arbitral case-law---doubtless they are being held in 
reserve.  For example:  In purporting to assess the “intentions” of contracting parties, might it 
perhaps be relevant to point to the fact that class actions happen to be commonplace in 
cognate litigation---say in employment discrimination claims?199 Might the prevalence of 
class litigation, then---given its comforting familiarity---bespeak the acceptability of the 
mechanism of aggregation---and thus give us some assurance that it was within the 
expectation of the contracting parties---at the same time permitting arbitrators to bootstrap 
themselves into a desirable job?200 (“Or might it rather represent the precise motivation for the 
parties’ desire to avoid it, through an “escape into arbitration?”)201 
 
 
IV. Some Conclusions 
 
 What, then, are we to make of this dizzying series of twists and turns? Where has the 
Supreme Court left us in our attempt to assess the power of arbitral tribunals to “fill gaps” in 
apparently “silent” agreements? One may well be forgiven for thinking that the result-oriented 
“reading” indulged in by the arbitrator in Oxford Health---in which the Court apparently saw 
itself obligated to acquiesce--- has set courts on the path of leaving future arbitrators quite at 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
would likewise [sic] be class arbitration of claims such as those they seek to raise on behalf of other 
students”).  
 
 Partial Final Clause Construction Award, McCullough v. Terminal Trucking Co., LLC, AAA 31-160-00371-12 
(Sept. 17, 2013)(under the AAA Employment Rules the “arbitrator may grant any remedy or relief that would 
have been available to the parties had the matter been heard in court”; the arbitrator reasoned that if the 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act “expressly allows an individual in court to seek a statutory 
remedy and relief on behalf of himself and other employees . . . does it not follow that he has authority to do 
the same in this arbitration?”  Quaere though whether even in employment cases, the federal procedural rules 
for aggregate litigation can fairly be deemed to amount to delegated “remedies.” Quaere also whether 
characterizing a classwide proceeding in this way---as “the same remedy” that would be available in a court of 
law---can truly be deemed an “interpretive” move---as opposed to a surreptitious policy judgment to the effect 
that any holding to the contrary would be “unconscionable” as against “public policy.” 
199
 See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 394 n.13 (1977) (“Title VII actions are by their very 
nature class complaints”).   
200
 For the argument that this is relevant to an arbitral determination, cf. Whitehill, supra note 89, at 14-15 
(imagine a price-fixing claim arising from a commercial supply contract “with the same broad arbitration 
agreement”; since “class action antitrust suits invariably follow the related criminal proceedings,” “it could fairly 
be argued that the parties understood that an antitrust class arbitration of that type could arise and be covered 
by” the agreement); Smith & Wollensky Restaurant Group, Inc. v. Passow, 831 F.Supp.2d 390 (D. Mass. 
2011)(arbitrator noted that “wage and hour claims like those in play here are frequently pursued as class or 
collective actions, and both [parties] must be deemed to understand that”; in consequence classwide arbitration 
was “contemplated and permitted by the agreement,” and the arbitrator subsequently “affirmed [his] initial Clause 
Construction Award as consistent with Stolt-Nielsen”; held, award was “the result of a reasonable interpretation” 
of  the agreement). 
201
 Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract, supra n. 100 at 459 fn. 85.       
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large.  Has the Supreme Court then just climbed all the way up the hill in Stolt-Nielsen just to 
placidly walk down it again a year or two later? 
 
 A number of things, though, can be asserted with at least some degree of confidence.  
 
1 .  The results reached by the tribunal in Oxford Health---and by most tribunals in succeeding 
cases---seem to be perfectly in line with the expansive “gap filling” authority that I have argued 
earlier should be presumptively attributed to arbitrators.  This is at least as broad as---and 
indeed considerably exceeds---the authority that a “common-law court” is assumed to possess.  
After all, the power that an arbitral tribunal may be given  
 
 to supply the appropriate default rule---whether a “majoritarian” rule that purports 
to “mimic” the parties' hypothetical bargain or to track their tacit assumptions---or 
a rule “crafted, more simply and directly, in overt response to concerns of 
efficiency and fair play”202--- 
 
is not, when you come to think about it, fundamentally different from 
 
 the power given to an “interest” arbitrator to determine what “contract rights ought 
to be”---at least to the extent he defines his task as an inquiry into what the 
parties “should, by negotiation, have agreed upon”: “What should the parties 
themselves, as reasonable men, have voluntarily agreed to?”203 
But however the cases should be characterized, at least one thing seems clear:  Even a 
cursory look at the current state of arbitral jurisprudence makes it impossible to believe that the 
outcomes at which tribunals are arriving are truly the results of exercises in anything like 
“textual interpretation”: To accept such a proposition amounts to nothing but willful blindness, 
the technique of Nelson at Copenhagen. 
 
2. The Court’s refusal in Stolt- Nielsen to allow arbitrators themselves to devise appropriate 
default rules in the absence of some demonstrable “agreement,” may perhaps have rested on 
considerations peculiar to classwide proceedings---concerns that seemed to justify the 
intrusion of some supervening federal common-law default rule that arbitrators are bound to 
respect.   But whether in that context or otherwise, there is inherent in the Court’s opinion a 
vision of arbitral adjudication that is cramped indeed---and which in consequence creates 
obvious incentives for private decisionmakers to be somewhat less than candid with respect to 
the true rationale of their awards, in the interest of avoiding the risk of vacatur. This cabined 
                                                          
202
 See the discussion at text accompanying nn. 112-116 supra. 
203
 Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 7 Lab. Arb. 845 (1947)(collective bargaining agreement provided that “if at the 
end of any contract year the parties are unable to agree upon the terms of a renewal contract, the matter shall be 
submitted to arbitration”).  See the discussion at text accompanying nn. 23-36 supra. 
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view of what is permissible (a “contractual basis”) and what is not (“sound policy”) promotes 
disingenuousness and so denatures the arbitral task, which---precisely as is true for state 
tribunals themselves---should embrace both.204   
3. Of course, Oxford Health suggests that the prevailing standard of review will be easy 
enough for any but the most unwary, clumsy, or naïve of arbitrators to satisfy:  In some 
jurisdictions we already see Stolt-Nielsen’s intrusive insistence on “interpretation” reformulated, 
so that nothing more is required than that a court assure itself that it “cannot say with certainty 
that the arbitrator's own words demonstrate that he failed to interpret the [agreement].”205  And 
at least with respect to classwide proceedings, drafting parties can be counted on---with the 
Court’s blessing---increasingly to create a “new normal” by drafting around---forestalling---the 
foreseeable propensities of arbitrators to parrot the Oxford Health analysis.206 
4. I suggested earlier that it simply will not do to try to demarcate the “gap filling” authority of 
arbitrators by purporting to distinguish between their power to “determine existing rights,” and 
their inability to ‘create new obligations”:  This, as I said--- nothing especially original here---is 
essentially question-begging, involves characterization after the fact, and really is little more 
than rhetoric.207  More fundamentally, Lon Fuller’s seminal work reminds us that this common 
                                                          
204
 A point I have been making throughout; see, e.g., text accompanying nn. 25-31, 36-41, and n. 136 supra. 
205
 Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. v. Paillardon, 944 F. Supp.2d 636, 645 (C.D. Ill. 2013)(a very easy case, however, 
in which the losing respondent claimed that the arbitrator had “exceeded his authority” by concluding that it had 
breached the agreement  because the agreement “did not require it to make sales through the joint venture”--- 
something that indicated that the award was “not based on the contract but rather the Arbitrator's “own sense of 
equity”). 
206
 Allowing a drafting party to prevent such nominal exercises in “interpretation”---through a contractual provision 
that bars classwide proceedings outright---was a move sanctioned by the Court in AT&T Mobility, LLC, supra n. 
161 (upheld against state challenges on the ground of “unconscionability”); and in American Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (upheld against federal challenges on the ground that a classwide 
proceeding was necessary to effectively “vindicate” plaintiff’s rights under the antitrust laws); see generally Rau, 
Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract, supra n. 100 at 523ff. 
A recent study by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau of the use of pre-dispute arbitration provisions in 
contracts for consumer financial services (essentially consumer checking accounts and credit cards), concluded 
that 
 larger banks tend to include arbitration clauses in their checking contracts, while mid-sized and smaller 
banks and credit unions do not----so that around 8% of banks---but covering 44% of insured deposits---
include such clauses in their contracts; 
 similarly, larger bank issuers of credit cards are more likely to include arbitration clauses than smaller 
bank issuers---so that around 17% of credit card contracts---but covering over 50% of credit card loans 
outstanding---are subject to such clauses.  
“Almost all of the arbitration clauses studied contained terms limiting class proceedings”; the “handful of clauses 
that did not . . . tended to be from very small institutions.” 
CFPB, Arbitration Study Preliminary Results (Dec. 12, 2013). 
207
 See text accompanying nn. 34-41 supra. 
 Cf. Kröll, supra n. 24 at p. 12. Here Dr. Kröll gives an account of the frequent objections made to the 
“gap-filling power of  the arbitrator”---summarizing arguments to the effect that the arbitrator’s task is normally 
restricted to the determination of “pre-existing rights”--- but that when arbitrators engage in gap filing in the sense 
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assumption---that it is the “proper province” of courts and arbitrators, the proper “limits of 
adjudication,” solely to make authoritative determinations of “claims of right”---is at bottom 
nothing but circular: For “it is not so much that adjudicators decide only issues presented by 
claims of right or accusations. The point is rather that whatever they decide, or whatever is 
submitted to them for decision, tends” by the institutional framework in which they function “to 
be converted into a claim of right or an accusation of fault.”208 
So, for example, in the case of unforeseen events having arisen in the course of a long-term 
relationship, to raise before the arbitral tribunal  
 a claim of “excuse” grounded in doctrines of “mistake” or “impracticability”---and 
equally,  
 a claim for readjustment and reformation of the transaction--- 
are both claims that might be justified as appeals to “work out all the implications of the parties’ 
original deal”---to consider the nature of their expectations, the objectives they were seeking to 
advance, thus the “sense of the transaction.”  This is true without regard to how they are 
characterized209---and without regard to whether they are ultimately found to have any merit.210  
Wisdom and power are not after all synonymous.211  
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
of “adding provisions to the contract at their discretion,” they instead “take up the creative task of rule-making  . . . 
and create at their discretion new obligations for the parties which did not exist before their intervention, not even 
in a hidden form.”  But it is striking that so often, and with but a little ingenuity, much that is latent, or lurking 
beneath the surface, or inherent in the structure, of a cooperative venture can be teased into “existence”---
revealing implications to be explored and possible ways of giving effect to  the parties’ original objectives.  And in 
the same vein see the highly convincing demonstration in Markovits, supra n. 5 at 703. Here Professor Markovits 
discusses the leading case of Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc., supra n. 19---in which the court refused to 
enforce a renewal term in a commercial lease by which, after an initial five-year term, the annual rentals were “to 
be agreed upon.” He points out that over the course of the initial term the “the shopping habits and travel patterns” 
of the tenant’s customers likely “made its business much more valuable in its current location than in any other”; 
conversely, for the landlord, this “developed customer base made the site more valuable when occupied by the 
existing firm than it would be when occupied by any other.” In consequence both parties had “a great deal to gain 
from maintaining their relationship”---and “insofar as the parties could have anticipated this contingency when 
they signed their initial lease, they had good reason . . . to allow a third party to divide the gains from their co-
dependence between them, and hence relieve them of the transaction costs that any negotiated solution would 
impose on them.” 
208
 Fuller, supra n. 31 at 368-69. 
209 An employee’s demand for a raise, if made not to his boss but before an arbitrator, would have to be 
supported “by a principle of some kind, and a demand supported by principle is the same thing as a claim of 
right.”   Id. at 369.(“he may argue the fairness of the principle of equal treatment and call attention to the fact that 
Joe, who is no better than he, recently got a raise”).  
210 Cf. Aluminum Co. of Amer. v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F.Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). Under the parties’ contract, 
Essex was to supply ALCOA with alumina which ALCOA would then convert by a smelting process into molten 
aluminum, which Essex in turn would pick up for further processing. The contract contained an escalation formula, 
designed with the aid of Alan Greenspan, by which the price paid to ALCOA would vary with changes in the 
Wholesale Price Index; by this means ALCOA sought to achieve “a stable net income of about $.04 per pound of 
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5. If there is any limiting principle to an arbitrator’s adjudicative authority, it may be one that 
Fuller himself suggested---cases where the ethic of reasoned argument no longer has any 
purchase at all---cases where the objectives of an enterprise would not be served if it were to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
aluminum converted,” with a “range of foreseeable deviation [of] roughly $.03.” But ALCOA claimed that in the 
period following execution of the contract, its production costs (mostly the cost of electricity) had risen greatly 
“beyond the foreseeable limits of risk” under the contract’s index formula, and it sought relief under the Contract-
law doctrines of “impracticability and frustration of purpose.”  The court held for ALCOA---and what is particularly 
interesting, the relief it granted took the form of “reformation or equitable adjustment” or “equitable modification” of 
the contract.  The price calculation derived from the contract was to be “changed” according to a formula devised 
by the court itself in order to “reduce ALCOA’s disappointment to the limit of risk the parties expected in making 
the contract”--- Essex was thus to pay prices that would ensure to ALCOA for all the aluminum it delivered a profit 
of $.01 per pound.  Merely to decree rescission would be “to grant ALCOA a windfall gain in the current aluminum 
market”; “a remedy modifying the price term of the contract in light of the circumstances which upset the price 
formula will better preserve the purposes and expectations of the parties.” In a learned “Appendix” the court 
surveyed the remedies resorted to by courts in other legal systems “when beset with contracts that are no longer 
deemed ‘fair’ in light of changed circumstances,” and observed that the prevailing approaches were to “try to 
establish the original economic position and intent of the parties; to try to distribute the consequences of  the 
unforeseen burden equally between the parties; [or to] try to determine what the parties would have agreed to had 
they been aware of what was going to happen.”   
 Note that I am certainly making no claim that the ALCOA case was “correctly decided” under US law----for 
it has always been much criticized and remains very much an outlier. (Professor Dawson has described the 
decision there as“bizarre,” and “a lonely monument on a bleak landscape,” John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of 
Frustrated Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 28, 35 (1984)).  Nor is there any reason why the 
choice posed to an adjudicator must be (as the court in ALCOA seemed to assume) binary; for intermediate and 
provisional positions are conceivable:  For example, the adjudicator might encourage the parties to salvage the 
transaction themselves by providing them an interlude for renegotiation, and then by saying, should a reasonable 
offer of modification have been rejected, “you should have accepted this reasonable proposal, so we will treat you 
as though you did.” Cf. id. at 29-30.  Nor, finally, am I making any claim whatever to the effect that an arbitrator in 
all these cases will be expected to proceed in precisely the same way, regardless of whether he is asked  
 to devise a remedy for an alleged breach,  
 to make the “yes/no” decision of  
 excuse that justifies rescission as opposed to  
 plenary enforcement, or instead 
 to undertake to readjust the terms of a transaction in light of changed circumstances.   
The point being made is infinitely simpler:  It is just that the question under the applicable law of the “merits” of 
reformation, like the merits of excuse, is not at all the same thing as the question of arbitral authority.   
 Under German law, cf. Markesinis, supra n. 24 at 336 (doctrine of the “disturbance of the foundation of 
the transaction” in German law; in the case of a “very exceptional transformation of circumstances,“ courts are not 
limited to terminating the contractual relationship, “but will adjust it,” substituting new terms, at least if :”both 
parties wish to continue with the contractual relationship”); Dawson, supra at 2 (a “preferred” solution at least if 
the court-ordered revision will produce “an imitation ‘contract’ that the parties could perform and that would bear a  
recognizable resemblance to the transaction it replaced”). 
211
 See text accompanying n. 111 supra, and n. 210 supra.  If, as St. Paul writes in Corinthians, “all things are 
lawful,” “not all things are expedient.  All things are lawful, but not all things edify.” 
 I believe Professor Berger makes a similar point in Berger, supra n. 38 at 1353, 1380 (“international 
arbitrators are . . . extremely reticent when it comes to varying contracts without a specific contractual basis”; 
contract adaptation and renegotiation are essentially “consensual procedures” in which “legal arguments, 
positions and principles mostly fade into the background”; “these sorts of complex processes are not compatible 
with the one-sided imposition of an adjustment by a neutral third party”). 
Alan Scott Rau 
“Gap Filling” by Arbitrators 
May 9, 2014 




be organized at the outset around the notion of formally defined rights.  The canonical 
examples are those problems that he called “polycentric” (or “many-centered”): A bequest to 
two museums of paintings “in equal shares,” for example, or the assignment to a particular 
position of players on a football team, may lie outside the province of adjudication because any 
particular choice (the disposition of a single painting, the shift of any one player) will 
necessarily have implications and repercussions for all the others:  Here the task of the judge--
-or arbitrator---would require him to coordinate “mutually interacting variables”; “the only way to 
solve the problem is to take account of all the variables at once, in other words, to consider the 
situation as a whole.”212  The case then doesn’t call for a decision of “yes” or “no,” or even 
“more” or “less,” but the available solutions are “scattered in an irregular pattern across a 
checkerboard of possibilities.”213 
In such cases, Fuller suggests, an optimal solution can only be arrived at by vesting the 
decisionmaker, whoever he is, with the power of “managerial direction.”214 
Now: Such power is not inevitably and in all cases outside the realm of private ordering: 
At least I know of no policy---nothing other than a rigid and a priori insistence on what 
“arbitration” necessarily “is”---that would place it irrevocably beyond the pale.  With a small 
amount of research one can readily find cases where “arbitrators” have been entrusted with 
the open-ended task of exercising business judgment in the running of a collaborative 
venture.215 But here---and only here---we are so far from the modal adjudication in terms of 
                                                          
212
 See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy between Dispute Resolution 
and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1273, 1314 (1995). 
213
 See Lon Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, Proceedings, 15
th
 Annual Meeting, National Academy 
of Arbitrators 8 (1962). 
 Professor Eisenberg would add another category of cases in which adjudication might not be appropriate-
--cases where decisions cannot be reached through an application of authoritative standards, that is, where 
among multiple possible criteria for decision, “no criterion would be authoritative in the sense that it would trump 
other criteria, or even in the sense that it carried an objective weight in relation to others. One football coach may 
legitimately emphasize one kind of ability, a second another kind, and a third experience.”  Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process:  An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 Harv. L. 
Rev. 410, 424-25 (1978). This is a subtly different analysis from Fuller’s: Unlike selection of players on a football 
team, for example, choosing members of a college golf team “may involve multiple criteria but not polycentricity, 
because golf is played on an individual basis and selection of the team therefore entails little or no interaction 
between choices.” Id. 
214
 Fuller, supra n. 31 at 398 (“the manner in which managerial direction solves polycentric problems is 
exemplified by the baseball manager who assigns his players to their positions, decides when to take a pitcher 
out, when and whom to pinch-hit, when and how far to shift the infield and outfield for a particular batter, etc.”). 
215
 See, e.g., Ringling v. Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 49 A.2d 603, 605 (Del. Ch. 
1946), modified, 53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947): Here shareholders agreed to “consult and confer” with each other and 
to “act jointly” in exercising their voting rights, and that if they failed to agree, the disagreement would be 
submitted to arbitration “to the end of assuring... good management”; the court held the agreement enforceable. 
The rationale contains much rich irony and somehow manages to get things completely backward:  State law at 
the time did not provide for the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements, but the court conveniently 
concluded that this agreement “does not possess the characteristics which go to make up an arbitration 
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what is expected of parties by way of proof and reasoned argument,216 that a court will 
naturally require a certain level of specificity and explicit contractual direction before subjecting 
the parties to any arbitration regime.  And putative arbitrators will equally shrink from 
construing the agreement so as to give them that role.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Agreement” since the “so-called arbitrator is not called upon to resolve a conflict which would otherwise be 
decided by a court.”  
 See also Vogel v. Lewis, 268 N.Y.S.2d 237 (App. Div. 1966), aff'd, 224 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 1967):  Here an 
agreement between the two owners of a close corporation provided that “in the event of a dispute, or difference, 
arising between them in the course of their transaction with each other,” the dispute would be settled by 
arbitration; the court held that a dispute over whether the company should exercise an option to purchase the 
warehouse where the business was carried on, was arbitrable  The precise legal issue posed was somewhat 
different from what we have been discussing---it was whether the agreement violated the state Business 
Corporation Law requiring that a corporation “shall be managed by its Board of Directors “---but the court held that 
there was “no reason why arbitrators may not be useful in resolving issues which involve some business 
judgment so long as they are not required to assume a continuing burden of management.” And, inter alia, see 
Application of DeCaro, 25 N.Y.S.2d 849 (App. Div. 1941)(“the chief controversy submitted for arbitration related to 
the management of the business of a corporation”; the “arbitrators applied the only feasible remedy to a situation 
which, if continued, would  have ruined the business of the corporation, and acted well within their powers”).  
Some years ago, among various “hypotheticals “to “illustrate the use of arbitration to fill ‘gaps’ in long-
term international commercial transactions,” Howard Holtzmann posed the case of a joint venture agreement 
under which disagreements between the owners “on such matters as the amount to be spent for advertising, or 
the choice of the managing director, or whether [the company] should pay a dividend rather than keeping the 
money to finance its future growth,” was to be resolved by arbitration.  He concluded that at least in the US “the 
use of arbitration for this purpose is well recognized.”  Howard Holtzmann, Powers of Arbitrators Under United 
States Law to Fill “Gaps” Arising Under Long-Term Commercial Contracts, in Proceedings, supra n. 25 at CIVh1, 
CIVh10. 
216
  “An adjudicative board might well undertake to allocate one thousand tons of coal among three claimants; it 
could hardly conduct even the simplest coal-mining enterprise by the forms of adjudication.”  Fuller, supra n. 31 at 
371. 
